I. Revised Penal Code / Special Laws, Presidential Decrees, and Executive Orders A. Book 1 (Articles 1-99, RPC, excluding provisions on civil liability), including related Special Laws 1. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES Definition of Criminal Law
(1) Criminal law is that branch of municipal law which defines crimes, treats of their nature and provides for their punishment. (2) It is that branch of public substantive law which defines offenses and prescribes their penalties. It is substantive because it defines the state’s right to inflict punishment and the liability of the offenders.
It is public law because it deals with the relation of the individual with the state. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MALA IN SE AND MALA PROHIBITA Violations of the Revised Penal Code are referred to as malum in se, which literally means, that the act is inherently evil or bad or per se wrongful. On the other hand, violations of special laws are generally referred to as malum prohibitum. Note, however, that not all violations of special laws are mala prohibita.
While intentional felonies are always mala in se, it does not follow that prohibited acts done in violation of special laws are always mala prohibita. Even if the crime is punished under a special law, if the act punished is one which is inherently wrong, the same is malum in se, and, therefore, good faith and the lack of criminal intent is a valid defense; unless it is the product of criminal negligence or culpa. Likewise when the special laws
requires that the 1. As to moral trait of the offender In crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code, the moral trait of the offender is considered.
This is why liability would only arise when there is dolo or culpa in the commission of the punishable act. In crimes punished under special laws, the moral trait of the offender is not considered; it is enough that the prohibited act was voluntarily done. 2. As to use of good faith as defense In crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code, good faith or lack of criminal intent is a valid defense; unless the crime is the result of culpa In crimes punished under special laws, good faith is not a defense 3. As to degree of accomplishment of the punished act be committed knowingly and willfully, criminal intent is required to be proved before criminal liability may arise. When the act penalized is not inherently wrong, it is wrong only because a law punishes the same. For example, Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes piracy in Philippine waters and the special law punishing brigandage in the highways. These acts are inherently wrong and although they are punished under special law, the acts themselves are mala in se; thus, good faith or lack of criminal intent is a defense. Distinction between crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code and crimes punished under special laws crime In crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code, the degree of accomplishment of the crime is taken into account in punishing the offender; thus, there are attempted, frustrated, and consummated stages in the commission of the crime. In crimes punished under special laws, the act gives rise to a crime only when it is consummated; there are no attempted or frustrated stages, unless the special law expressly penalize the mere attempt or frustration of the crime. 4. As to mitigating and aggravating circumstances In crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code, mitigating and aggravating
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circumstances are taken into account in imposing the penalty since the moral trait of the offender is considered. In crimes punished under special laws, mitigating and aggravating circumstances are not taken into account in imposing the penalty. 5. As to degree of participation In crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code, when there is more than one offender, the degree of participation of
each in the commission of the crime is taken into account in imposing the penalty; thus, offenders are classified as principal, accomplice and accessory. In crimes punished under special laws, the degree of participation of the offenders is not considered. All who perpetrated the prohibited act are penalized to the same extent. There is no principal or accomplice or accessory to consider.
Mala in Se
Basis Moral state of the offender; hence, good faith or lack of criminal intent is a defense. Taken into account in imposing the penalty on the offender precisely because his moral trait is the basis of his crime. Hence, greater perversity deserves a higher penalty; whereas, lesser depravity deserves mitigation. Penalty is computed on the basis of whether the malefactor is a principal offender, or merely an accomplice or accessory. The penalty imposed depends on whether the crime is consummated, frustrated or attempted. Generally involve moral turpitude logically, so for its basis is the moral state of the offender. Generally, the Revised Penal Code.
Mala Prohibita
Voluntariness; hence, good faith or lack of criminal intent is not a defense, unless intent is an element of the crime such as in Sec. 3[e] of RA 3019. Not considered because the law intends to discourage the commission of the act specially prohibited.
Modifying circumstances
Degree of participation Stage of accomplishment
The penalty on the offenders is the same as they are all deemed principals. Violation of law is punished only when accomplished or consummated because intent is inherent in attempted or frustrated stage and intent is not relevant in crimes mala prohibita. Not involved because the act would not have been wrong if not for the prohibition of law. Generally, special penal laws.
Moral turpitude Law violated
SCOPE OF APPLICATION
Art. 2. Application of its provisions. — Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who: 1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship; 2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands; 3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the
obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding number; 4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or 5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code. The provision in Article 2 embraces two scopes of applications: (1) Intraterritorial – refers to the application of the Revised Penal Code within the Philippine territory;
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(2) Extraterritorial – refers to the application of the Revised Penal Code outside the Philippine territory. Intraterritorial application In the intraterritorial application of the Revised Penal Code, Article 2 makes it clear that it does not refer only to Philippine archipelago but it also includes the atmosphere, interior waters and maritime zone. So whenever you use the word territory, do not limit this to land area only. As far as jurisdiction or application of the Revised Penal Code over crimes committed on maritime zones or interior waters, the Archipelagic Rule shall be observed. So the three-mile limit on our shoreline has been modified by the rule. Any crime committed in interior waters comprising the Philippine archipelago shall be subject to our laws although committed on board a foreign merchant vessel. A vessel is considered a Philippine ship only when it is registered in accordance with Philippine laws. Under international law, as long as such vessel is not within the territorial waters of a foreign country, Philippine laws shall govern.
Extraterritorial application Extraterritorial application of the Revised Penal Code on crime committed on board Philippine ship or airship refers only to a situation where the Philippine ship or airship is not within the territorial waters or atmosphere of a foreign country. Otherwise, it is the foreign country’s criminal law that will apply. However, there are two situations where the foreign country may not apply its criminal law even if a crime was committed on board a vessel within its territorial waters and these are: (1) When the crime is committed in a war vessel of a foreign country, because war vessels are part of the sovereignty of the country to whose naval force they belong; (3) When the foreign country in whose territorial waters the crime was committed adopts the French Rule, which applies only to merchant vessels, except when the crime committed affects the national security or public order of such foreign country.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PHILIPPINE CRIMINAL LAW 1. Generality 2. Territoriality 3. Prospectivity Generality (1) Penal laws and those of
public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations (Art. 14, NCC). (2) The law is binding upon all persons who reside or sojourn in the Philippines, irrespective of age, sex, color, creed, or personal circumstances. (3) Generality of criminal law means that the criminal law of the country governs all persons within the country regardless of their race, belief, sex, or creed. However, it is subject to certain exceptions brought about by international agreement. Ambassadors, chiefs of states and other diplomatic officials are immune from the application of penal laws when they are in the country where they are assigned. Note that consuls are not diplomatic officers. This includes consul-general, vice-consul or any consul in a foreign country, who are therefore, not immune to the operation or application of the penal law of the country where they are assigned. Consuls are subject to the penal laws of the country where they are assigned. (4) It has no reference to territory. Whenever you are asked to explain this, it does not include territory. It refers to persons that may be governed by the penal law (Dean Ortega). Territoriality (1) The law is applicable to all crimes committed within the limits of Philippine territory, which includes its atmosphere, interior waters and maritime zone (Art. 2). (2) Territoriality means that the penal laws of the country have force and effect only within its territory. It cannot penalize crimes committed outside the same. This is subject to certain exceptions brought about by international agreements and
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practice. The territory of the country is not limited to the land where its sovereignty resides but includes also its maritime and interior waters as
well as its atmosphere. (3) Terrestrial jurisdiction is the jurisdiction exercised over land. Fluvial jurisdiction is the jurisdiction exercised over maritime and interior waters. Aerial jurisdiction is the jurisdiction exercised over the atmosphere. The Archipelagic Rule (1) All bodies of water comprising the maritime zone and interior waters abounding different islands comprising the Philippine Archipelago are part of the Philippine territory regardless of their breadth, depth, width or dimension. (2) On the fluvial jurisdiction there is presently a departure from the accepted International Law Rule, because the Philippines adopted the Archipelagic Rule. In the International Law Rule, when a strait within a country has a width of more than 6 miles, the center lane in excess of the 3 miles on both sides is considered international waters. Three international law theories on aerial jurisdiction (1) The atmosphere over the country is free and not subject to the jurisdiction of the subjacent state, except for the protection of its national security and public order. Under this theory, if a crime is committed on board a foreign aircraft at the atmosphere of a country, the law of that country does not govern unless the crime affects the national security. (2) Relative Theory – The subjacent state exercises jurisdiction over its atmosphere only to the extent that it can effectively exercise control thereof. The Relative Theory Under this theory, if a crime was committed on an aircraft which is already beyond the control of the subjacent state, the criminal law of that state will not govern anymore. But if the crime is committed in an aircraft within the atmosphere over a subjacent state which exercises control, then its criminal law will govern. (3) Absolute Theory – The subjacent state has complete jurisdiction over the atmosphere
above it subject only to innocent passage by aircraft of foreign country. Under this theory, if the crime is committed in an aircraft, no matter how high, as long as it can establish that it is within the Philippine atmosphere, Philippine criminal law will govern. This is the theory adopted by the Philippines. Exceptions to the application of the Code: (1) The Philippine ship or airship must be duly registered under the Philippine laws. Such vessel when beyond the maritime zone is considered as extension of Philippine national territory. But if said Philippine vessel or aircraft
within the territory of a foreign country when the crime is committed, the laws of that country will apply as a rule. (2) The reason for the exception in pars. 2 and 3 is to preserve the financial credit and stability of the state. (3) The offense committed by a public officer abroad, like the disbursing official of a Philippine Embassy, must refer to the discharge of his functions, like bribery or malversation. This exception does not apply to public officers of the Philippine government who enjoy diplomatic immunity because in such a case the principles of public international law will govern. (4) The reason for the exception regarding crimes against national security and the law of the nations is to safeguard the existence of the state. Piracy is triable anywhere. Piracy and mutiny are crimes against the law of nations, while treason and espionage are crimes against the national security of the state. Prospectivity / irretrospectivity (1) No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted (Sec. 22, Art. III, Constitution). (2) Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same (Art. 22, RPC).
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(3) No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission (Art. 21, RPC). (4) Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided (Art. 4, NCC). (5) Doctrinal application of the prospectivity rule: (a) The prospectivity rule applies to administrative rulings and circulars, and to judicial decisions which though not laws, are evidence of what the laws mean. Thus under Art. 8, NCC, judicial decisions applying the laws or the Constitution form part of the legal system. Legis
interpretation legis uim obtinet. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society. (b) Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is that a law usually derides rights which may have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract, hence, constitutional. Prior to the statute’s nullification it must have been in force and had to be complied with (doctrine of operative fact). It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice if there be no recognition of what transpired prior to such adjudication (Co vs. CA, GR 100776, 10/28/93). Acts or omissions will only be subject to a penal law if they are committed after a penal law had already taken effect. Vice-versa, this act or omission which has been committed before the effectivity of a penal law could not be penalized by such penal law because penal laws operate only prospectively. In some textbooks, an exemption is said to exist when the penal law is favorable to the offender, in which case it would have retroactive application; provided that the offender is not a habitual delinquent and there is no provision in the law against its retroactive application. The exception where a penal law may be given retroactive application is true only with a repealing law. If it is an original penal law, that exception can never operate. What is contemplated by the exception is that there is an original law and there
is a repealing law repealing the original law. It is the repealing law that may be given retroactive application to those who violated the original law, if the repealing penal law is more favorable to the offender who violated the original law. If there is only one penal law, it can never be given retroactive effect. Rule of prospectivity also applies to administrative rulings and circulars. In Co v. CA, decided on October 28, 1993, it was held that the principle of prospectivity of statutes also applies to administrative rulings and circulars. In this case, Circular No. 4 of the Ministry of Justice, dated December 15, 1981, provides that ―where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation of BP22.‖ Subsequently, the administrative
interpretation of was reversed in Circular No. 12, issued on August 8, 1984, such that the claim that the check was issued as a guarantee or part of an arrangement to secure an obligation or to facilitate collection, is no longer a valid defense for the prosecution of BP22. Hence, it was ruled in Que v. People that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is, nevertheless, covered by BP 22. But consistent with the principle of prospectivity, the new doctrine should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. No retrospective effect. Consequences if repeal of penal law is total or absolute (1) If a case is pending in court involving the violation of the repealed law, the same shall be dismissed, even though the accused may be a habitual delinquent. This is so because all persons accused of a crime are presumed innocent until they are convicted by final judgment. Therefore, the accused shall be acquitted. (2) If a case is already decided and the accused is already serving sentence by final judgment, if the convict is not a habitual delinquent, then he will be entitled to a release unless there is a reservation clause in the penal law that it will not apply to those serving sentence at the time of the repeal. But if there is no reservation, those who are not habitual delinquents even if they are already serving their sentence will receive the benefit of the
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repealing law. They are entitled to release. This does not mean that if they are not released, they are free to escape. If they escape, they commit the crime of evasion of sentence, even if there is no more legal basis to hold them in the penitentiary. This is so because prisoners are accountabilities of the government; they are not supposed to step out simply because their sentence has already been, or that the law under which they are sentenced
has been declared null and void. If they are not discharged from confinement, a petition for habeas corpus should be filed to test the legality of their continued confinement in jail. Consequences if repeal of penal law is partial or relative (1) If a case is pending in court involving the violation of the repealed law, and the repealing law is more favorable to the accused, it shall be the one applied to him. So whether he is a habitual delinquent or not, if the case is still pending in court, the repealing law will be the one to apply unless there is a saving clause in the repealing law that it shall not apply to pending causes of action. (2) If a case is already decided and the accused is already serving sentence by final judgment, even if the repealing law is partial or relative, the crime still remains to be a crime. Those who are not habitual delinquents will benefit on the effect of that repeal, so that if the repeal is more lenient to them, it will be the repealing law that will henceforth apply to them.
For example, under the original law, the penalty is six years. Under the repealing law, it is four years. Those convicted under the original law will be subjected to the four-year penalty. This retroactive application will not be possible if there is a saving clause that provides that it should not be given retroactive effect. Under Article 22, even if the offender is already convicted and serving sentence, a law which is beneficial shall be applied to him unless he is a habitual delinquent in accordance with Rule 5 of Article 62. Consequences if repeal of penal law is express or implied (1) If a penal law is impliedly repealed, the subsequent repeal of the repealing law will revive the original law. So the act or omission which was punished as a crime under the original law will be revived and the same shall again be crimes although during the implied repeal they may not be punishable. (2) If the repeal is express, the repeal of the repealing law will not revive the first law, so the act or omission will no longer be penalized. These effects of repeal do not apply to selfrepealing laws or those which have automatic termination. An example is the Rent Control Law which is revived by Congress every two years. When there is a repeal, the repealing law expresses the legislative intention to do away with such law, and, therefore, implies a condonation of the punishment. Such legislative intention does not exist in a selfterminating law because there was no
repeal at all.
Constitutional limitations on the power of Congress to enact penal laws in the Bill of Rights Equal protection No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws (Sec. 1, Art. III). (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been
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duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable (Sec. 14, Art. III). (3) No person or class of persons shall be deprived to the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances (Tolentino vs. Board of Accountancy). For classification to be reasonable, it must: (a) Rest on substantial distinctions; (b) Germane to the purpose of the law; (c) Not limited to existing conditions only; (d) Apply equally to all members of the same class. Due process The law must observe both substantive and procedural due process (Sec. 1, Art. III). No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law (Sec. 14[1], Art. III). To satisfy due process, official actions must be responsive to the supremacy of
reasons and the dictates of justice (Relucio III vs. Macaraeg, Jr., 73 SCRA 635). It is satisfied if the following conditions are present: (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired by it over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of proceedings; (3) The defendant must be given an opportunity to he heard; (4) Judgment must be rendered lawful hearing (Banco Español de Filipinas vs. Palanes, 37 Phil. 921). In criminal proceedings, due process requires that the accused be informed why he is being proceeded against and what charge he has to meet, with his conviction being made to rest on evidence that is not tainted with falsity after full opportunity for him to rebut it and the sentence being imposed in accordance with a valid law. It is assumed, therefore, that the court that renders the decision is one of competent jurisdiction (Ang Tibay vs. CA, 69 Phil. 635). Non-imposition of cruel and unusual punishment or excessive fines- Act Prohibiting the Imposition
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua (Sec. 19, Art. III). (2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law. (3) The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, RA 8177 (Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection) is hereby repealed. RA 7659 (Death Penalty Law) and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly (Sec. 1, RA 9346). Bill of attainder (1) No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted (Sec. 22, Art. III, Constitution). (2) A bill of attainder applies only to statutes and a statute becomes a bill of attainder when it applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group inflicting punishment on them amounting to a deprivation of any right, civil or political, without judicial trial. Stated otherwise, the singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative
intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder (Montegro vs. Castañeda, 91 Phil. 882). (3) A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial; the essence of which is the substantial legislative fiat for a judicial determination of guilt.
Ex post facto law
(1) Penalties that may be imposed. — No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission (Art. 21, RPC). (2) Characteristics of ex post facto law: (a) Refers to criminal matters; (b) Prejudicial to the accused; (c) Retroactive in application. (3) A law to be called ex post facto must refer to penal matters, retroactive in application and prejudicial to the accused. (4) Ex post facto law is one which:
of Death Penalty in the Philippines (R.A. 9346)
(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor
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(a) Provides for the infliction of punishment upon a person for an act done which, when it was committed, was innocent; (b) Aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; (c) Changes the punishment or inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; (d) Changes the rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony then was required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender;
(e) Assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or the disposition of a right which when done was lawful; (f)
Deprives the person s accused of crime of some lawful protection to which they have become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or of the proclamation of amnesty; (g) In relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage.
2. FELONIES
Art. 3. Definitions. — Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos). Felonies are committed not only be means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill. CLASSIFICATIONS OF FELONIES (1) According to the manner of their commission Under Article 3, they are classified as, intentional felonies or those committed with deliberate intent; and culpable felonies or those resulting from negligence, reckless imprudence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. (2) According to the stages of their execution Under Article 6., felonies are classified as attempted felony when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance; frustrated felony when the offender commences the commission of a felony as a consequence but which would produce the felony as a consequence but which nevertheless do not produce the felony by reason of causes independent of the perpetrator; and, consummated felony when all the elements necessary for its execution are present. (3) According to their gravity Under Article 9, felonies are classified as grave felonies or those to which attaches the capital punishment or penalties which in any of their periods are afflictive; less grave felonies or those to which the law punishes with penalties which in their maximum period was correccional; and light felonies or those infractions of law for the commission of which the penalty is arresto menor. It is necessary to determine whether the crime is grave, less grave or light to determine whether these felonies can be complexed or not, and to determine the prescription of the crime and the prescription of the penalty. In other words, these are felonies classified according to their gravity, stages and the penalty attached to them. Take note that when the Revised Penal Code speaks of grave and less grave
felonies, the definition makes a reference specifically to Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code. Do not omit the phrase ―In accordance with Article 25‖ because there is also a classification of penalties under Article 26 that was not applied. If the penalty is fine and exactly P200.00, it is only considered a light felony under Article 9. If the fine is imposed as an alternative penalty or as a single penalty, the fine of P200.00 is considered a correctional penalty under Article 26. If the penalty is exactly P200.00, apply Article 26. It is considered as correctional penalty and it prescribes in 10 years. If the offender is apprehended at any time within ten years, he can be made to suffer the fine. This classification of felony according to gravity is
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important with respect prescription of crimes.
to
the
question
of
In the case of light felonies, crimes prescribe in two months. After two months, the state loses the right to prosecute unless the running period is suspended. If the offender escapes while in ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
detention after he has been loose,, if there was already judgment that was
passed, it can be promulgated even if absent under the New Rules on Criminal Procedure. If the crime is correctional, it prescribes in ten years, except arresto mayor, which prescribes in five years.
Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred: 1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. 2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. (1) The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine, el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado (He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused). (2) Elements: (a) A felony is committed; (b) The wrong done must be the direct, natural and logical consequence of felony committed even though different from that intended. Article 4, paragraph 1 presupposes that the act done is the proximate cause of the resulting felony. It must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the felonious act. Proximate cause is that cause which sets into motion other causes and which unbroken by any efficient supervening cause produces a felony without which such felony could not have resulted. He who is the cause of the cause is the evil of the cause. As a general rule, the offender is criminally liable for all the consequences of his felonious act, although not intended, if the felonious act is the proximate cause of the felony or resulting felony. A proximate cause is not necessarily the immediate cause. This may be a cause which is far and remote from the consequence which sets into motion other causes which resulted in the felony. Wrongful act done be different from what was intended What makes the first paragraph of Article 4 confusing is the qualification ―although the wrongful act done be different from what was
intended‖. There are three situations contemplated under paragraph 1 of Article 4: (1) Aberratio ictus or mistake in the blow; (2) Error in personae or mistake in identity; and (3) Praeter intentionem or where the consequence exceeded the intention. Aberration ictus (1) In aberratio ictus, a person directed the blow at an intended victim, but because of poor aim, that blow landed on somebody else. In aberratio ictus, the intended victim as well as
the actual victim are both at the scene of the crime. (2) Distinguish this from error in personae, where the victim actually received the blow, but he was mistaken for another who was not at the scene of the crime. The distinction is important because the legal effects are not the same. (3) In aberratio ictus, the offender delivers the blow upon the intended victim, but because of poor aim the blow landed on somebody else. You have a complex crime, unless the resulting consequence is not a grave or less grave felony. You have a single act as against the intended victim and also giving rise to another felony as against the actual victim. To be more specific, let us take for example A and B. A and B are enemies. As soon as A saw B at a distance, A shot at B. However, because of poor aim, it was not B who was hit but C. You can readily see that there is only one single act – the act of firing at B. In so far as B is concerned, the crime at least is attempted homicide or attempted murder, as the case may be, if there is any qualifying circumstance. As far as the third party C is concerned, if C were killed, crime is homicide. If C was only wounded, the crime is only physical injuries. You cannot have attempted or frustrated homicide or murder as far as C is concerned, because as far as C is
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concern, there is no intent to kill. As far as that other victim is concerned, only physical injuries – serious or less serious or slight. (4) If the resulting physical injuries were only slight, then you cannot complex; you will have one prosecution for the attempted homicide or murder, and another prosecution for slight physical injuries for the innocent party. But if the innocent party was seriously injured or less seriously injured, then you have another grave or less grave felony resulting from the same act which gave rise to attempted homicide or murder against B; hence, a complex
crime. (5) In other words, aberratio ictus, generally gives rise to a complex crime. This being so, the penalty for the more serious crime is imposed in the maximum period. This is the legal effect. The only time when a complex crime may not result in aberratio ictus is when one of the resulting felonies is a light felony. Error in personae (1) In error in personae, the intended victim was not at the scene of the crime. It was the actual victim upon whom the blow was directed, but he was not really the intended victim. There was really a mistake in identity. (2) This is very important because Article 49 applies only in a case of error in personae and not in a case of abberatio ictus. (3) In Article 49, when the crime intended is more serious than the crime actually committed or vice-versa, whichever crime carries the lesser penalty, that penalty will be the one imposed. But it will be imposed in the maximum period. For instance, the offender intended to commit homicide, but what was actually committed with parricide because the person he killed by mistake was somebody related to him within the degree of relationship in parricide. In such a case, the offender will be charged with parricide, but the penalty that would be imposed will be that of homicide. This is IMPOSSIBLE CRIME (1) An impossible crime is an act which would be an offense against person or property
because under Article 49, the penalty for the lesser crime will be the one imposed, whatever crime the offender is prosecuted under. In any event, the offender is prosecuted for the crime committed not for the crime intended.
Praeter intentionem
(1) In People v. Gacogo, 53 Phil 524, two persons quarreled. They had fist blows. The other started to run away and Gacogo went after him, struck him with a fist blow at the back of the head. Because the victim was running, he lost balance, he fell on the pavement and his head struck the cement pavement. He suffered cerebral hemorrhage. Although Gacogo claimed that he had no intention of killing the victim, his claim is useless. Intent to kill is only relevant when the victim did not die. This is so because the purpose of intent to kill is to differentiate the crime of physical injuries from the crime of attempted homicide or attempted murder or frustrated homicide or frustrated murder. But once the victim is dead, you do not talk of intent
to kill anymore. The best evidence of intent to kill is the fact that victim was killed. Although Gacogo was convicted for homicide for the death of the person, he was given the benefit of paragraph 3 of Article13, that is, ” that the offender did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as that committed‖. (2) This is the consequence of praeter intentionem. In short, praeter intentionem is mitigating, particularly covered by paragraph 3 of Article 13. In order however, that the situation may qualify as praeter intentionem, there must be a notable disparity between the means employed and the resulting felony. If there is no disparity between the means employed by the offender and the resulting felony, this circumstance cannot be availed of. It cannot be a case of praeter intentionem because the intention of a person is determined from the means resorted to by him in committing the crime.
were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the
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employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. (2) Accused was a houseboy in a house where only a spinster resides. It is customary for the spinster to sleep nude because her room was warm. It was also the habit of the houseboy that whenever she enters her room, the houseboy would follow and peek into the keyhole. Finally, when the houseboy could no longer resist the urge, he climbed into the ceiling, went inside the room of his master, placed himself on top of her and abused her, not knowing that she was already dead five minutes earlier. Is an impossible crime committed? Yes. Before, the act performed by the offender could not have been a crime against person or property. The act performed would have been constituted a crime against
chastity. An impossible crime is true only if the act done by the offender constitutes a crime against person or property. However, with the new rape law amending the Revised Penal Code and classifying rape as a crime against persons, it is now possible that an impossible crime was committed. Note, however, that the crime might also fall under the Revised Administrative Code – desecrating the dead. (3) A was driving his car around Roxas Boulevard when a person hitched a ride. Because this person was exquisitely dressed, A readily welcomed the fellow inside his car and he continued driving. When he reached a motel, A suddenly swerved his car inside. A started kissing his passenger, but he found out that his passenger was not a woman but a man, and so he pushed him out of the car, and gave him fist blows. Is an impossible crime committed? If not, is there any crime committed at all? STAGES OF EXECUTION
It cannot be an impossible crime, because the act would have been a crime against chastity. The crime is physical injuries or acts of lasciviousness, if this was done against the will of the passenger. There are two ways of committing acts of lasciviousness. Under Article 336, where the acts of lasciviousness were committed under circumstances of rape, meaning to say, there is employment of violence or intimidation or the victim is deprived of reason. Even if the victim is a man, the crime of acts of lasciviousness is committed. This is a crime that is not limited to a victim who is a woman. Acts of lasciviousness require a victim to be a woman only when it is committed under circumstances of seduction. If it is committed under the circumstances of rape, the victim may be a man or a woman. The essence of an impossible crime is the inherent impossibility of accomplishing the crime or the inherent impossibility of the means employed to bring about the crime. When we say inherent impossibility, this means that under any and all circumstances, the crime could not have materialized. If the crime could have materialized under a different set of facts, employing the same mean or the same act, it is not an impossible crime; it would be an attempted felony. (4) Under Article 4, paragraph 2, impossible crime is true only when the crime committed would have been against person or against property. It is, therefore, important to know what are the crimes under Title VIII, against persons and those against property under Title X. An impossible
crime is true only to any of those crimes.
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. — Consummated felonies as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable. A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
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perpetrator. There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly or over acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than this own spontaneous desistance. Art. 7. When light felonies are punishable. — Light felonies are punishable only when they have been consummated, with the exception of those committed against person or property. The classification of stages of a felony in Article 6 are true only to crimes under the Revised Penal Code. This does not apply to crimes punished under special laws. But even certain crimes which are punished under the Revised Penal Code do not admit of these stages. The purpose of classifying penalties is to bring about a proportionate penalty and equitable punishment. The penalties are graduated according to their degree of severity. The stages may not apply to all kinds of felonies. There are felonies which do not admit of division. Formal crimes Formal crimes are crimes which are consummated in one instance. For example, in oral
defamation, there is no attempted oral defamation or frustrated oral defamation; it is always in the consummated stage. So also, in illegal exaction under Article 213 is a crime committed when a public officer who is authorized to collect taxes, licenses or impose for the government, shall demand an amount bigger than or different from what the law authorizes him to collect. Under sub-paragraph a of Article 213 on Illegal exaction, the law uses the word ―demanding‖. Mere demanding of an amount different from what the law authorizes him to collect will already consummate a crime, whether the taxpayer pays the amount being demanded or not. Payment of the amount being demanded is not essential to the consummation of the crime. The difference between the attempted stage and the frustrated stage lies on whether the offender has performed all the acts of execution for the accomplishment of a felony. Literally, under the
article, if the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence but the felony was not realized, then the crime is already in the frustrated stage. If the offender has not yet performed all the acts of execution – there is yet something to be performed – but he was not able to perform all the acts of execution due to some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, then you have an attempted felony. You will notice that the felony begins when the offender performs an overt act. Not any act will mark the beginning of a felony, and therefore, if the act so far being done does not begin a felony, criminal liability correspondingly does not begin. In criminal law, there is such a thing as preparatory act. These acts do not give rise to criminal liability. An overt act is that act which if allowed to continue in its natural course would definitely result into a felony. In the attempted stage, the definition uses the word ―directly‖. This is significant. In the attempted stage, the acts so far performed may already be a crime or it may be just an ingredient of another crime. The word “directly’” emphasizes the requirement that the attempted felony is that which is directly linked to the overt act performed by the offender, not the felony he has in his mind. In criminal law, you are not allowed to speculate, not to imagine what crime is intended, but apply the provisions of the law of the facts given. When a person starts entering the dwelling of another, that act is already
trespassing. But the act of entering is an ingredient of robbery with force upon things. You could only hold him liable for attempted robbery when he has already completed all acts performed by him directly leading to robbery. The act of entering alone is not yet indicative of robbery although that may be what he may have planned to commit. In law, the attempted stage is only that overt act which is directly linked to the felony intended to be committed. In US v. Namaja, the accused was arrested while he was detaching some of the wood panels of a store. He was already able to detach two wood panels. To a layman, the only conclusion that will come to your mind is that this fellow started to enter the store to steal something. He would not be there just to sleep there. But in criminal law, since the act of removing the panel indicates only at most the
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intention to enter. He can only be prosecuted for trespass. The removal of the panelling is just an attempt to trespass, not an attempt to rob. Although, Namaja was prosecuted for attempted robbery, the Supreme Court held it is only attempted trespass because that is the crime that can be directly linked to his act of removing the wood panel. There are some acts which are ingredients of a certain crime, but which are, by themselves, already criminal offenses. In abduction, your desire may lead to acts of lasciviousness. In so far the woman being carried is concerned, she may already be the victim of lascivious acts. The crime is not attempted abduction but acts of lasciviousness. You only hold him liable for an attempt, so far as could be reasonably linked to the overt act done by him. Do not go far and imagine what you should do. Desistance Desistance on the part of the offender negates criminal liability in the attempted stage. Desistance is true only in the attempted stage of the felony. If under the
definition of the felony, the act done is already in the frustrated stage, no amount of desistance will negate criminal liability. The spontaneous desistance of the offender negates only the attempted stage but not necessarily all criminal liability. Even though there was desistance on the part of the offender, if the desistance was made when acts done by him already resulted to a felony, that offender will still be criminally liable for the felony brought about his act. What is negated is only the attempted stage, but there may be other felony constituting his act. Illustrations: A fired at B and B was hit on the shoulder. But B’s wound was not mortal. What A then did was to approach B, and told B, ―Now you are dead, I will kill you.‖ But A took pity and kept the revolver and left. The crime committed is attempted homicide and not physical injuries, because there was an intention to kill. The desistance was with the second shot and would not affect the first shot because the first shot had already hit B. The second attempt has nothing to do with the first. In another instance, A has a very seductive neighbor in the person of B. A had always been looking at B and had wanted to possess her but
their status were not the same. One evening, after A saw B at her house and thought that B was already asleep, he entered the house of B through the window to abuse her. He, however, found out that B was nude, so he lost interest and left. Can a be accused of attempted rape? No, because there was desistance, which prevented the crime from being consummated. The attempted stage was erased because the offender desisted after having commenced the commission of the felony. The attempted felony is erased by desistance because the offender spontaneously desisted from pursuing the acts of execution. It does not mean, however, that there is no more felony committed. He may be liable for a consummated felony constituted by his act of trespassing. When A entered the house through the window, which is not intended for entrance, it is always presumed to be against the will of the owner. If the offender proceeded to abuse the woman, but the latter screamed, and A went out of the window again, he could not be prosecuted for qualified trespass. Dwelling is taken as an aggravating circumstance so he will be prosecuted for attempted rape aggravated by dwelling. In deciding whether a felony is attempted or frustrated or consummated, there are three
criteria involved: (1) The manner of committing the crime; (2) The elements of the crime; and (3) The nature of the crime itself. Manner of committing a crime For example, let us take the crime of bribery. Can the crime of frustrated bribery be committed? No. (Incidentally, the common concept of bribery is that it is the act of one who corrupts a public officer. Actually, bribery is the crime of the receiver not the giver. The crime of the giver is corruption of public official. Bribery is the crime of the public officer who in consideration of an act having to do with his official duties would receive something, or accept any promise or present in consideration thereof.) The confusion arises from the fact that this crime requires two to commit — the giver and the receiver. The law called the crime of the giver as corruption of public official and the receiver as bribery. Giving the idea that these are independent crimes, but actually, they cannot arise without the other. Hence, if only one side of the crime is present, only corruption, you cannot
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have a consummated corruption without the corresponding consummated bribery. There cannot be a consummated bribery without the corresponding consummated corruption. If you have bribery only, it is only possible in the attempted stage. If you have a corruption only, it is possible only in the attempted stage. A corruptor gives money to a public officer for the latter not to prosecute him. The public officer received the money but just the same, arrested him. He received the money to have evidence of corruption. Do not think that because the corruptor has already delivered the money, he has already performed all the acts of execution, and, therefore, the corruption is already beyond the attempted stage. That thinking does away with the concept of the crime that it requires two to commit. The manner of
committing the crime requires the meeting of the minds between the giver and the receiver. When the giver delivers the money to the supposed receiver, but there is no meeting of the minds, the only act done by the giver is an attempt. It is not possible for him to perform all the acts of execution because in the first place, the receiver has no intention of being corrupted. Similarly, when a public officer demands a consideration by official duty, the corruptor turns down the demand, there is no bribery. If the one to whom the demand was made pretended to give, but he had reported the matter to higher authorities, the money was marked and this was delivered to the public officer. If the public officer was arrested, do not think that because the public officer already had the money in his possession, the crime is already frustrated bribery, it is only attempted bribery. This is because the supposed corruptor has no intention to corrupt. In short, there is no meeting of the minds. On the other hand, if there is a meeting of the minds, there is consummated bribery or consummated corruption. This leaves out the frustrated stage because of the manner of committing the crime. But indirect bribery is always consummated. This is because the manner of consummating the crime does not admit of attempt or frustration. You will notice that under the Revised Penal Code, when it takes two to commit the crime, there could hardly be a frustrated stage. For instance, the crime of adultery. There is no frustrated adultery. Only attempted or consummated. This is because it requires the link of two participants. If that link is there, the
crime is consummated; if such link is absent, there is only an attempted adultery. There is no middle ground when the link is there and when the link is absent. There are instances where an intended felony could already result from the acts of execution already done. Because of this, there are felonies where the offender can only be determined to have performed all the acts of execution when the resulting felony is already accomplished. Without the resulting felony, there is no way of determining whether the offender has already performed all the acts or not. It is in such felonies that the frustrated stage does not exist because without the felony being accomplished, there is no way of stating that the offender has already performed all the acts of execution. An example of this is the crime of
rape. The essence of the crime is carnal knowledge. No matter what the offender may do to accomplish a penetration, if there was no penetration yet, it cannot be said that the offender has performed all the acts of execution. We can only say that the offender in rape has performed all the acts of execution when he has effected a penetration. Once there is penetration already, no matter how slight, the offense is consummated. For this reason, rape admits only of the attempted and consummated stages, no frustrated stage. This was the ruling in the case of People v. Orita. In rape, it requires the connection of the offender and the offended party. No penetration at all, there is only an attempted stage. Slightest penetration or slightest connection, consummated. You will notice this from the nature of the crime requiring two participants. This is also true in the crime of arson. It does not admit of the frustrated stage. In arson, the moment any particle of the premises intended to be burned is blackened, that is already an indication that the premises have begun to burn. It does not require that the entire premises be burned to consummate arson. Because of that, the frustrated stage of arson has been eased out. The reasoning is that one cannot say that the offender, in the crime of arson, has already performed all the acts of execution which could produce the destruction of the premises through the use of fire, unless a part of the premises has begun to burn. If it has not begun to burn, that means that the offender has not yet performed all the acts of execution. On the other hand, the moment it begins to burn, the crime is consummated. Actually, the frustrated stage is
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already standing on the consummated stage except that the outcome did not result. As far as the stage is concerned, the frustrated stage overlaps the consummated stage. Because of this reasoning by the Court of Appeals in
People v. Garcia, the Supreme Court followed the analysis that one cannot say that the offender in the crime of arson has already performed all the acts of execution which would produce the arson as a consequence, unless and until a part of the premises had begun to burn. In US v. Valdez, the offender had tried to burn the premises by gathering jute sacks laying these inside the room. He lighted these, and as soon as the jute sacks began to burn, he ran away. The occupants of the room put out the fire. The court held that what was committed was frustrated arson. This case was much the way before the decision in the case of People v. Garcia was handed down and the Court of Appeals ruled that there is no frustrated arson. But even then, the analysis in the case of US v. Valdez is correct. This is because, in determining whether the felony is attempted, frustrated or consummated, the court does not only consider the definition under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, or the stages of execution of the felony. When the offender has already passed the subjective stage of the felony, it is beyond the attempted stage. It is already on the consummated or frustrated stage depending on whether a felony resulted. If the felony did not result, frustrated. The attempted stage is said to be within the subjective phase of execution of a felony. On the subjective phase, it is that point in time when the offender begins the commission of an overt act until that point where he loses control of the commission of the crime already. If he has reached that point where he can no longer control the ensuing consequence, the crime has already passed the subjective phase and, therefore, it is no longer attempted. The moment the execution of the crime has already gone to that point where the felony should follow as a consequence, it is either already frustrated or consummated. If the felony does not follow as a consequence, it is already frustrated. If the felony follows as a consequence, it is consummated. The trouble is that, in the jurisprudence recognizing the objective phase and the subjective phase, the Supreme Court considered
not only the acts of the offender, but also his belief. That although the offender may not have done the act to bring about the felony as a consequence, if he could have continued committing those acts but he himself did not proceed because he believed that he had done enough to consummate
the crime, Supreme Court said the subjective phase has passed. This was applied in the case of US v. Valdez, where the offender, having already put kerosene on the jute sacks, lighted the same, he had no reason not to believe that the fire would spread, so he ran away. That act demonstrated that in his mind, he believed that he has performed all the acts of execution and that it is only a matter of time that the premises will burn. The fact that the occupant of the other room came out and put out the fire is a cause independent of the will of the perpetrator. The ruling in the case of US v. Valdez is still correct. But in the case of People v. Garcia, the situation is different. Here, the offender who put the torch over the house of the offended party, the house being a nipa hut, the torch which was lighted could easily burn the roof of the nipa hut. But the torch burned out. In that case, you cannot say that the offender believed that he had performed all the acts of execution. There was not even a single burn of any instrument or agency of the crime. The analysis made by the Court of Appeals is still correct: that they could not demonstrate a situation where the offender has performed all the acts of execution to bring about the crime of arson and the situation where he has not yet performed all the acts of execution. The weight of the authority is that the crime of arson cannot be committed in the frustrated stage. The reason is because we can hardly determine whether the offender has performed all the acts of execution that would result in arson, as a consequence, unless a part of the premises has started to burn. On the other hand, the moment a particle or a molecule of the premises has blackened, in law, arson is consummated. This is because consummated arson does not require that the whole of the premises be burned. It is enough that any part of the premises, no matter how small, has begun to burn. There are also certain crimes that do not admit of the attempted or frustrated stage, like physical injuries. One of the known commentators in criminal law has advanced the view that the crime of physical injuries can be committed in the attempted as well as the frustrated stage.
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He explained that by going through the definition of an attempted and a frustrated felony under Article 6, if a person who was about to give a fist blow to another raises his arms, but before he could throw the blow, somebody holds that arm, there would be attempted physical injuries. The reason for this is because the offender was not able to perform all the acts of execution to bring about physical injuries. On the other hand, he also stated that the crime of physical injuries may be committed in the frustrated stage when the offender was able to throw the blow but somehow, the offended party was able to sidestep away from the blow. He reasoned out that the crime would be frustrated because the offender was able to perform all the acts of execution which would bring about the felony were it not for a cause independent of the will of the perpetrator. The explanation is academic. You will notice that under the Revised Penal Code, the crime of physical injuries is penalized on the basis of the gravity of the injuries. Actually, there is no simple crime of physical injuries. You have to categorize because there are specific articles that apply whether the physical injuries are serious, less serious or slight. If you say physical injuries, you do not know which article to apply. This being so, you could not punish the attempted or frustrated stage because you do not know what crime of physical injuries was committed. Questions & Answers 1. Is there injuries? an attempted slight physical
The crime committed here is serious physical injuries because of the deformity. When there is deformity, you disregard the healing duration of the wound or the medical treatment required by the wound. In order that in law, a deformity can be said to exist, three factors must concur: (1) The injury should bring about the ugliness; (2) The ugliness must be visible; (3) The ugliness would not disappear through natural healing process. Along this concept of deformity in law, the plastic surgery applied to B is beside the point. In law, what is considered is not the artificial or the scientific treatment but the natural healing of the injury. So the fact that
there was plastic surgery applied to B does not relieve the offender from the liability for the physical injuries inflicted. The crime committed is serious physical injuries. It is consummated. In determining whether a felony is attempted, frustrated or consummated, you have to consider the manner of committing the felony, the element of the felony and the nature of the felony itself. There is no real hard and fast rule. Elements of the crime In the crime of estafa, the element of damage is essential before the crime could be consummated. If there is no damage, even if the offender succeeded in carting away the personal property involved, estafa cannot be considered as consummated. For the crime of estafa to be consummated, there must be misappropriation already done, so that there is damage already suffered by the offended party. If there is no damage yet, the estafa can only be frustrated or attempted. On the other hand, if it were a crime of theft, damage or intent to cause damage is not an element of theft. What is necessary only is intent to gain, not even gain is important. The mere intent to derive some profit is enough but the thinking must be complete before a crime of theft shall be consummated. That is why we made that distinction between theft and estafa. If the personal property was received by the offender, this is where you have to decide whether what was transferred to the offender is juridical possession or physical possession only. If the offender did not receive the personal property, but took the same from the possession of the owner without the latter’s consent, then
If there is no result, you do not know. Criminal law cannot stand on any speculation or ambiguity; otherwise, the presumption of innocence would be sacrificed. Therefore, the commentator’s opinion cannot stand because you cannot tell what particular physical injuries was attempted or frustrated unless the consequence is there. You cannot classify the physical injuries. 2. A threw muriatic acid on the face of B. The injuries would have resulted in deformity were it not for timely plastic surgery. After the surgery, B became more handsome. What crime is committed? Is it attempted, frustrated or consummated?
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there is no problem. That cannot be estafa; this is only theft or none at all. In estafa, the offender receives the property; he does not take it. But in receiving the property, the recipient may be committing theft, not estafa, if what was transferred to him was only the physical or material possession of the object. It can only be estafa if what was transferred to him is not only material or physical possession but juridical possession as well. When you are discussing estafa, do not talk about intent to gain. In the same manner that when you are discussing the crime of theft, do not talk of damage. The crime of theft is the one commonly given under Article 6. This is so because the concept of theft under the Revised Penal Code differs from the concept of larceny under American common law. Under American common law, the crime of larceny which is equivalent to our crime of theft here requires that the offender must be able to carry away or transport the thing being stolen. Without that carrying away, the larceny cannot be consummated. In our concept of theft, the offender need not move an inch from where he was. It is not a matter of carrying away. It is a matter of whether he has already acquired complete control of the personal property involved. That complete control simply means that the offender has already supplanted his will from the will of the possessor or owner of the personal property involved, such that he could exercise his own control on the thing. Illustration: I placed a wallet on a table inside a room. A stranger comes inside the room, gets the wallet and puts it in his pocket. I suddenly started searching him and I found the wallet inside his pocket. The crime of theft is already consummated because he already acquired complete control of my wallet. This is so true when he removed the wallet from the confines of the table. He can exercise his will over the wallet already, he can drop this on the floor, etc. But as long as the wallet remains on the table, the theft is not yet consummated; there can only be attempted or frustrated theft. If he has started lifting the wallet, it is frustrated. If he is in
the act of trying to take the wallet or place it under, attempted.
―Taking‖ in the concept of theft, simply means exercising control over the thing. If instead of the wallet, the man who entered the room pretended to carry the table out of the room, and the wallet is there. While taking the table out of the room, I apprehended him. It turned out that he is not authorized at all and is interested only in the wallet, not the table. The crime is not yet consummated. It is only frustrated because as far as the table is concern, it is the confines of this room that is the container. As long as he has not taken this table out of the four walls of this room, the taking is not complete. A man entered a room and found a chest on the table. He opened it found some valuables inside. He took the valuables, put them in his pocket and was arrested. In this case, theft is consummated. But if he does not take the valuables but lifts the entire chest, and before he could leave the room, he was apprehended, there is frustrated theft. If the thing is stolen from a compound or from a room, as long as the object has not been brought out of that room, or from the perimeter of the compound, the crime is only frustrated. This is the confusion raised in the case of US v. Diño compared with People v. Adio and People v. Espiritu. In US v. Diño, the accused loaded boxes of rifle on their truck. When they were on their way out of the South Harbor, they were checked at the checkpoint, so they were not able to leave the compound. It was held that what was committed was frustrated Theft. In People v. Espiritu, the accused were on their way out of the supply house when they were apprehended by military police who found them secreting some hospital linen. It was held that what was committed was consummated theft. The emphasis, which was erroneously laid in some commentaries, is that, in both cases, the offenders were not able to pass the checkpoint. But why is it that in one, it is frustrated and in the other, it is consummated? In the case of US v. Diño, the boxes of rifle were stocked file inside the compound of the South
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Harbor. As far as the boxes of rifle are concerned, it is the perimeter of the compound that is the container. As long as they were not able to bring these boxes of rifle out of the compound, the taking is not complete. On the other hand, in the case of People v. Espiritu, what were taken were hospital linens. These were taken from a warehouse. Hospital linens were taken from boxes that were diffused or destroyed and brought out of the hospital. From the moment they took it out of the boxes where the owner or the possessor had placed it, the control is complete. You do not have to go out of the compound to complete the taking or the control. This is very decisive in the problem because in most problems given in the bar, the offender, after having taken the object out of the container changed his mind and returned it. Is he criminally liable? Do not make a mistake by saying that there is a desistance. If the crime is one of theft, the moment he brought it out, it was consummated. The return of the thing cannot be desistance because in criminal law, desistance is true only in the attempted stage. You cannot talk of desistance anymore when it is already in the consummated stage. If the offender has already acquired complete control of what he intended to take, the fact that he changed his mind and returned the same will no longer affect his criminal liability. It will only affect the civil liability of the crime because he will no longer be required to pay the object. As far as the crime committed is concerned, the offender is criminally liable and the crime is consummated theft. Illustration: A and B are neighbors. One evening, A entered the yard of B and opened the chicken coop where B keeps his fighting cocks. He discovered that the fighting cocks were not physically fit for cockfighting so he returned it. The crime is consummated theft. The will of the owner is to keep the fighting cock inside the chicken coop. When the offender succeeded in bringing the cock out of the coop, it is clear that his will completely governed or superseded the will of the owner to keep such cock inside the chicken coop. Hence, the crime was already consummated, and being consummated, the return of the owner’s property is not desistance anymore. The offender is criminally liable but he
will not be civilly liable because the object was returned.
When the receptacle is locked or sealed, and the offender broke the same, in lieu of theft, the crime is robbery with force upon things. However, that the receptacle is locked or sealed has nothing to do with the stage of the commission of the crime. It refers only to whether it is theft or robbery with force upon things. Nature of the crime itself In crimes involving the taking of human life – parricide, homicide, and murder – in the definition of the frustrated stage, it is indispensable that the victim be mortally wounded. Under the definition of the frustrated stage, to consider the offender as having performed all the acts of execution, the acts already done by him must produce or be capable of producing a felony as a consequence. The general rule is that there must be a fatal injury inflicted, because it is only then that death will follow. If the wound is not mortal, the crime is only attempted. The reason is that the wound inflicted is not capable of bringing about the desired felony of parricide, murder or homicide as a consequence; it cannot be said that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce parricide, homicide or murder as a result. An exception to the general rule is the so-called subjective phase. The Supreme Court has decided cases which applied the subjective standard that when the offender himself believed that he had performed all the acts of execution, even though no mortal wound was inflicted, the act is already in the frustrated stage. Composite crimes Composite crimes are crimes which, in substance, consist of more than one crime but in the eyes of the law, there is only one crime. For example, the crimes of robbery with homicide, robbery with rape, robbery with physical injuries. In case the crime committed is a composite crime, the conspirator will be liable for all the acts committed during the commission of the crime agreed upon. This is because, in the eyes of the law, all those acts done in pursuance of the crime agreed upon are acts which constitute a single crime.
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Illustrations: A, B, and C decided to commit robbery in the house of D. Pursuant to their agreement, A would ransack the second floor, B was to wait outside, and C would stay on the first floor. Unknown to B and C, A raped the girl upstairs. All of them will be liable for robbery with rape. The crime committed is robbery with rape, which is not a complex crime, but an indivisible felony under the Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. Even if B and C did not know that rape was being committed and they agreed only and conspired to rob, yet rape was part of robbery. Rape can not be separated from robbery. A, B and C agreed to rob the house of D. It was agreed that A would go the second floor, B would stay in the first floor, and C stands guard outside. All went to their designated areas in pursuit of the plan. While A was ransacking the second floor, the owner was awakened. A killed him. A, B and C will be liable for robbery with homicide. This is because, it is well settled that any killing taking place while robbery is being committed shall be treated as a single indivisible offense. As a general rule, when there is conspiracy, the rule is that the act of one is the act of all. This principle applies only to the crime agreed upon. The exception is if any of the co-conspirator would commit a crime not agreed upon. This CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL
happens when the crime agreed upon and the crime committed by one of the co-conspirators are distinct crimes. Exception to the exception: In acts constituting a single indivisible offense, even though the coconspirator performed different acts bringing about the composite crime, all will be liable for such crime. They can only evade responsibility for any other crime outside of that agreed upon if it is proved that the particular conspirator had tried to prevent the commission of such other act. The rule would be different if the crime committed was not a composite crime. Illustration: A, B and C agreed to kill D. When they saw the opportunity, A, B and C killed D and after that, A and B ran into different directions. C inspected the pocket of the victim and found that the victim was wearing a
ring – a diamond ring – and he took it. The crimes committed are homicide and theft. As far as the homicide is concerned, A, B and C are liable because that was agreed upon and theft was not an integral part of homicide. This is a distinct crime so the rule will not apply because it was not the crime agreed upon. Insofar as the crime of theft is concerned, C will be the only one liable. So C will be liable for homicide and theft.
Art. 8. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony. — Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are punishable only in the cases in which the law specially provides a penalty therefor. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Two ways for conspiracy to exist: (1) There is an agreement. (2) The participants acted in concert or simultaneously which is indicative of a meeting of the minds towards a common criminal goal or criminal objective. When several offenders act in a synchronized,
coordinated manner, the fact that their acts complimented each other is indicative of the meeting of the minds. There is an implied agreement. Two kinds of conspiracy: (1) Conspiracy as a crime; and (2) Conspiracy as a manner of incurring criminal liability When conspiracy itself is a crime, no overt act is necessary to bring about the criminal liability. The mere conspiracy is the crime itself. This is only true when the law expressly punishes the mere conspiracy; otherwise, the conspiracy does not bring about the commission of the crime because conspiracy is not an overt act but a mere preparatory act. Treason, rebellion,
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sedition, and coup d’etat are the only crimes where the conspiracy and
proposal to commit to them are punishable. Question & Answer Union A proposed acts of sedition to Union B. Is there a crime committed? Assuming Union B accepts the proposal, will your answer be different? There is no crime committed. Proposal to commit sedition is not a crime. But if Union B accepts the proposal, there will be conspiracy to commit sedition which is a crime under the Revised Penal Code. When the conspiracy is only a basis of incurring criminal liability, there must be an overt act done before the co-conspirators become criminally liable. When the conspiracy itself is a crime, this cannot be inferred or deduced because there is no overt act. All that there is the agreement. On the other hand, if the co-conspirator or any of them would execute an overt act, the crime would no longer be the conspiracy but the overt act itself. Illustration: A, B, C and D came to an agreement to commit rebellion. Their agreement was to bring about the rebellion on a certain date. Even if none of them has performed the act of rebellion, there is already criminal liability arising from the conspiracy to commit the rebellion. But if anyone of them has committed the overt act of rebellion, the crime of all is no longer conspiracy to commit rebellion but rebellion itself. This subsists even though the other co-conspirator does not know that one of them had already done the act of rebellion. This legal consequence is not true if the conspiracy is not a crime. If the conspiracy is only a basis of criminal liability, none of the coconspirators would be liable, unless there is an overt act. So, for as long as anyone shall desist before an overt act in furtherance of the crime was committed, such a desistance would negate criminal liability. Illustration: Three persons plan to rob a bank. For as long as none of the conspirators has committed an
overt act, there is no crime yet. But when one of them commits any overt act, all of them shall be held liable, unless a co-conspirator was absent from the scene of the crime or he showed up, but he tried to prevent the commission of the crime As a general rule, if there has been a conspiracy to commit a crime in a particular place, anyone who did not appear shall be presumed to have desisted. The exception to this is if such person who did not appear was the mastermind. We have to observe the distinction between the two because conspiracy as a crime, must have a clear and convincing
evidence of its existence. Every crime must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. When the conspiracy is just a basis of incurring criminal liability, however, the same may be deduced or inferred from the acts of several offenders in carrying out the commission of the crime. The existence of a conspiracy may be reasonably inferred from the acts of the offenders when such acts disclose or show a common pursuit of the criminal objective. This was the ruling in People v. Pinto, 204 SCRA 9. Although conspiracy is defined as two or more person coming to an agreement regarding the commission of a felony and deciding to commit it, the word ―person‖ here should not be understood to require a meeting of the coconspirator regarding the commission of the felony. A conspiracy of the second kind can be inferred or deduced even though they have not met as long as they acted in concert or simultaneously, indicative of a meeting of the minds toward a common goal or objective. Conspiracy is a matter of substance which must be alleged in the information, otherwise, the court will not consider the same. In People v. Laurio, 200 SCRA 489, it was held that it must be established by positive and conclusive evidence, not by conjectures or speculations. In Taer v. CA, 186 SCRA 5980, it was held that mere knowledge, acquiescence to, or approval of the act, without cooperation or at least, agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute a conspiracy. There must be an intentional participation in the crime with a view to further the common felonious objective.
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When several persons who do not know each other simultaneously attack the victim, the act of one is the act of all, regardless of the degree of injury inflicted by any one of them. All will be liable for the consequences. A conspiracy is possible even when participants are not known to each other.
Do not think that participants are always known to each other. Illustrations: A thought of having her husband killed because the latter was maltreating her. She hired some persons to kill him and pointed at her husband. The goons got hold of her husband and started mauling him. The wife took pity and shouted for them to stop but the goons continued. The wife ran away. The wife was prosecuted for parricide. But the Supreme Court said that there was desistance so she is not criminally liable. A law student resented the fact that his brother was killed by A. He hired B to kill A and offered him P50,000.00. He disclosed to B that A was being arraigned in the City Hall of Manila and told him to execute the plan on the following day. In the evening of that same day, the law student changed his mind so he immediately went to the police and told them to dispatch police officers to prevent B from committing the crime. Unfortunately, the police were caught in traffic causing their delay, so that when they reached the place, B had already killed A. In this case, there was no proposal but a conspiracy. They have conspired to execute a crime but the crime involved here is murder and a conspiracy to commit murder is not a crime in itself but merely a basis for incurring criminal liability. This is just a preparatory act, and his desistance negates criminal liability. Proposal is true only up to the point where the party to whom the proposal was made has not yet accepted the proposal. Once the proposal was accepted, a conspiracy arises. Proposal is unilateral, one party makes a proposition to the other; conspiracy is bilateral, it requires two parties. As pointed out earlier, desistance is true only in the attempted stage. Before this stage, there is only a preparatory stage. Conspiracy is only in the preparatory stage. The Supreme Court has ruled that one who desisted is not criminally liable. ―When a
person has set foot to the path of wickedness and brings back his foot to the path of righteousness, the law shall reward him for doing so.‖ Where there are several persons who participated, like in a killing, and they attacked the victim simultaneously, so much so that it cannot be known what participation each one had, all these participants shall be considered as having acted in conspiracy and they will be held collectively responsible. Do not search for an agreement among the participants. If they acted simultaneously to bring about their common intention, conspiracy exists. And
when conspiracy exists, do not consider the degree of participation of each conspirator because the act of one is the act of all. As a general rule, they have equal criminal responsibility. Question & Answer There are several offenders who acted simultaneously. When they fled, a victim was found dead. Who should be liable for the killing if who actually killed the victim is not known? There is collective responsibility here. Without the principle of conspiracy, nobody would be prosecuted; hence, there is the rule on collective responsibility since it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the victim. There is conspiracy when the offenders acted simultaneously pursuing a common criminal design; thus, acting out a common criminal intent. Illustration: A, B and C have been courting the same lady for several years. On several occasions, they even visited the lady on intervening hours. Because of this, A, B and C became hostile with one another. One day, D invited the young lady and she accepted the invitation. Eventually, the young lady agreed to marry D. When A, B and C learned about this, they all stood up to leave the house of the young lady feeling disappointed. When A looked back at the young lady with D, he saw D laughing menacingly. At that instance, A stabbed D. C and B followed. In this case, it was held that conspiracy was present.
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The common notion is that when there is conspiracy involved, the participants are punished as principals. This notion is no longer absolute. In the case of People v. Nierra, the Supreme Court ruled that even though there was conspiracy, if a co-conspirator merely cooperated in the commission of the crime with insignificant or minimal acts, such that even without his cooperation, the crime could be carried out as well, such co-conspirator should be punished as an accomplice only. The reason given is
that penal laws always favor a milder form of responsibility upon an offender. So it is no longer accurate to think that when there is a conspiracy, all are principals. Notwithstanding that there is conspiracy, a coconspirator may be held liable only as an accomplice. That means the penalty which shall be imposed upon him is one degree lower. For example, there was a planned robbery, and the taxi driver was present during the planning. There, the conspirators told the taxi driver that they are going to use his taxicab in going to the place of robbery. The taxi driver agreed but said, ―I will bring you there, and after committing the robbery I will return later‖. The taxi driver brought the conspirators where the robbery
would be committed. After the robbery was finished, he took the conspirators back to his taxi and brought them away. It was held that the taxi driver was liable only as an accomplice. His cooperation was not really indispensable. The robbers could have engaged another taxi. The taxi driver did not really stay during the commission of the robbery. At most, what he only extended was his cooperation. That is why he was given only that penalty for an accomplice. A, B, and C, under the influence of marijuana, broke into a house because they learned that the occupants have gone on an excursion. They ransacked the house. A got a colored TV, B saw a camera and took that, and C found a can of salmon and took that. In the crime of robbery with force upon things, the penalty is based on the totality of the value of the personal property taken and not on the individual property taken by him. In Siton v. CA, it was held that the idea of a conspiracy is incompatible with the idea of a free for all. There is no definite opponent or definite intent as when a basketball crowd beats a referee to death.
MULTIPLE OFFENDERS (DIFFERENCES, RULES, EFFECTS) Habituality (Reiteracion) Served out sentence for the first offense Previous and subsequent offenses must not be embraced in the same title of the Code, but the previous offense must be one to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two crimes which it attaches a lighter penalty Not always aggravating Habitual Deliquency Convicted of the first offense Any of the habitual delinquency crimes: serious or less serious physical injuries, theft, robbery, estafa, or falsification Recidivism Final judgment rendered in the first offense
Requisites that the offenses be included in the same title of the Code Quasi-Recidivism Convicted of the first offense First crime need not be a felony, but the second crime must be a felony
Additional penalty provided by law
as
Always to be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty to be imposed upon the accused. If not offset by a mitigating circumstance, serves to
Maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony
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Second offense is committed after serving sentence for the first offense A generic aggravating circumstance and may be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance
Offender is found guilty within 10 years from his last release or last conviction for the third time or oftener Cannot be offset by an ordinary aggravating circumstance
increase the penalty only to the maximum No period of time between the former conviction and the last conviction A generic aggravating circumstance and may be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance
Second offense is committed after conviction before service the sentence or while serving sentence A special aggravating circumstance which cannot be
offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance
COMPLEX CRIMES vs. SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIMES
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Philosophy behind plural crimes: The treatment of plural crimes as one is to be lenient to the offender, who, instead of being made to suffer distinct penalties for every resulting crime is made to suffer one penalty only, although it is the penalty for the most serious one and is in the maximum period. Purpose is in the pursuance of the rule of pro reo. If be complexing the crime, the penalty would turn out to be higher, do not complex anymore. Example: Murder and theft (killed with treachery, then stole the right). Penalty: If complex – Reclusion temporal maximum to death. If treated individually – Reclusion temporal to Reclusion Perpetua. Complex crime is not just a matter of penalty, but of substance under the Revised Penal Code. Plurality of crimes may be in the form of: (1) Compound crime; (2) Complex crime; and (3) Composite crime. A compound crime is one where a single act produces two or more crimes.
A complex crime strictly speaking is one where the offender has to commit an offense as a means for the commission of another offense. It is said that the offense is committed as a necessary means to commit the other offense. ―Necessary‖ should not be understood as indispensable, otherwise, it shall be considered absorbed and not giving rise to a complex crime. A composite crime is one in which substance is made up of more than one crime, but which in the eyes of the law is only a single indivisible offense. This is also known as special complex crime. Examples are robbery with homicide, robbery with rape, rape with homicide. These are crimes which in the eyes of the law are regarded only as a single indivisible offense. Composite Crime/Special Complex Crime This is one which in substance is made up of more than one crime but which in the eyes of the law is only a single indivisible offense. This is also known as a special complex crime. Examples are robbery with
homicide, robbery with rape, and rape with homicide. The compound crime and the complex crime are treated in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. But in such article, a compound crime is also designated as a complex crime, but ―complex crimes‖ are limited only to a situation where the resulting felonies are grave and/or less grave. Whereas in a compound crime, there is no limit as to the gravity of the resulting crimes as long as a single act brings about two or more crimes. Strictly speaking, compound crimes are not
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limited to grave or less grave felonies but covers all single act that results in two or more crimes. Illustration: A person threw a hand grenade and the people started scampering. When the hand grenade exploded, no on was seriously wounded all were mere wounded. It was held that this is a compound crime, although the resulting felonies are only slight. Illustration of a situation where the term ―necessary‖ in complex crime should not be understood as indispensable: Abetting committed during the encounter between rebels and government troops such that the homicide committed cannot be complexed with rebellion. This is because they are indispensable part of rebellion. (Caveat: Ortega says rebellion can be complexed with common crimes in discussion on Rebellion) The complex crime lies actually in the first form under Article 148. The first form of the complex crime is actually a compound crime, is one where a single act constitutes two or more grave and/or less grave felonies. The basis in complexing or compounding the crime is the act. So that when an offender performed more than one act, although similar, if they result in separate crimes, there is no complex crime at all, instead, the offender shall be prosecuted for as many
crimes as are information.
committed
under
separate
When the single act brings about two or more crimes, the offender is punished with only one penalty, although in the maximum period, because he acted only with single criminal impulse. The presumption is that, since there is only one act formed, it follows that there is only one criminal impulse and correctly, only one penalty should be imposed. Conversely, when there are several acts performed, the assumption is that each act is impelled by a distinct criminal impulse and for ever criminal impulse, a separate penalty. However, it may happen that the offender is impelled only by a single criminal impulse in committing a series of acts that brought about more than one crime, considering that Criminal Law, if there is only one criminal impulse which brought about the commission of the crime, the offender should be penalized only once. There are in fact cases decided by the Supreme Court where the offender has performed a series of acts but the acts appeared to be impelled by one and the same impulse, the ruling is that a complex crime is committed. In this case it is not the singleness of the act but the singleness of the impulse that has been considered. There are cases where the Supreme Court held that the crime committed is complex even though the offender performed not a single act but a series of acts. The only reason is that the series of acts are impelled by a single criminal impulse.
3. CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY
There are five circumstances affecting criminal liability: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Justifying circumstances; Exempting circumstances; Mitigating circumstances; Aggravating circumstances; and Alternative circumstances. In justifying and exempting circumstances, there is no criminal liability. When an accused invokes them, he in effect admits the commission of a crime but tries to avoid the liability thereof. The burden is upon him to establish beyond reasonable doubt the required conditions to justify or exempt his
acts from criminal liability. What is shifted is only the burden of evidence, not the burden of proof. Justifying circumstances contemplate intentional acts and, hence, are incompatible with dolo. Exempting circumstances may be invoked in culpable felonies.
There are two others which are found elsewhere in the provisions of the Revised Penal Code: (6) Absolutory cause; and (7) Extenuating circumstances.
Distinctions between justifying circumstances and exempting circumstances
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In justifying circumstances – (1) The circumstance affects the act, not the actor; (2) The act complained of is considered to have been done within the bounds of law; hence, it is legitimate and lawful in the eyes of the law; (3) Since the act is considered lawful, there is no crime, and because there is no crime, there is no criminal; (4) Since there is no crime or criminal, there is no criminal liability as well as civil liability. In exempting circumstances – (1) The circumstances affect the actor, not the act; (2) The act complained of is actually wrongful, Justifying circumstances
but the actor acted without voluntariness. He is a mere tool or instrument of the crime; (3) Since the act complained of is actually wrongful, there is a crime. But because the actor acted without voluntariness, there is absence of dolo or culpa. There is no criminal; (4) Since there is a crime committed but there is no criminal, there is civil liability for the wrong done. But there is no criminal liability. However, in paragraphs 4 and 7 of Article 12, there is neither criminal nor civil liability. When you apply for justifying or exempting circumstances, it is confession and avoidance and
burden of proof shifts to the accused and he can no longer rely on weakness of prosecution’s evidence
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. — following do not incur any criminal liability:
The
First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it. 5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. 6. Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose. Since the justifying circumstances are in the nature of defensive acts, there must be always unlawful aggression. The reasonableness of the means employed depends on the gravity of the aggression. If the unlawful aggressor was killed, this can only be justified if it was done to save the life of the person defending or the person being defended. The equation is ―life was taken to save life.‖ Self Defense In justifying circumstances, the most important is self-defense. When this is given in the bar, it is the element of unlawful aggression that is in issue. Never confuse unlawful aggression with provocation. Mere provocation is not enough. Illustration: A and B are long standing enemies. Because of their continuous quarrel over the boundaries of
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur; First. Unlawful aggression. Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it. Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or his relatives by affinity in the same degrees and those consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the revocation was given by the person
attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein. 3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this Art. Are present and that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. 4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does not act which causes damage to another, provided that the following requisites are present;
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their adjoining properties, when A saw B one afternoon, he approached the latter in a menacing manner with a bolo in his hand. When he was about five feet away from B, B pulled out a revolver and shot A on the chest, killing him. Is B criminally liable? What crime was committed, if any? The act of A is nothing but a provocation. It cannot be characterized as an unlawful aggression because in criminal law, an unlawful aggression is an attack or a threatened attack which produces an imminent danger to the life and limb of the one resorting to self-defense. In the facts of the problem given above, what was said was that A was holding a bolo. That bolo does not produce any real or imminent danger unless a raises his arm with the bolo. As long as that arm of A was down holding the bolo, there is no imminent danger to the life or limb of B. Therefore, the act of B in shooting A is not justified. Defense of rights is included in the circumstances of defense and so is defense of honor. In US v. Mateo, while a woman was sleeping, her sister and brother-in-law went to see a movie and came home late that evening. The accused was already asleep. The brother-in-law came up first while his wife was still in the staircase. He started feeling through the dark, and in the process, he awakened the accused. Believing that her honor was at stake, she got a pair of scissors and stabbed the man. When the lights were turned on,
she realized that she had stabbed her brother-in-law. The accused claimed as having acted in defense of her honor and mistake of fact. She said that she believed that her own honor was at stake. It was held that the whole matter is purely her imagination. Touching the arm could not produce such danger as would really be imminent to the honor of the woman. Apparently, under the Revised Penal Code, the honor of a woman in respect of her defense is equated with her virginity. In US v. Jaurigue, it was held that it was not possible to rape the accused because the whole thing transpired in the church, where there were so many people. Therefore, her availing of defense of honor is not tenable. She could not possibly be raped in that place. Defense of honor here is being equated with one of abuse of
chastity of a woman. In this case, the offended party placed his hand on the thigh of the woman who was then praying. There was already some sort of aggression but it was not enough to warrant the act resorted to by the accused in getting a small knife from her bag and thrusting it on the chest of the offended party. Do not confuse unlawful aggression with provocation. What justifies the killing of a supposed unlawful aggressor is that if the offender did not kill the aggressor, it will be his own life that will be lost. That will be the situation. If that is not the situation, even if there was an unlawful aggression that has already begun, you cannot invoke self-defense. Illustration: Two policemen quarreled inside a police precinct. One shot the other. The other was wounded on his thigh. The policeman who was wounded on the thigh jumped on the arm of the fellow who shot him. In the process, they wrestled for possession of the gun. The policeman who shot the other guy fell on the floor. On that point, this policeman who was shot at the thigh was already able to get hold of the revolver. In that position, he started emptying the revolver of the other policeman who was lying on the floor. In this case, it was held that the defense of self-defense is no available. The shooting was not justified. In People v. Rodriguez, a woman went into the house of another woman whom she suspected of having an affair with her husband. She started pouring gasoline on the house of the woman. Since the woman has children inside the house, she jumped out to prevent this other woman from pouring gasoline around the house. The woman who was pouring gasoline had a bolo, so she started hacking
the other woman with it. They grappled with the bolo. At that moment, the one who jumped out of the house was able to wrest the bolo away and started hacking the other woman. It was held that the hacking was not justified. Actually, when she killed the supposed unlawful aggressor, her life and limb were no longer in imminent danger. That is the focal point. At the time the accused killed the supposed unlawful aggressor, was her life in danger? If the answer is no, there is no self-defense. But while there may be no justifying circumstance, do not forget the incomplete self-defense. This
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is a mitigating circumstance under paragraph 1 of Article 13. This mitigating circumstance is either privileged or ordinary. If ordinary, it has the effect of reducing the imposable penalty to the minimum period. But if it is privileged, it has the effect of lowering the penalty by one to two degrees, depending on how the court will regard the absence or presence of conditions to justify the act. Defense of property rights This can only be invoked if the life and limb of the person making the defense is also the subject of unlawful aggression. Life cannot be equal to property. Defense of stranger If the person being defended is already a second cousin, you do not invoke defense of relative anymore. It will be defense of stranger. This is vital because if the person making the defense acted out or revenge, resentment or some evil motive in killing the aggressor, he cannot invoke the justifying circumstance if the relative defended is already a stranger in the eyes of the law. On the other hand, if the relative defended is still within the coverage of defense of relative, even though he acted out of some evil motive, it would still apply. It is enough that there was unlawful aggression against the relative defended, and that the person defending did not contribute to the unlawful aggression. Question & Answer The person
being defended was a relative – a first cousin. But the fellow who killed the aggressor had some score to settle with the aggressor. Is he entitled to a justifying circumstance? Yes. In law, the condition that a person making the defense did not act out of revenge, resentment or evil motive is not a requirement in defense of relative. This is only required in defense of strangers. Incomplete self-defense or incomplete justifying circumstance or incomplete exempting circumstances When you say incomplete justifying circumstance, it means that not all the requisites to justify the act are present or not the requisites to exempt from criminal liability are present.
How, if at all, may incomplete self-defense affect the criminal liability of the offender? If the question specifically refers to incomplete self-defense, defense of relative or defense of stranger, you have to qualify your answer. First, to have incomplete self-defense, the offended party must be guilty of unlawful aggression. Without this, there can be no incomplete self-defense, defense of relative, or defense of stranger. Second, if only the element of unlawful aggression is present, the other requisites being absent, the offender shall be given only the benefit of an ordinary mitigating circumstance. Third, if aside from the element of unlawful aggression another requisite, but not all, are present, the offender shall be given the benefit of a privileged mitigating circumstance. In such a case, the imposable penalty shall be reduced by one or two degrees depending upon how the court regards the importance of the requisites present. Or absent. If the question refers generally to justifying or exempting circumstances, the question should be, ―how may incomplete justifying circumstance affect criminal liability of the offender, if at all?‖ Make a separate answer with respect to selfdefense, defense of relative or defense of stranger because in these cases, you always have to specify the element of unlawful aggression; otherwise, there would be no incomplete self-defense, defense of relative or defense of stranger. In general, with respect to other circumstances, you need only to say this: If less than a majority of the requisites necessary to justify the act or exempt from criminal liability are present, the offender shall only be entitled to an ordinary mitigating circumstance. If a majority of the requisites needed to justify the act or exempt from criminal liability are
present, the offender shall be given the benefit of a privileged mitigating circumstance. The penalty shall be lowered by one or two degrees. When there are only two conditions to justify the act or to exempt from criminal liability, the presence of one shall be regarded as the majority. State of necessity
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The state of necessity must not have been created by the one invoking the justifying circumstances. For example, A drove his car beyond the speed limit so much so that when he reached the curve, his vehicle skidded towards a ravine. He swerved his car towards a house, destroying it and killing the occupant therein. A cannot be justified because the state of necessity was brought about by his own felonious act. Civil liability referred to in a state of necessity is based not on the act committed but on the benefit derived from the state of necessity. So the accused will not be civilly liable if he did not receive any benefit out of the state of necessity. On the other hand, persons who did not participate in the damage or injury would be pro tanto civilly liable if they derived benefit out of the state of necessity. Civil liability is based on the benefit derived and not on the act, damage or injury caused. It is wrong to treat this as an exception to the rule that in justifying circumstances, there is no criminal nor civil liability, on the principle that ―no one should enrich himself at the expense of another‖. Illustration: A and B are owners of adjoining lands. A owns the land for planting certain crops. B owns the land for raising certain goats. C used another land for a vegetable garden. There was heavy rain and floods. Dam was opened. C drove all the goats of B to the land of A. The goats rushed to the land of A to be saved, but the land of A was destroyed. The author of the act is C, but C is not civilly liable because
he did not receive benefits. It was B who was benefited, although he was not the actor. He cannot claim that it was fortuitous event. B will answer only to the extent of the benefit derived by him. If C who drove all the goats is accused of malicious mischief, his defense would be that he acted out of a state of necessity. He will not be civilly liable. Fulfillment of duty In the justifying circumstance of a person having acted out of fulfillment of a duty and the lawful exercise of a right or office, there are only two conditions:
(1) The felony was committed while the offender was in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and (2) The resulting felony is the unavoidable consequence of the due fulfillment of the duty or the lawful exercise of the right or office. Invariably, when you are given a problem on this premise, and the first condition is present, but the second is not because the offender acted with culpa, the offender will be entitled to a privelege mitigating circumstance. This is what you call incomplete justification of fulfillment of duty or incomplete justification of exercise of a right. In that case, the penalty would be reduced by one or two degrees. In People v. Oanis and Callanta, the accused Chief of Police and the constabulary soldier were sent out to arrest a certain Balagtas, supposedly a notorious bandit. There was an order to kill Balagtas if he would resist. The accused arrived at the house of a dancer who was supposedly the girlfriend of Balagtas. When they were there, they saw a certain person who resembled Balagtas in all his bodily appearance sleeping on a bamboo bed but facing the other direction. The accused, without going around the house, started firing at the man. They found out later on that the man was not really Balagtas. They tried to invoke the justifying circumstance of having acted in fulfillment of a duty. The second requisite is absent because they acted with negligence. There was nothing that prevented them from looking around the house and looking at the face of the fellow who was sleeping. There could not be any danger on their life and limb. Hence, they were held guilty of the crime of murder because the fellow was killed when he was sleeping and totally defenseless. However, the Supreme Court granted them the benefit of incomplete justification of fulfillment of duty and the penalty was reduced by one or two degrees. Do
not confuse fulfillment of a duty with selfdefense. Illustration: A, a policeman, while waiting for his wife to go home, was suddenly stabbed at the back by B, a hoodlum, who mistook him for someone else. When A saw B, he drew his revolver and went
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after B. After firing a shot in the air, B did not stop so A shot B who was hit at a vital part of the body. B died. Is the act of A justified? Yes. The justifying circumstance of self-defense cannot be invoked because the unlawful aggression had already ceased by the time A shot B. When the unlawful aggressor started fleeing, the unlawful aggression ceased. If the person attacked runs after him, in the eyes of the law, he becomes the unlawful aggressor. Selfdefense cannot be invoked. You apply paragraph 5 on fulfillment of duty. The offender was not only defending himself but was acting in fulfillment of a duty, to bring the criminal to the Exempting circumstances
authorities. As long as he was not acting out of malice when he fired at the fleeing criminal, he cannot be made criminally liable. However, this is true only if it was the person who stabbed was the one killed. But if, let us say, the policeman was stabbed and despite the fact that the aggressor ran into a crowd of people, the policeman still fired indiscriminately. The policeman would be held criminally liable because he acted with imprudence in firing toward several people where the offender had run. But although he will be criminally liable, he will be given the benefit of an incomplete fulfillment of duty.
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — the following
are exempt from criminal liability: 1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court. 2. A person under nine years of age. 3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80 of this Code. When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in conformably with the provisions of this and the preceding paragraph, shall commit him to the care and custody of his family who shall be charged with his surveillance and education otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some institution or person mentioned in said Art. 80. 4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it. 5. Any person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force. 6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. 7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some lawful insuperable cause. In exempting circumstances, the reason for the exemption lies on the involuntariness of the act – one or some of the ingredients of voluntariness such as criminal intent, intelligence, or freedom of action on the part of the offender is missing. In case it is a culpable felony, there is absence of freedom of action or intelligence, or absence of negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. Imbecility and insanity There is complete absence of intelligence. Imbecile has an IQ of 7. The intellectual deficiency is permanent. There is no lucid interval unlike in insanity. The insanity that is exempting is limited only to mental aberration or disease of the mind and must completely impair the intelligence of the accused. Under common law countries, emotional or spiritual insanity are exempting circumstances unlike in this jurisdiction because the Revised Administrative Code, as defined is limited to mental aberration of the mind. This was the ruling in People v. Dungo. In People v. Rafanan, decided on November 21,
1991, the following are the two tests for exemption on grounds of insanity: (1) The test of cognition, or whether the accused acted with complete deprivation of
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intelligence in committing said crime; and (2) The test of volition, or whether the accused acted in total deprivation of freedom of will. Schizoprenia (dementia praecox) can only be considered a mitigating circumstance because it does not completely deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts. Minority In exempting circumstances, the most important issue is how the minority of the offender affected his criminal liability. It seems that the view of many is that when the offender is a youthful offender, he must necessarily be confined in a reformatory. This is wrong. A youthful offender can only be confined in a reformatory upon order of the court. Under the amendment to Presidential Decree No. 603, Presidential Decree No. 1179 requires that before a youthful offender may be given the benefit if a suspension of sentence, there must be an application filed with the court which should pronounce sentence. Note that the commitment of the offender in a reformatory is just a consequence of the suspension of the sentence. If the sentence is not suspended, there is no commitment in a reformatory. The commitment is in a penitentiary, since suspension of sentence requires certain conditions: (1) The crime committed should not be punishable by reclusion perpetua or death penalty; (2) The offender should not have been given the benefit of a suspended sentence before. This means he is a first timer; (3) He must be below 18 years old because a youthful offender is one who is below 18. Note that the age of majority has been reduced to 18. There is no more bracket where the offender is a minor yet no longer entitled to a mitigating circumstance. An offender
below 18 is always entitled to a mitigating or exempting circumstance. How does the minority of the offender affect his criminal liability? (1) If the offender is within the bracket of nine years old exactly or less, he is exempt from criminal liability but not from civil liability. This type of offenders are absolutely exempt. Even if the offender nine years or below acted with discernment, this should
not be taken against him because in this age bracket, the exemption is absolute. (2) If over nine but below 15, a distinction has to be made whether the offender acted with or without discernment. The burden is upon the prosecution to prove that the offender acted with discernment. It is not for the minor to prove that he acted without discernment. All that the minor has to show is that he is within the age bracket. If the prosecution would want to pin criminal liability on him, it has to prove that the crime was committed with discernment. Here, if the offender was exempt from criminal liability because the prosecution was not able to prove that the offender acted with discernment, he is only civilly liable but he will be committed to the surveillance of his parents who will be required to report to the court periodically on the progress or development of the offender. If the offender is proven to have acted with discernment, this is where the court may give him the benefit of a suspended sentence. He may be given the benefit of a suspended sentence under the conditions mentioned earlier and only if he would file an application therefor. Suspension of sentence is not automatic. If the youthful offender has filed an application therefor. (3) If at the time the judgment is to be promulgated he is already above 18, he cannot avail of a suspended sentence. The reason is because if the sentence were to be suspended, he would be committed in a reformatory. Since he cannot be committed to a reformatory anymore because he is not less than 18 years old, he would have to be committed to a penitentiary. That means promulgation of the sentence shall not be suspended. If the sentence should not be suspended, although the minor may be qualified, the court will promulgate the sentence but the minor shall be entitled to the reduction of the penalty by at least two degrees. When the offender is over nine but below 15, the penalty to be imposed is discretionary on the court, but lowered by at least two degrees. It may be lowered by three or four degrees,
depending upon whether the court
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deems best for the interest of the offender. The limitation that it should be lowered by at least two degrees is just a limitation on the power of the court to reduce the penalty. It cannot be less than two degrees. (4) If the offender is 15 years old and above but below 18, there is no exemption anymore but he is also given the benefit of a suspended sentence under the conditions stated earlier and if at the time the sentence is promulgated, he is not 18 years old or over yet. If the sentence is promulgated, the court will impose a penalty one degree lower. This time it is fixed. It is to be imposed one degree lower and in the proper periods subject to the rules in Article 64. Damnum absque injuria Under Article 12, paragraph 4, the offender is exempt not only from criminal but also from civil liability. This paragraph embodies the Latin maxim ―damnum absque injuria‖. Illustration: A person who is driving his car within the speed limit, while considering the condition of the traffic and the pedestrians at that time, tripped on a stone with one of his car tires. The stone flew hitting a pedestrian on the head. The pedestrian suffered profuse bleeding. What is the liability of the driver? There is no civil liability under paragraph 4 of Article 12. Although, this is just an exempting circumstance, where generally there is civil liability, yet, in paragraph 4 of Article 12, there is no civil liability as well as criminal liability. The driver is not under obligation to defray the medical expenses. However, correlate paragraph 4 of Article 12 with the second paragraph of Article 275. Article 275 gives you the crime of abandoning the victim of one’s own accident. It is a crime. Here, the accident referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 275 is in the concept of paragraph 4 of Article 12. This means that the offender must be
performing a lawful act, that he was doing it with due care but somehow, injury resulted by mere
accident without fault or intention of causing it. If at the very beginning, the offender was negligent, you do not apply Article 275, paragraph 2. Instead, it will be Article 365 on criminal negligence. Notice that in the last paragraph of Article 365, in the case of the socalled hit and run drivers who have injured somebody and would abandon the victim of the accident, the penalty is qualified to a higher degree. Here, under paragraph 4 of Article 12, the infliction of the injury by mere accident does not give rise to a criminal or civil liability, but the person who caused the injury is duty bound to attend to the person who was injured. If he would abandon him, it is in that abandonment that the crime arises which is punished under the second paragraph of Article 275. Compulsion of irresistible force and under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear The offender must be totally deprived of freedom. If the offender has still freedom of choice, whether to act or not, even if force was employed on him or even if he is suffering from uncontrollable fear, he is not exempt from criminal liability because he is still possessed with voluntariness. In exempting circumstances, the offender must act without voluntariness. In a situation where the offender would otherwise be exempt, but the requisites for exemption are not all present, the offender is still entitled to a mitigating circumstance of incomplete exemption under paragraph 1 of Article 13. Apply the rule if majority of the requisites to exempt from criminal liability are present. The offender shall be given the benefit of privelege mitigating circumstances. That means that the penalty prescribed of the crime committed shall be reduced by one or two degrees in accordance with Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. If less than a majority of the requisites for exemption are present, the offender shall be given only the benefit of ordinary mitigating circumstances. That means the penalty shall be reduced to the minimum period of the prescribed penalty, unless the mitigating circumstance is offset by an aggravating circumstance.
Mitigating circumstances
Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. following are mitigating circumstances;
—
The
1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the requisites necessary to justify or to
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exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant. 2. That the offender is under eighteen year of age or over seventy years. In the case of the minor, he shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80. 3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. 4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act. 5. That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees. 6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation. 7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agents, or that he had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution; 8. That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his means of action, defense, or communications with his fellow beings. 9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts. 10. And, finally, any other circumstances of
a similar nature and analogous to those above mentioned. Distinctions between ordinary circumstances and privileged circumstances mitigating mitigating
to reduce the penalty by one or two degrees, depending upon what the law provides. You can easily detect whether the circumstance which mitigates the liability of the offender is privilege or not, that is, if the penalty is reduced by degree. If the penalty is lowered by one or two degrees, it is privilege; therefore, even if there is an aggravating circumstance, do not compensate because that would be violating the rules. The circumstances under Article 13 are generally ordinary mitigating, except in paragraph 1, where it is privilege, Article 69 would apply. So also, paragraph 2, in cases where the offender is below 18 years old, such an offender if criminally liable is entitled to the lowering of penalty by one degree. But if over nine but under 15, he is entitled to a discretionary penalty of at least two degrees lower. When there is a lowering of penalties by degrees, it is a privilege. It cannot be offset by an aggravating circumstance. Although the bulk of the circumstances in Article 13 are ordinary mitigating circumstances, yet, when the crime committed is punishable by a divisible penalty, two or more of this ordinary mitigating circumstances shall have the effect of a privilege mitigating circumstances if there is no aggravating circumstance at all. Correlate Article 13 with Articles 63 and 64. Article 13 is meaningless without knowing the rules of imposing the penalties under Articles 63 and 64. In bar problems, when you are given indeterminate sentences, these articles are very important. When the circumstance which mitigates criminal liability is privileged, you give effect to it above all considerations. In other words, before you go into any circumstance, lower first the penalty to the proper degree. That is precisely why this circumstance is considered privileged. It takes preference over all other circumstances. Question & Answer A 17 year old boy committed parricide. Will he be given the benefit of Indeterminate Sentence Law? Then, the facts state, penalty for parricide is reclusion perpetua to death.
(1) As to the nature of the circumstances Ordinary mitigating circumstances
can be offset by aggravating circumstances. Privilege mitigating circumstance can never be offset by any aggravating circumstance. (2) As to effect Ordinary mitigating circumstances, if not offset, will operate to reduce the penalty to the minimum period, provided the penalty is a divisible one. Privilege mitigating circumstances operate
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You have learned that the Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply, among other situations, when the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment. But then in the problem given, the offender is a 17-year old boy. That circumstance is privileged. So before you go in the Indeterminate Sentence Law, you have to apply that circumstance first. Being a 17-year old boy, therefore, the penalty would go one degree lower and the penalty for parricide which now stands at reclusion perpetua will go down to reclusion temporal. Reclusion temporal is already governed by the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The answer, therefore, is yes. He shall be given the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Although the penalty prescribed for the crime committed is reclusion perpetua, that is not the imposable penalty, since being 17 years old is a privilege mitigating circumstance. That privilege lowers the penalty by one degree. The imposable penalty, therefore, is reclusion temporal. The Indeterminate Sentence Law applies to this and so the offender will be given its benefit. Criminal laws are to be construed always in a manner liberal or lenient to the offender. Between giving the offender the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and withholding it away from him, there is more reason to give him its benefit. It is wrong for you to determine whether the Indeterminate Sentence Law will apply or not on the basis of reclusion perpetua because that is not the imposable penalty. The moment you do that, you disregard the privileged
character of minority. You are only treating it as an ordinary mitigating circumstance. Privilege mitigating circumstance will apply over and above all other considerations. When you arrive at the correct penalty, that is the time when you find out whether the Indeterminate Sentence Law will apply or not. For purposes of lowering the penalty by one or two degrees, the age of the offender at the time of the commission of the crime shall be the basis, not the age of the offender at the time the sentence is to be imposed. But for purposes of suspension of the sentence, the age of the offender at the time the crime was committed is not considered, it is the age of the offender at the time the sentence is to be promulgated.
Praeter intentionem The common circumstance given in the bar of praeter intentionem, under paragraph 3, means that there must be a notable disproportion between the means employed by the offender compared to that of the resulting felony. If the resulting felony could be expected from the means employed, this circumstance does not avail. This circumstance does not apply when the crime results from criminal negligence or culpa. When the crime is the product of reckless imprudence or simple negligence, mitigating circumstances does not apply. This is one of the three instances where the offender has performed a felony different from that which he intended. Therefore, this is the product of intentional felony, not a culpable one. Sufficient threat or provocation This is mitigating only if the crime was committed on the very person who made the threat or provocation. The common set-up given in a bar problem is that of provocation was given by somebody. The person provoked cannot retaliate against him; thus, the person provoked retaliated on a younger brother or on an elder father. Although in fact, there is sufficient provocation, it is not mitigating because the one who gives the provocation is not the one against whom the crime was committed. Question & Answer A was walking in front of the house of B. B at that time was with his brother C. C told B that sometime in the past, A boxed him, and because he was small, he did not fight back. B approached A and boxed him, but A cannot hit back at B because B is bigger, so A boxed C. Can A invoke sufficient provocation to mitigate criminal liability? No. Sufficient provocation must come from the offended party. There may actually be sufficient provocation which immediately preceded the act, but if
provocation did not come from the person offended, paragraph 4, Article 13 will not apply. The commission of the felony must be immediate to the threat or provocation in order that this circumstance be mitigating. If there is sufficient break of time before the provocation or threat and the consequent commission of the crime, the law presupposes that during that
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interval, whatever anger or diminished self control may have emerged from the offender had already vanished or disappeared. In applying this mitigating circumstance, the courts are generally considering that there must be no break between the provocation or threat and the commission of the felony. In other words, the felony was committed precisely because he was then and there provoked. However, the recent rulings of the Supreme Court, as well as the Court of Appeals, has stretched this criterion – it is not only a matter of time anymore. Before, there was a ruling that if a period of one hour had lapsed between the provocation and the commission of the felony, this mitigating circumstance is no longer applicable. Illustration: The accused went to a barrio dance. In that gathering, there was a bully and he told the accused that he is not allowed to go inside. The accused tried to reason out but the bully slapped him several times in front of so many people, some of whom were ladies who were being courted by the accused, so he was humiliated and embarrassed. However, he cannot fight the bully at that time because the latter was much bigger and heavier. Accused had no choice but to go home. When he saw the bully again, this time, he was armed with a knife and he stabbed the bully to death. The evidence for the accused showed that when he went home, he was not able to sleep throughout the night, thinking of the humiliation and outrage done to him, despite the lapse of about 22 hours. The Supreme Court gave him the benefit of this
mitigating circumstance. The reason stated by the Supreme Court for allowing the accused to be benefited by this mitigating circumstance is that the effect of the humiliation and outrage emitted by the offended party as a provocation upon the accused was still present when he committed the crime and, therefore, the reason for paragraph 4 still applies. The accused was still acting under a diminished self control because he was thinking of the humiliation he suffered in the hands of the offended party. The outrage was so serious unless vindicated. This is the correct interpretation of paragraph 4, Article 13. As long as the offender at the time he committed the felony was still under the influence of the outrage caused by the provocation or threat, he is acting under a
diminished self control. This is the reason why it is mitigating. You have to look at two criteria: (1) If from the element of time, there is a material lapse of time stated in the problem and there is nothing stated in the problem that the effect of the threat or provocation had prolonged and affected the offender at the time he committed the crime, then you use the criterion based on the time element. (2) However, if there is that time element and at the same time, facts are given indicating that at the time the offender committed the crime, he is still suffering from outrage of the threat or provocation done to him, then he will still get the benefit of this mitigating circumstance. In People v. Diokno, a Chinaman eloped with a woman. Actually, it was almost three days before accused was able to locate the house where the Chinaman brought the woman. Here, sufficient provocation was one of the mitigating circumstances considered by the Supreme Court in favor of the accused. Vindication of a grave offense The word ―offense‖ should not be taken as a crime. It is enough if what was imputed or what was done was wrong. In considering whether the wrong is a grave one upon the person who committed the crime, his age, education and social status will be considered. Here, in vindication of a grave offense, the vindication need not be done by the person upon whom the grave offense was committed. So, unlike in sufficient threat or provocation where the crime should be inflicted upon the very person who made the threat or provocation, here, it need not be the same person who committed the grave offense or who was offended by the wrong done by the offended party. The word ―immediate‖ here
does not carry the same meaning as that under paragraph 4. The word ―immediate‖ here is an erroneous Spanish translation because the Spanish word is ―proxima‖ and not ―immediatementa.‖ Therefore, it is enough that the offender committed the crime with the grave offense done to him, his spouse, his ascendant or descendant or to his
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brother or sister, whether natural, adopted or legitimate and that is the proximate cause of the commission of the crime. Passion or obfuscation This stands on the premise or proposition that the offender is suffering from a diminished self control because of the passion or obfuscation. The same is true with the circumstances under paragraphs 4 and 5. So, there is a ruling to the effect that if the offender is given the benefit of paragraph 4, he cannot be given the benefit of paragraph 5 or 6, or vice-versa. Only one of the three mitigating circumstances should be given in favor of the offender. However, in one case, one of the mitigating circumstances under paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 stands or arises from a set of facts, and another mitigating circumstance arises from another set of facts. Since they are predicated on different set of facts, they may be appreciated together, although they arose from one and the same case. Hence, the prohibition against considering all these mitigating circumstances together and not as one applies only if they would be taken on the basis of the same set of facts. If the case involves a series of facts, then you can predicate any one of these circumstances on one fact and the other on another fact and so on. The passion must be legitimate. As a rule, it cannot be based on common law relationship because common law relationships are illicit. However, consider whether passion or obfuscation is generated by common law relationship or by some other human consideration. In a case where the relationship between the
accused and the woman he was living with was one of common law, he came home and surprised his common law wife having sexual intercourse with a friend. This infuriated him. He killed the friend and he claimed passion or obfuscation. The trial court denied his claim because the relationship was a common law one. On review, the accused was given the benefit of the circumstances and the basis of considering passion or obfuscation in favor of the accused was the act of the common law wife in committing adultery right from the conjugal bed.
Whether or not they are married, any man who discovers that infidelity was committed on the very bed provided by him to the woman would naturally be subjected to obfuscation. When a married person surprised his better half in the act of sexual intercourse with another, he gets the benefit of Article 247. However, that requisite which in the first place, the offender must have surprised his/her spouse actually committing sexual intercourse should be present. If the surprising was done not in the actual act of sexual intercourse but before or after it, then Article 247 does not apply. Although this is the ruling, still, the accused will be given the benefit of sufficient provocation if the intercourse was done in his dwelling. If this act was done somewhere else and the accused kills the paramour or the spouse, this may be considered as mitigation of a grave offense to him or otherwise as a situation sufficient to create passion or obfuscation. Therefore, when a married man upon coming home, surprises his wife who was nude and lying with another man who was also nude, Article 247 does not apply. If he kills them, vindication of a grave offense will be mitigating in favor of the offender. Illustrations: A is courting B, a receptionist in a beerhouse. C danced with B. A saw this and stabbed C. It was held that jealousy is an acknowledged basis of passion. A, a male classmate is escorting B, a female classmate. On the way out, some men whistled lustfully. The male classmate stabbed said men. This was held to be obfuscation. When a man saw a woman bathing, almost naked, for which reason he raped her, such man cannot claim passion as a mitigating circumstance. A man and a woman were living together for 15 years. The man left the village where they were living and never returned home. The common law wife learned that he was getting married to a classmate. On the scheduled wedding day,
she stabbed the groom in the chest, instantly killing him. She confessed and explained that any woman cannot tolerate what he did to her. She gave him the best years of her life. She practically waited for him day and night. It was held that passion and obfuscation were
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considered mitigating. here. Voluntary surrender
Ingratitude was shown Where the offender went to the municipal building not to own responsibility for the killing, such fact is not tantamount to voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance. Although he admitted his participation in the killing, he tried to avoid responsibility by claiming self-defense which however he was not able to prove. People v. Mindac, decided December 14, 1992. Surrender to be considered voluntary and thus mitigating, must be spontaneous, demonstrating an intent to submit himself unconditionally to the person in authority or his agent in authority, because (1) he acknowledges his guilt (2) he wishes to save the government the trouble and expenses of searching and capturing him. Where the reason for the surrender of the accused was to insure his safety, his arrest by policemen pursuing him being inevitable, the surrender is not spontaneous. Physical defect The physical defect that a person may have must have a relation to the commission of the crime. In a case where the offender is deaf and dumb, personal property was entrusted to him and he misappropriated the same. The crime committed was estafa. The fact that he was deaf and dumb is not mitigating because that does not bear any relation to the crime committed. Not any physical defect will affect the crime. It will only do so if it has some relation to the crime committed. If a person is deaf and dumb and he has been slandered, he cannot talk so what he did was, he got a piece
of wood and struck the fellow on the head. The crime committed was physical injuries. The Supreme Court held that being a deaf and dumb is mitigating because the only way is to use his force because he cannot strike back. If the offender is blind in one eye, as long as his means of action, defense or communication with others are not restricted, such circumstance is not mitigating. This circumstance must also have a bearing on the crime committed and must depend on how the crime was committed. Analogous cases The act of the offender of leading the law enforcers to the place where he buried the instrument of the crime has been considered as
The essence of voluntary surrender requires that the offender, after having committed the crime, had evaded the law enforcers and the law enforcers do not know of his whereabouts. In short, he continues to elude arrest. If, under this circumstance, the offender would come out in the open and he gives himself up, his act of doing so will be considered as indicative of repentance and he also saves the government the time and the expense of looking for him. As a general rule, if after committing the crime, the offender did not flee and he went with the responding law enforcers meekly, voluntary surrender is not applicable. However, there is a ruling that if after committing the crime, the offender did not flee and instead waited for the law enforcers to arrive and he surrendered the weapon he used in killing the victim, the ruling was that voluntary surrender is mitigating. In this case, the offender had the opportunity to go into hiding, the fact that he did not flee is not voluntary surrender. However, if he comes out from hiding because he is seriously ill and he went to get medical treatment, the surrender is not considered as indicative of remorse or repentance. The surrender here is only done out of convenience to save his own self. Hence, it is not mitigating. Even if the offender may have gone into hiding, if the law enforcers had already known where he is hiding and it is just a matter of time before he is flushed out of that place, then even if the law enforcers do not know exactly where he was hiding and he would come out, this is not voluntary surrender. Whether or not a warrant of arrest had been issued against the offender is immaterial and irrelevant. The criterion is whether or not the offender had gone into hiding or had the opportunity to go into hiding and the law enforcers do not know of his whereabouts. If he
would give up, his act of surrendering under such circumstance indicates that he is willing to accept the consequences of the wrong he has done and also thereby saves the government the effort, the time and the expenses to be incurred in looking for him.
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equivalent to voluntary surrender. The act of a thief in leading the authorities to the place where he disposed of the loot has been considered as analogous or equivalent to voluntary surrender. Stealing by a person who is driven to do so out of extreme poverty is considered as analogous to incomplete state of necessity. However, this
is not so where the offender became impoverished because of his own way of living his life. If his lifestyle is one of having so many vices, as a result of which he became poor, his subsequent stealing because of his poverty will not be considered mitigated by incomplete state of necessity.
Aggravating circumstances
Art. 14. Aggravating circumstances. — The following are aggravating circumstances: 1. That advantage be taken by the offender of his public position. 2. That the crime be committed in contempt or with insult to the public authorities. 3. That the act be committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank, age, or sex, or that is be committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not given provocation. 4. That the act be committed with abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness. 5. That the crime be committed in the palace of the Chief Executive or in his presence, or where public
authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, or in a place dedicated to religious worship. 6. That the crime be committed in the night time, or in an uninhabited place, or by a band, whenever such circumstances may facilitate the commission of the offense. Whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of an offense, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band. 7. That the crime be committed on the occasion of a conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic or other calamity or misfortune. 8. That the crime be committed with the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity. 9. That the accused is a recidivist. A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of this Code. 10. That the offender has been previously punished by an offense to which the law
attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty. 11. That the crime be committed in consideration of a price, reward, or promise. 12. That the crime be committed by means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, stranding of a vessel or international damage thereto, derailment of a locomotive, or by the use of any other artifice involving great waste and ruin. 13. That the act be committed with evidence premeditation. 14. That the craft, fraud or disguise be employed. 15. That advantage be taken of superior strength, or means be employed to weaken the defense. 16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia). There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 17. That means be employed or circumstances brought about which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act. 18. That the crime be committed after an unlawful entry. There is an unlawful entry when an entrance of a crime a wall, roof, floor, door, or window be broken. 20. That the crime be committed with the aid of persons under fifteen years of age or by means of motor vehicles, motorized watercraft, airships, or other similar means. (As amended by RA 5438).
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21. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its commissions. Kinds of aggravating circumstances: (1) Generic or those that can generally apply to all crime; (2) Specific or those that apply only to a particular crime; (3) Qualifying or those that change the nature of the crime; (4) Inherent or those that must of necessity accompany the commission of the crime. The aggravating circumstances must be established with moral certainty, with the same degree of proof required to establish the crime itself. Most important of the classification of aggravating circumstances are the qualifying and the generic aggravating circumstances. In practice, the so-called generic aggravating circumstances are referred to simply as aggravating circumstances. The so-called qualifying aggravating circumstances are simply referred to as qualifying circumstances. This is so because there is no qualifying circumstance that is not aggravating. To say qualifying aggravating circumstance is redundant. In the examination, if you find qualifying circumstances, you have to think about these as aggravating circumstances which are the ingredients of the crime. Distinctions between aggravating and qualifying circumstances: In aggravating circumstances – (1) The circumstance can be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance; (2) No need to allege this circumstance in the information, as long as it is proven during trial. If it is proved during trial, the court would consider the same in imposing the penalty; (3) It is not an ingredient of a crime. It only affects the penalty to be imposed but the crime remains the same. In qualifying circumstance – (1) The circumstance affects the nature of the
crime itself such that the offender shall be liable for a more serious crime. The circumstance is actually an ingredient of the crime; (2) Being an ingredient of the crime, it cannot be offset by any mitigating circumstance;
(3) Qualifying circumstances to be appreciated as such must be specifically alleged in the complaint or information. If not alleged but proven during the trial, it will be considered only as generic aggravating circumstance. If this happens, they are susceptible of being offset by a mitigating circumstance. An aggravating circumstance is qualifying when it is an ingredient of the crime. Therefore it is included in the provision of law defining the crime. If it is not so included, it is not qualifying. In Article 248, in the crime of murder, the law specifically mentions thereunder several circumstances which are aggravating under Article 14. All of these will qualify a killing from homicide to murder; however, you understand that only one is qualifying. If let us say, the accused was charged with murder. Three of these circumstances: treachery, evident premeditation and act was done in consideration of a price, reward or promise were alleged as aggravating. Only one of these is qualifying. If any one of the three circumstances was proven, the crime was already murder. If the other two are also proven, even if they are alleged in the information or complaint, they are only to be taken as generic. If there is any mitigating circumstance in favor of the offender, the two other circumstances which are otherwise qualifying could be offset by the mitigating, provided the mitigating circumstance is not a privileged mitigating circumstance. Therefore, if there are three of the qualifying circumstances alleged in the complaint or information, only one will qualify the crime. The others will merely be considered as generic. Thus, if there is any ordinary mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused, such will be wiped out by these circumstances, although initially they are considered as qualifying. Do not hesitate to offset on the principle that a qualifying circumstance cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance because only one is necessary. Even if any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248 on murder was proven, if that is not the circumstance alleged in the
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information, it cannot qualify the crime. Let us say, what was alleged in the information was treachery. During the trial, what was proven was the price, reward or promise as a consideration for killing. The treachery was not proved. Just the same, the accused cannot be convicted of murder because the circumstance proven is not qualifying but merely generic. It is generic because it is not alleged in the information at all. If any of these qualifying circumstances is not alleged in the information, it cannot be considered qualifying because a qualifying is an ingredient of the crime and it cannot be taken as such without having alleged in the information because it will violate the right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him. Correlate Article 14 with Article 62. Article 62 gives you the different rules regarding aggravating circumstances. Aggravating circumstances will not be considered when it is the crime itself. If the crime charged is qualified trespass to dwelling, dwelling is no longer aggravating. When the aggravating circumstance refers to the material execution of the crime, like treachery, it will only aggravate the criminal liability of those who employed the same. Illustration: A person induced another to kill somebody. That fellow killed the other guy and employed treachery. As far as the killing is concerned, the treachery will qualify only the criminal liability of the actual executioner. The fellow who induced him becomes a co-principal and therefore, he is liable for the same crime committed. However, let us say, the fellow was hired to kill the parent of the one who hired him. He killed a stranger and not the parent. What was committed is different from what was agreed upon. The fellow who hired him will not be liable for the crime he had done because that was not the crime he was hired to commit. Taking advantage of public position Article 62 was also amended by the Republic Act No. 7659. The legal import of this amendment is that the subject circumstance has been made a qualifying or special aggravating that shall not be offset or compensated by a mitigating circumstance. If not alleged in the information, however, but proven during the trial, it is only appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance. The mitigating circumstance referred to in the amendment as not affecting the imposition of the penalty in the maximum are only ordinary mitigating circumstances. Privileged mitigating circumstances always lower the penalty accordingly. Disrespect due to rank, age, sex Aggravating only in crimes against persons and honor, not against property like Robbery with homicide (People v. Ga, 156 SCRA 790). Teachers, professors, supervisors of public and duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities, as well as lawyers are persons in authority only for purposes of direct assault and simple resistance, but not for purposes of aggravating circumstances in paragraph 2, Article 14. (People v. Taoan, 182 SCRA 601). Abuse of confidence Do not confuse this with mere betrayal of trust. This is aggravating only when the very offended party is the one who reposed the confidence. If the confidence is reposed by another, the offended party is different from the fellow who reposed the confidence and abuse of confidence in this case is not aggravating. Illustrations: A mother left her young daughter with the accused because she had nobody to leave the child with while she had to go on an errand. The accused abused the child. It was held that the abuse of confidence is not aggravating. What is present is betrayal of trust and that is not aggravating. In a case where the offender is a servant, the offended party is one of the members of the family. The servant poisoned the child. It was held that abuse of confidence is aggravating. This is only true however, if the servant was still in the service of the family when he did the killing. If he was driven by the master already out of the house for some time and he came back and poisoned the child, abuse of confidence is no longer aggravating. The reason is because that confidence has already been terminated when the offender was driven out of the house. Dwelling
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Dwelling will only be aggravating if it is the dwelling of the offended party. It should also not be the dwelling of the offender. If the dwelling is both that of the offended party and the offender, dwelling is not aggravating. Dwelling need not be owned by the offended party. It is enough that he used the place for his peace of mind, rest, comfort and privacy. The rule that dwelling, in order to be aggravating must be owned by the offended party is no longer absolute. Dwelling can be aggravating even if it is not owned by the offended party, provided that the offended party is considered a member of the family who owns the dwelling and equally enjoys peace of mind, privacy and comfort. Illustration: Husband and wife quarreled. Husband inflicted physical violence upon the wife. The wife left the conjugal home and went to the house of her sister bringing her personal belongings with her. The sister accommodated the wife in the formers home. The husband went to the house of the sister-in-law and tried to persuade the wife to come back to the conjugal home but the wife refused because she is more at peace in her sister’s house than in the conjugal abode. Due to the wife’s refusal to go back to the conjugal home and live with the husband, the husband pulled out a knife and stabbed the wife which caused her death. It was held that dwelling was aggravating although it is not owned by the offended party because the offended party is considered as a member of the family who owns the dwelling and that dwelling is where she enjoyed privacy. Peace of mind and comfort. Even a room in a hotel if rented as a dwelling, like what the salesmen do when they are assigned in the provinces and they rent rooms, is considered a dwelling. A room in a hotel or motel will be considered dwelling if it is used with a certain degree of permanence, where the offended party seeks privacy, rest, peace of mind and comfort. If a young man brought a woman in a motel for a short time and there he was killed, dwelling is not aggravating. A man was killed in the house of his common law wife. Dwelling is aggravating in this case because the house was provided by the man.
Dwelling should not be understood in the concept of a domicile. A person has more than one dwelling. So, if a man has so many wives and he gave them a
places of their own, each one is his own dwelling. If he is killed there, dwelling will be aggravating, provided that he also stays there once in a while. When he is only a visitor there, dwelling is not aggravating. The crime of adultery was committed. Dwelling was considered aggravating on the part of the paramour. The paramour is not a resident of the same dwelling. However, if the paramour was also residing on the same dwelling, dwelling is not considered aggravating. The term ―dwelling‖ includes all the dependencies necessary for a house or for rest or for comfort or a place of privacy. If the place used is on the second floor, the stairs which are used to reach the second floor is considered a dwelling because the second floor cannot be enjoyed without the stairs. If the offended party was assaulted while on the stairs, dwelling is already aggravating. For this reason, considering that any dependency necessary for the enjoyment of a place of abode is considered a dwelling. Illustrations: A and B are living in one house. A occupies the ground floor while B the upper floor. The stairs here would form part only of B’s dwelling, the same being necessary and an integral part of his house or dwelling. Hence, when an attack is made while A is on the stairs, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling is not present. If the attack is made while B was on the stairs, then the aggravating circumstance of dwelling is present. Whenever one is in his dwelling, the law is presuming that he is not intending to commit a wrong so one who attacks him while in the tranquility of his home shows a degree of perversity in him. Hence, this aggravating circumstance. Dwelling is not limited to the house proper. All the appurtenances necessary for the peace and comfort, rest and peace of mind in the abode of the offended party is considered a dwelling. Illustrations:
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A man was fixing something on the roof of his house when he was shot. It was held that dwelling is aggravating. Roof still part of the house. In the provinces where the comfort rooms are usually far from the house proper, if the offended party while answering the call of nature is killed, then dwelling is aggravating because the comfort room is a necessary dependency of the house proper. A person while in the room of his house, maintaining the room, was shot. Dwelling is aggravating. If the offender entered the house and the offended party jumped out of the house, even if the offender caught up with him already out of the house, dwelling is still aggravating. The reason is because he could not have left his dwelling were it not for the fact that the attacker entered the house. If the offended party was inside the house and the offender was outside and the latter shot the former inside the house while he was still outside. Dwelling is still aggravating even if the offender did not enter the house. A garage is part of the dwelling when connected with an interior passage to the house proper. If not connected, it is not considered part of the dwelling. One-half of the house is used as a store and the other half is used for dwelling but there is only one entrance. If the dwelling portion is attacked, dwelling is not aggravating because whenever a store is open for business, it is a public place and as such is not capable of being the subject of trespass. If the dwelling portion is attacked where even if the store is open, there is another separate entrance to the portion used for dwelling, the circumstance is aggravating. However, in case the store is closed, dwelling is aggravating since here, the store is not a public place as in the first case. Balcony is part of the dwelling because it is appurtenant to the house Dwelling is aggravating in robbery with homicide because the crime can be committed without necessarily transgressing the sanctity of the home (People v. De Los Reyes, decided October 22, 1992).
Dwelling is aggravating where the place is, even for a brief moment, a ―home‖, although he is not the owner thereof as when victim was shot in the house of his parents. Band In band, there should at least be four persons. All of them should be armed. Even if there are four, but only three or less are armed, it is not a band. Whenever you talk of band, always have in mind four at least. Do not say three or more because it is four or more. The way
the law defines a band is somewhat confusing because it refers simply to more than 3, when actually it should be 4 or more. Correlate this with Article 306 – Brigandage. The crime is the band itself. The mere forming of a band even without the commission of a crime is already a crime so that band is not aggravating in brigandage because the band itself is the way to commit brigandage. However, where brigandage is actually committed, band becomes aggravating. Uninhabited place It is determined not by the distance of the nearest house to the scene of the crime but whether or not in the place of the commission of the offense , there was a reasonable possibility of the victim receiving some help. Illustration: A is on board a banca, not so far away. B and C also are on board on their respective bancas. Suddenly, D showed up from underwater and stabbed B. Is there an aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place here? Yes, considering the fact that A and C before being able to give assistance still have to jump into the water and swim towards B and the time it would take them to do that, the chances of B receiving some help was very little, despite the fact that there were other persons not so far from the scene. Evidence tending to prove that the offender took advantage of the place and purposely availed of it is to make it easier to commit the crime, shall be necessary. Nighttime
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What if the crime started during the daytime and continued all the way to nighttime? This is not aggravating. As a rule, the crime must begin and end during the nighttime. Crime began at day and ended at night, as well as crime began at night and ended at day is not aggravated by the circumstance of nighttime. Darkness is what makes this circumstance aggravating. Illustration: One evening, a crime was committed near the lamp post. The Supreme Court held that there is no aggravating circumstance of nighttime.
Even if the crime was committed at night, but there was light, hence, darkness was not present, no aggravating circumstance just by the fact of nighttime alone. Even if there was darkness but the nighttime was only an incident of a chance meeting, there is no aggravating circumstance here. It must be shown that the offender deliberately sought the cover of darkness and the offender purposely took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense. Nocturnity is the period of time after sunset to sunrise, from dusk to dawn. Different forms of repetition or habituality of the offender (1) Recidivism under Article 14 (9) – The offender at the time of his trial for one crime shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code. (2) Repetition or reiteracion under Article 14 (10) – The offender has been previously punished for an offense which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty. (3) Habitual delinquency under Article 62 (5) – The offender within the period of 10 years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification, is found guilty of the any of said crimes a third time or oftener. (4) Quasi-recidivism under Article 160 – Any person who shall commit a felony after
having been convicted by final judgment before beginning to serve such sentence or while serving such sentence shall be punished by the maximum period prescribed by law for the new felony. Distinctions between recidivism and habitual delinquency In recidivism – (1) Two convictions are enough. (2) The crimes are not specified; it is enough that they may be embraced under the same title of the Revised Penal Code. (3) There is no time limit between the first conviction and the subsequent conviction. Recidivism is imprescriptible. (4) It is a generic aggravating circumstance which can be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance. If not offset, it would only increase the penalty prescribed by law for the crime committed to its maximum period. (5) The circumstance need not be alleged in the information. In habitual delinquency – (1) At least three convictions are required. (2) The crimes are limited and specified to: (a) serious physical injuries, (b) less serious physical injuries, (c) robbery, (d) theft, (e) estafa or
swindling and (f) falsification. (3) There is a time limit of not more than 10 years between every convictions computed from the first conviction or release from punishment thereof to conviction computed from the second conviction or release therefrom to the third conviction and so on . .. (4) Habitual delinquency is a special aggravating circumstance, hence it cannot be offset by any mitigating circumstance. Aside from the penalty prescribed by law for the crime committed, an additional penalty shall be imposed depending upon whether it is already the third conviction, the fourth, the fifth and so on . . . (5) The circumstance must be alleged in the information; otherwise the court cannot acquire jurisdiction to impose additional penalty. Recidivism In recidivism, the emphasis is on the fact that the
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offender was previously convicted by final judgement of a felony and subsequently found guilty of another felony embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code. The law considers this aggravating when a person has been committing felonies embraced in the same title because the implication is that he is specializing on such kind of crime and the law wants to prevent any specialization. Hence, ordinarily, when a person commits a crime under different titles, no aggravating circumstance is present. It is important that the conviction which came earlier must refer to the crime committed earlier than the subsequent conviction. Illustration:
It is necessary to allege recidivism in the information, but if the defense does not object to the presentation of evidence during the trial and the same was proven, the court shall consider such aggravating circumstance because it is only generic. In recidivism, although the law defines it as a
circumstance where a person having been convicted by final judgement was previously convicted also by final judgement for a crime embraced in the same title in the Revised Penal Code, it is necessary that the conviction must come in the order in which they are committed. Question & Answer
In 1980, A committed robbery. While the case was being tried, he committed theft in 1983. He was found guilty and was convicted of theft also in 1983. The conviction became final because he did not appeal anymore and the trial for his earlier crime which was robbery ended in 1984 where he was also convicted. He also did not appeal this decision. Is the accused a recidivist? The subsequent conviction must refer to a felony committed later in order to constitute recidivism. The reason for this is as the time the first crime was committed, there was no other crime of which he was convicted so he cannot be regarded as a repeater. In recidivism, the crimes committed should be felonies. Recidivism cannot be had if the crime committed is a violation of a special law. Recidivism does not prescribe. No matter how long ago the offender was convicted, if he is subsequently convicted of a crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code, it is taken into account as aggravating in imposing the penalty. Pardon does not erase recidivism, even if it is absolute because only excuses the service of the penalty, but not the conviction. If the offender has already served his sentence and he was extended an absolute pardon, the pardon shall erase the conviction including recidivism because there is no more penalty so it shall be understood as referring to the conviction or the effects of the crime. Recidivism may be considered even though not alleged in the information because this is only a generic aggravating circumstance.
In 1975, the offender committed robbery. While the same was being tried in 1978, he committed theft. In 1980, he was convicted of theft and he did not appeal this decision. The trial for robbery ended in 1981. May the judge in imposing the penalty for robbery consider the accused a recidivist considering that he was already convicted in 1980 for the crime of theft which is under the same title of the Revised Penal Code as that of robbery? No, because the robbery which was committed earlier would be decided later. It must be the other way around. This is because in 1975 when he committed
the robbery, there was no crime committed yet. Thus, even though in imposing the penalty for the robbery, there was already a previous conviction, if that conviction is subsequent to the commission of the robbery, he is not a recidivist. If you will interpret the definition of recidivism, this would seem to be covered but that is not so. Habitual delinquency We have to consider the crimes in it and take note of the titles of crimes in the Revised Penal Code. If the offender had committed and was convicted of each of the crimes under each category so that no two crimes fall under the same title of the Revised Penal Code, you have a situation where the offender is a habitual delinquent but not a recidivist because no two crimes fall under the same title of the Code.
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If the first conviction is for serious physical injuries or less serious physical injuries and the second conviction is for robbery, theft or estafa and the third is for falsification, then the moment the habitual delinquent is on his fourth conviction already, you cannot avoid that he is a habitual delinquent and at the same time a recidivist because at least, the fourth time will have to fall under any of the three categories. When the offender is a recidivist and at the same time a habitual delinquent, the penalty for the crime for which he will be convicted will be increased to the maximum period unless offset by a mitigating circumstance. After determining the correct penalty for the last crime committed, an added penalty will be imposed in accordance with Article 62. Habitual delinquency, being a special or specific aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the information. If it is not alleged in the information and in the course of the trial, the prosecution tried to prove that the offender is a habitual delinquent over the objection of the accused, the court has no jurisdiction to consider the
offender a habitual delinquent. Even if the accused is in fact a habitual delinquent but it is not alleged in the information, the prosecution when introducing evidence was objected to, the court cannot admit the evidence presented to prove habitual delinquency over the objection of the accused. On the other hand, recidivism is a generic aggravating circumstance. It need not be alleged in the information. Thus, even if recidivism is not alleged in the information, if proven during trial, the court can appreciate the same. If the prosecution tried to prove recidivism and the defense objected, the objection should be overruled. The reason is recidivism is a generic aggravating circumstance only. As such, it does not have to be alleged in the information because even if not alleged, if proven during trial, the trial court can appreciate it. Right now, the present rule is that it can be appreciated even if not alleged in the information. This is the correct view because recidivism is a generic aggravating circumstance. The reason why habitual delinquency cannot be appreciated unless alleged in the information is because recidivism has nothing to do with the crime committed. Habitual delinquency refers to prior conviction and therefore this must be brought in the
information before the court jurisdiction over this matter.
can
acquire
Generally, the procedure you know that when the prosecutor alleges habitual delinquency, it must specify the crimes committed, the dates when they were committed, the court which tried the case, the date when the accused was convicted or discharged. If these are not alleged, the information is defective. However, in a relatively recent ruling of the Supreme Court, it was held that even though the details of habitual delinquency was not set forth in the information, as long as there is an allegation there that the accused is a habitual delinquent, that is enough to confer jurisdiction upon the court to consider habitual delinquency. In the absence of the details set forth in the information, the accused has the right to avail of the
so-called bill of particulars. Even in a criminal case, the accused may file a motion for bill of particulars. If the accused fails to file such, he is deemed to have waived the required particulars and so the court can admit evidence of the habitual delinquency, even though over and above the objection of the defense. Reiteracion This has nothing to do with the classification of the felonies. In reiteracion, the offender has already tasted the bitterness of the punishment. This is the philosophy on which the circumstance becomes aggravating. It is necessary in order that there be reiteracion that the offender has already served out the penalty. If the offender had not yet served out his penalty, forget about reiteracion. That means he has not yet tasted the bitterness of life but if he had already served out the penalty, the law expects that since he has already tasted punishment, he will more or less refrain from committing crimes again. That is why if the offender committed a subsequent felony which carries with it a penalty lighter than what he had served, reiteracion is not aggravating because the law considers that somehow, this fellow was corrected because instead of committing a serious crime, he committed a lesser one. If he committed another lesser one, then he becomes a repeater. So, in reiteracion, the penalty attached to the crime subsequently committed should be higher or at least equal to the penalty that he has
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already served. If that is the situation, that means that the offender was never reformed by the fact that he already served the penalty imposed on him on the first conviction. However, if he commits a felony carrying a lighter penalty; subsequently, the law considers that somehow he has been reformed but if he, again commits another felony which carries a lighter penalty, then he becomes a repeater because that means he has not yet reformed. You
will only consider the penalty in reiteracion if there is already a second conviction. When there is a third conviction, you disregard whatever penalty for the subsequent crimes committed. Even if the penalty for the subsequent crimes committed are lighter than the ones already served, since there are already two of them subsequently, the offender is already a repeater. However, if there is only a second conviction, pay attention to the penalty attached to the crime which was committed for the second crime. That is why it is said that reiteracion is not always aggravating. This is so because if the penalty attached to the felony subsequently committed is not equal or higher than the penalty already served, even if literally, the offender is a repeater, repetition is not aggravating. Quasi-recidivism This is found in Article 160. The offender must already be convicted by final judgement and therefore to have served the penalty already, but even at this stage, he committed a felony before beginning to serve sentence or while serving sentence. Illustration: Offender had already been convicted by final judgement. Sentence was promulgated and he was under custody in Muntinlupa. While he was in Muntinlupa, he escaped from his guard and in the course of his escape, he killed someone. The killing was committed before serving sentence but convicted by final judgement. He becomes a quasi-recidivist because the crime committed was a felony. The emphasis here is on the crime committed before sentence or while serving sentence which should be a felony, a violation of the Revised Penal Code. In so far as the earlier crime is concerned, it is necessary that it be a felony.
Illustration: The offender was convicted of homicide. While serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he was found smoking marijuana. He was prosecuted for illegal use of prohibited drugs and was convicted. Is he a quasi-recidivist? No, because the crime committed while serving sentence is not a felony. Reverse the situation. Assume that the offender was found guilty of illegal use of prohibited drugs. While he was serving sentence, he got involved in a quarrel and killed a fellow inmate. Is he a quasi-recidivist? Yes, because while serving sentence, he committed a felony. The emphasis is on the nature of the crime committed while serving sentence or before serving sentence. It should not be a violation of a special law. Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance. This cannot be offset by any mitigating
circumstance and the imposition of the penalty in the maximum period cannot be lowered by any ordinary mitigating circumstance. When there is a privileged mitigating circumstance, the penalty prescribed by law for the crime committed shall be lowered by 1 or 2 degrees, as the case may be, but then it shall be imposed in the maximum period if the offender is a quasi-recidivist. In consideration of a price, reward or promise The Supreme Court rulings before indicate that this circumstance aggravates only the criminal liability of the person who committed the crime in consideration of the price, promise, or reward but not the criminal liability of the person who gave the price, reward or consideration. However, when there is a promise, reward or price offered or given as a consideration for the commission of the crime, the person making the offer is an inducer, a principal by inducement while the person receiving the price, reward or promise who would execute the crime is a principal by direct participation. Hence, their responsibilities are the same. They are both principals and that is why the recent rulings of the Supreme Court are to the effect that this aggravating circumstance affects or aggravates not only the criminal liability of the receiver of the price, reward or promise but also the criminal liability of the one giving the offer.
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By means of inundation or fire Fire is not aggravating in the crime of arson. Whenever a killing is done with the use of fire, as when to kill someone, you burn down his house while the latter is inside, this is murder. There is no such crime as murder with arson or arson with homicide. The crime committed is only murder. If the victim is already dead and the house is burned, the crime is arson. It is either arson or murder. If the intent is to destroy property, the crime is arson even if someone dies as a
consequence. If the intent is to kill, there is murder even if the house is burned in the process. Illustration:
reflect upon the consequences of his act. Illustration: A, on Monday, thought of killing B on Friday. A knew that B is coming home only on Friday so A decided to kill B on Friday evening when he comes home. On Thursday, A met B and killed him. Is there evident premeditation? None but there is treachery as the attack was sudden. Can there be evident premeditation when the killing is accidental? No. In evident premeditation, there must be a clear reflection on the part of the offender. However, if the killing was accidental, there was no evident premeditation. What is necessary to show and to bring about evident premeditation aside from showing that as some prior time, the offender has manifested the intention to kill the victim, and subsequently killed the victim. Illustrations:
A and B were arguing about something. One argument led to another until A struck B to death with a bolo. A did not know that C, the son of B was also in their house and who was peeping through the door and saw what A did. Afraid that A might kill him, too, he hid somewhere in the house. A then dragged B’s body and poured gasoline on it and burned the house altogether. As a consequence, C was burned and eventually died too. As far as the killing of B is concerned, it is homicide since it is noted that they were arguing. It could not be murder. As far as the killing of C is concerned, the crime is arson since he intended to burn the house only. No such crime as arson with homicide. Law enforcers only use this to indicate that a killing occurred while arson was being committed. At the most, you could designate it as ―death as a consequence of arson.‖ Evident premeditation For evident premeditation to be aggravating, the following conditions must concur: (1) The time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) An act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; (3) Sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution, to allow him to
A and B fought. A told B that someday he will kill B. On Friday, A killed B. A and B fought on Monday but since A already suffered so many blows, he told
B, “This week shall not pass, I will kill you.” On Friday, A killed B. Is there evident premeditation in both cases? None in both cases. What condition is missing to bring about evident premeditation? Evidence to show that between Monday and Friday, the offender clung to his determination to kill the victim, acts indicative of his having clung to his determination to kill B. A and B had a quarrel. A boxed B. A told B, “I will kill you this week.” A bought firearms. On Friday, he waited for B but killed C instead. Is there evident premeditation? There is aberratio ictus. So, qualify. Insofar as B is concerned, the crime is attempted murder because there is evident premeditation. However, that murder cannot be considered for C. Insofar as C is concerned, the crime is homicide because there was no evident premeditation. Evident premeditation shall not be considered when the crime refers to a different person other than the person premeditated against. While it is true that evident premeditation may be absorbed in treachery because the means, method and form of attack may be premeditated and would be resorted to by the offender. Do not consider both aggravating circumstances of
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treachery and evident premeditation against the offender. It is only treachery because the evident premeditation is the very conscious act of the offender to ensure the execution. But there may be evident premeditation and there is treachery also when the attack was so sudden. A and B are enemies. They fought on Monday and parted ways. A decided to seek revenge. He bought a firearm and practiced shooting and then sought B. When A saw B in the restaurant with so many people, A did not dare fire at B for fear that he might hit a stranger but instead, A saw a knife and used it to stab B with all suddenness. Evident premeditation was not absorbed in treachery because
treachery refers to the manner of committing the crime. Evident premeditation is always absorbed in treachery. This is one aggravating circumstance where the offender who premeditated, the law says evident. It is not enough that there is some premeditation. Premeditation must be clear. It is required that there be evidence showing meditation between the time when the offender determined to commit the crime and the time when the offender executed the act. It must appear that the offender clung to his determination to commit the crime. The fact that the offender premeditated is not prima facie indicative of evident premeditation as the meeting or encounter between the offender and the offended party was only by chance or accident. In order for evident premeditation to be considered, the very person/offended party premeditated against must be the one who is the victim of the crime. It is not necessary that the victim is identified. It is enough that the victim is determined so he or she belongs to a group or class who may be premeditated against. This is a circumstance that will qualify a killing from homicide to murder. Illustration: A person who has been courting a lady for several years now has been jilted. Because of this, he thought of killing somebody. He, then bought a knife, sharpened it and stabbed the first man he met on the street. It was held that evident premeditation is not present. It is essential for this aggravating circumstance for the victim to be identified from the beginning.
A premeditated to kill any member of particular fraternity. He then killed one. This is murder – a homicide which has been qualified into murder by evident premeditation which is a qualifying circumstance. Same where A planned to kill any member of the Iglesio ni Kristo. There are some crimes which cannot be aggravated by evident premeditation because they require some planning before they can be committed. Evident premeditation is part of the crime like kidnapping for ransom, robbery with force upon things where there is entry into the premises of the offended party, and estafa through false pretenses where the offender employs insidious means which cannot happen accidentally. Craft Aggravating in a case where the offenders pretended to be bona fide passengers of a jeepney in order not to arouse suspicion, but once inside the jeepney, robbed the passengers and the driver (People v. Lee, decided on December 20, 1991). Abuse of superior strength
There must be evidence of notorious inequality of forces between the offender and the offended party in their age, size and strength, and that the offender took advantage of such superior strength in committing the crime. The mere fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se constitute abuse of superior strength (People v. Carpio, 191 SCRA 12). Treachery Treachery refers to the employment of means, method and form in the commission of the crime which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The means, method or form employed my be an aggravating circumstance which like availing of total darkness in nighttime or availing of superior strength taken advantage of by the offender, employing means to weaken the defense. Illustration: A and B have been quarreling for some time. One day, A approached B and befriended him. B
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accepted. A proposed that to celebrate their renewed friendship, they were going to drink. B was having too much to drink. A was just waiting for him to get intoxicated and after which, he stabbed B. A pretended to befriend B, just to intoxicate the latter. Intoxication is the means deliberately employed by the offender to weaken the defense of the offended party. If this was the very means employed, the circumstance may be treachery and not abuse of superior strength or means to weaken the defense. What is the essence of treachery? The essence of treachery is that by virtue of the means, method or form employed by the offender, the offended party was not able to put up any defense. If the offended party was able to put up a defense, even only a token one, there is no treachery anymore. Instead some other aggravating circumstance may be present but not treachery anymore. Illustration: A and B quarreled. However A had no chance to fight with B
because A is much smaller than B. A thought of killing B but then he cannot just attack B because of the latter’s size. So, A thought of committing a crime at nighttime with the cover of darkness. A positioned himself in the darkest part of the street where B passes on his way home. One evening, A waited for B and stabbed B. However, B pulled a knife as well and stabbed A also. A was wounded but not mortal so he managed to run away. B was able to walk a few steps before he fell and died. What crime was committed? The crime is only homicide because the aggravating circumstance is only nocturnity and nocturnity is not a qualifying circumstance. The reason why treachery cannot be considered as present here is because the offended party was able to put up a defense and that negates treachery. In treachery, the offended party, due to the means, method or form employed by the offender, the offended party was denied the chance to defend himself. If because of the cover of darkness, B was not able to put up a defense and A was able to flee while B died, the crime is murder because there is already treachery. In the first situation, the crime was homicide only, the nighttime is generic aggravating circumstance.
In the example where A pretended to befriend B and invited him to celebrate their friendship, if B despite intoxication was able to put up some fight against A but eventually, B died, then the attendant circumstance is no longer treachery but means employed to weaken the defense. But in murder, this is also a qualifying circumstance. The crime committed is murder but then the correct circumstance is not treachery but means employed to weaken the defense. In the same manner, if the offender avails of the services of men and in the commission of the crime, they took advantage of superior strength but somehow, the offended party fought back, the crime is still murder if the victim is killed. Although the qualifying circumstance is abuse of superior strength and not treachery, which is also a qualifying circumstance of murder under Article 248. Treachery is out when the attack was merely incidental or accidental because in the definition of treachery, the implication is that the offender had consciously and deliberately adopted the method, means and form used or employed by him. So, if A and B casually met and there and then A stabbed B, although stabbing may be sudden since A was not shown to have the intention of killing B, treachery cannot
be considered present. There must be evidenced on how the crime was committed. It is not enough to show that the victim sustained treacherous wound. Example: A had a gunshot wound at the back of his head. The SC ruled this is only homicide because treachery must be proven. It must be shown that the victim was totally defenseless. Suddenness of the attack does not by itself constitute treachery in the absence of evidence that the manner of the attack was consciously adopted by the offender to render the offended party defenseless (People v. Ilagan, 191 SCRA 643). But where children of tender years were killed, being one year old and 12 years old, the killing is murder even if the manner of attack was not shown (People v. Gahon, decided on April 30, 1991). In People v. Lapan, decided on July 6, 1992, the accused was prosecuted for robbery with
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homicide. Robbery was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Accused held liable only for the killings. Although one of the victims was barely six years old, the accused was convicted only for homicide, aggravated by dwelling and in disregard of age. Treachery not appreciated where quarrel and heated discussion preceded a killing, because the victim would be put on guard (People v. Gupo). But although a quarrel preceded the killing where the victim was atop a coconut tree, treachery was considered as the victim was not in a position to defend himself (People v. Toribio). Distinction between ignominy and cruelty Ignominy shocks the moral conscience of man while cruelty is physical. Ignominy refers to the moral effect of a crime and it pertains to the moral order, whether or not the victim is dead or alive. Cruelty pertains to physical suffering of the victim so the victim has to be alive. In plain language, ignominy is adding insult to injury. A clear example is a married woman being raped before the eyes of her husband.
In a case where the crime committed is rape and the accused abused the victims from behind, the Supreme Court considered the crime as aggravated by ignominy. Hence, raping a woman from behind is ignominious because this is not the usual intercourse, it is something which offends the moral of the offended woman. This is how animals do it. In a case of homicide, while the victim after having been killed by the offender, the offender shoved the body inside a canal, ignominy is held aggravating. After having been killed, the body was thrown into pile of garbage, ignominy is aggravating. The Supreme Court held that it added shame to the natural effects of the crime. Cruelty and ignominy are circumstances brought about which are not necessary in the commission of the crime. Illustration: A and B are enemies. A upon seeing B pulled out a knife and stabbed B 60 times. Will that fact be considered as an aggravating circumstance of cruelty? No, there is cruelty only when there
are evidence that the offender inflicted the stab wounds while enjoying or delighted to see the victim in pain. For cruelty to exist as an aggravating circumstance, there must be evidence showing that the accused inflicted the alleged cruel wounds slowly and gradually and that he is delighted seeing the victim suffer in pain. In the absence of evidence to this effect, there is no cruelty. Sixty stab wounds do not ipso facto make them aggravating circumstances of cruelty. The crime is murder if 60 wounds were inflicted gradually; absence of this evidence means the crime committed is only homicide. Cruelty is aggravating in rape where the offender tied the victim to a bed and burnt her face with a lighted cigarette while raping her laughing all the way (People v. Lucas, 181 SCRA 315). Unlawful entry Unlawful entry is inherent in the crime of robbery with force upon things but aggravating in the crime of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. Motor vehicle The Supreme Court considers strictly the use of the word ―committed‖, that the crime is committed with the use of a motor vehicle, motorized means of transportation or motorized watercraft. There is a decision by the Court of Appeals that a motorized bicycle is a motor vehicle even if the offender used only the foot pedal because he does not know how to operate the motor so if a bicycle is used in the commission of the crime, motor vehicle becomes aggravating if the bicycle is motorized.
This circumstance is aggravating only when used in the commission of the offense. If motor vehicle is used only in the escape of the offender, motor vehicle is not aggravating. To be aggravating, it must have been used to facilitate the commission of the crime. Aggravating when a motorized tricycle was used to commit the crime Organized or syndicated crime group In the same amendment to Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, paragraphs were added which provide that the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any person who belongs to an organized or
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syndicated crime group. An organized or syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of a crime. With this provision, the circumstance of an organized or syndicated crime group having committed the crime has been added in the Code as a special aggravating circumstance. The circumstance being special or qualifying, it must be alleged in the information and proved during the trial. Otherwise, if not alleged in the information, even though proven during the trial,
the court cannot validly consider the circumstances because it is not among those enumerated under Article 14 of the Code as aggravating. It is noteworthy, however, that there is an organized or syndicated group even when only two persons collaborated, confederated, or mutually helped one another in the commission of a crime, which acts are inherent in a conspiracy. Where therefore, conspiracy in the commission of the crime is alleged in the information, the allegation may be considered as procedurally sufficient to warrant receiving evidence on the matter during trial and consequently, the said special aggravating circumstance can be appreciated
if proven.
Alternative circumstances
Art.
15. Their concept. — Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and the other conditions attending its commission. They are the relationship, intoxication and the degree of instruction and education of the offender. The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when the offended party in the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degrees of the offender. The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstances when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony but when the intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
considered as such or the other. If relationship is aggravating, refer to it as aggravating. If mitigating, then refer to it as such. Except for the circumstance of intoxication, the other circumstances in Article 15 may not be taken into account at all when the circumstance has no bearing on the crime committed. So the court will not consider this as aggravating or mitigating simply because the circumstance has no relevance to the crime that was committed. Do not think that because the article says that these circumstances are mitigating or aggravating, that if the circumstance is present, the court will have to take it as mitigating, if not mitigating, aggravating. That is wrong. It is only the circumstance of intoxication which if not mitigating, is automatically aggravating. But the other circumstances, even if they are present, but if they do not influence the crime, the court will not consider it at all. Relationship may not be considered at all, especially if it is not inherent in the commission of the crime. Degree of instruction also will not be considered if the crime is
something which does not require an educated person to understand. Relationship Relationship is not simply mitigating or aggravating. There are specific circumstances where relationship is exempting. Among such circumstances are: (1) In the case of an accessory who is related to the principal within the relationship
Four alternative circumstances (1) (2) (3) (4) Relationship; Intoxication; Degree of instruction; and Education.
Use only the term alternative circumstance for as long as the particular circumstance is not involved in any case or problem. The moment it is given in a problem, do not use alternative circumstance, refer to it as aggravating or mitigating depending on whether the same is
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prescribed in Article 20; (2) Also in Article 247, a spouse does not incur criminal liability for a crime of less serious physical injuries or serious physical injuries if this was inflicted after having surprised the offended spouse or paramour or mistress committing actual sexual intercourse. (3) Those commonly given in Article 332 when the crime of theft, malicious mischief and swindling or estafa. There is no criminal liability but only civil liability if the offender is related to the offended party as spouse, ascendant, or descendant or if the offender is a brother or sister or brother in law or sister in law of the offended party and they are living together. Exempting circumstance is the relationship. This is an absolutory cause. Sometimes, relationship is a qualifying and not only a generic aggravating circumstance. In the crime of qualified seduction, the offended woman must be a virgin and less than 18 yrs old. But if the offender is a
brother of the offended woman or an ascendant of the offended woman, regardless of whether the woman is of bad reputation, even if the woman is 60 years old or more, crime is qualified seduction. In such a case, relationship is qualifying. Intoxication This circumstance is ipso facto mitigating, so that if the prosecution wants to deny the offender the benefit of this mitigation, they should prove that it is habitual and that it is intentional. The moment it is shown to be habitual or intentional to the commission of the crime, the same will immediately aggravate, regardless of the crime committed. Intoxication to be considered mitigating, requires that the offender has reached that degree of intoxication where he has no control of himself anymore. The idea is the offender, because of the intoxication is already acting under diminished self control. This is the rational why intoxication is mitigating. So if this reason is not present, intoxication will not be considered mitigating. So the mere fact that the offender has taken one or more cases of beer of itself does not warrant a conclusion that intoxication is mitigating. There must be indication that because of the alcoholic intake of the offender, he is suffering from diminished self control. There is diminished voluntariness insofar as his intelligence or freedom of action is concerned. It
is not the quantity of alcoholic drink. Rather it is the effect of the alcohol upon the offender which shall be the basis of the mitigating circumstance. Illustration: In a case, there were two laborers who were the best of friends. Since it was payday, they decided to have some good time and ordered beer. When they drank two cases of beer they became more talkative until they engaged in an argument. One pulled out a knife and stabbed the other. When arraigned he invoked intoxication as a mitigating circumstance. Intoxication does not simply mean that the offender has partaken of so much alcoholic beverages. The intoxication in law requires that because of the quality of the alcoholic drink taken, the offender had practically lost self control. So although the offender may have partaken of two cases of beer, but after stabbing the victim he hailed a tricycle and even instructed the driver to the place where he is sleeping and the tricycle could not reach his house and so he has to alight and walk to his house, then there is no diminished self control. The Supreme Court did not
give the mitigating circumstance because of the number of wounds inflicted upon the victim. There were 11 stab wounds and this, the Supreme Court said, is incompatible with the idea that the offender is already suffering from diminished self control. On the contrary, the indication is that the offender gained strength out of the drinks he had taken. It is not the quantity of drink that will determine whether the offender can legally invoke intoxication. The conduct of the offender, the manner of committing the crime, his behavior after committing the crime must show the behavior of a man who has already lost control of himself. Otherwise intoxication cannot legally be considered. Degree of instruction and education These are two distinct circumstances. One may not have any degree of instruction but is nevertheless educated. Example: A has been living with professionals for some time. He may just be a maid in the house with no degree of instruction but he may still be educated. It may happen also that the offender grew up in a family of professionals, only he is the black sheep because he did not want to go to school. But it does not follow that he is bereft of education.
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If the offender did not go higher than Grade 3 and he was involved in a felony, he was invoking lack of degree of education. The Supreme Court held that although he did not receive schooling, yet it cannot be said that he lacks education because he came from a family where brothers are all professionals. So he understands what is right and wrong. The fact that the offender did not have schooling and is illiterate does not mitigate his liability if the crime committed is one which he inherently Absolutory cause The effect of this is to absolve the offender from criminal liability, although not from civil liability. It has the same effect as an exempting circumstance, but it is not called as such in order not to confuse it with
the circumstances under Article 12. (1) Article 20 provides that the penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees with the exception of accessories who profited themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime. (2) Then, Article 89 provides how criminal liability is extinguished: Death of the convict as to the personal penalties, and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished if death occurs before final judgment; Service of the sentence; Amnesty; Absolute pardon; Prescription of the crime; Prescription of the penalty; and Marriage of the offended woman as provided in Article 344. (3) Under Article 247, a legally married person who kills or inflicts physical injuries upon his or her spouse whom he surprised having sexual intercourse with his or her paramour or mistress in not criminally liable. (4) Under Article 219, discovering secrets
understands as wrong such as parricide. If a child or son or daughter would kill a parent, illiteracy will not mitigate because the low degree of instruction has no bearing on the crime. In the same manner, the offender may be a lawyer who committed rape. The fact that he has knowledge of the law will not aggravate his liability, because his knowledge has nothing to do with the commission of the crime. But if he committed falsification, that will aggravate his criminal liability, where he used his special knowledge as a lawyer.
through seizure of correspondence of the ward by their guardian is not penalized. (5) Under Article 332, in the case of theft, swindling and malicious mischief, there is no criminal liability but only civil liability, when the offender and the offended party are related as spouse, ascendant, descendant, brother and sister-in-law living together or where in case the widowed spouse and the property involved is that of the deceased spouse, before such property had passed on to the possession of third parties. (6) Under Article 344, in cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and rape, the marriage of the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action. Absolutory cause has the effect of an exempting circumstance and
they are predicated on lack of voluntariness like instigation. Instigation is associated with criminal intent. Do not consider culpa in connection with instigation. If the crime is culpable, do not talk of instigation. In instigation, the crime is committed with dolo. It is confused with entrapment. Entrapment is not an absolutory cause. Entrapment does not exempt the offender or mitigate his criminal liability. But instigation absolves the offender from criminal liability because in instigation, the offender simply acts as a tool of the law enforcers and, therefore, he is acting without criminal intent because without the instigation, he would not have done the criminal act which he did upon instigation of the law enforcers.
Extenuating circumstances The effect of this is to mitigate the criminal liability of the offender. In other words, this has the same effect as mitigating circumstances, only you do not call it mitigating because this is not found in
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Article 13. Illustrations: (1) An unwed mother killed her child in order to conceal a dishonor. The concealment of dishonor is an extenuating circumstance insofar as the unwed mother or the maternal grandparents is concerned, but not insofar as the father of the child is concerned. Mother killing her new born child to conceal her dishonor, penalty is lowered by two degrees. Since there is a material lowering of the penalty or mitigating the penalty, this is an extenuating circumstance. (2) The concealment of honor by mother in the crime of infanticide is an extenuating circumstance but not in the case of parricide when the age of the victim is three days old and above. (3) In the crime of adultery on the part of a married woman
abandoned by her husband,
at the time she was abandoned by her husband, is it necessary for her to seek the company of another man. Abandonment by the husband does not justify the act of the woman. It only extenuates or reduces criminal liability. When the effect of the circumstance is to lower the penalty there is an extenuating circumstance. (4) A kleptomaniac is one who cannot resist the temptation of stealing things which appeal to his desire. This is not exempting. One who is a kleptomaniac and who would steal objects of his desire is criminally liable. But he would be given the benefit of a mitigating circumstance analogous to paragraph 9 of Article 13, that of suffering from an illness which diminishes the exercise of his will power without, however, depriving him of the consciousness of his act. So this is an extenuating circumstance. The effect is to mitigate the criminal liability.
Distinctions between justifying circumstances and exempting circumstances In justifying circumstances – (5) The circumstance affects the act, not the actor; (6) The act complained of is considered to have been done within the bounds of law; hence, it is legitimate and lawful in the eyes of the law; (7) Since the act is considered lawful, there is no crime, and because there is no crime, there is no criminal; (8) Since there is no crime or criminal, there is no criminal liability as well as civil liability. In exempting circumstances – (5) The circumstances affect the actor, not the act; (6) The act complained of is actually wrongful, but the actor acted without voluntariness. He is a mere tool or instrument of the crime; (7) Since the act complained of is actually wrongful, there is a crime. But because the actor acted without voluntariness, there is absence of dolo or culpa. There is no criminal; (8) Since there is a crime committed but there is no criminal, there is civil liability for the wrong done. But there is no criminal liability. However, in paragraphs 4 and 7 of Article 12, there is neither criminal nor civil liability. When you apply for justifying or exempting circumstances, it is confession and avoidance and burden of proof shifts to the accused and he can no longer rely on weakness of prosecution’s evidence
DECREE CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL / UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION, OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES (P.D. 1866, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 8294) AS AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE (1) If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance (Sec. 1, par. 3). (2) The use of unlicensed firearm to commit homicide or murder is now a special aggravating circumstance; hence, only one crime is committed, i.e., homicide or murder and, therefore, only one information shall be filed (People vs. Castillo, GR 131592-93, 02/15/2000).
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THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002 (RA 9165) As a qualifying aggravating circumstance Qualifying Aggravating Circumstances in the Commission of a Crime by an Offender Under the Influence of Dangerous Drugs. – Notwithstanding the provisions of any law to the contrary, a positive finding for the use of dangerous drugs shall be a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime by an offender, and the application of the penalty provided for in the Revised Penal Code shall be applicable testimony of said informant or witness; and (5) The informant or witness shall strictly and faithfully comply without delay, any condition or undertaking, reduced into writing, lawfully imposed by the State as further consideration for the grant of immunity from prosecution and punishment. Provided, further, That this immunity may be enjoyed by such informant or witness who does not appear to be most guilty for the offense with reference to which his/her information or testimony were given: Provided, finally, That there is no direct evidence available for the State except for the information and testimony of the said informant or witness (Sec. 33).
Termination of the Grant of Immunity. – The immunity granted to the informant or witness, as prescribed in Section 33 of this Act, shall not attach should it turn out subsequently that the information and/or testimony is false, malicious or made only for the purpose of harassing, molesting or in any way prejudicing the persons described in the preceding Section against whom such information or testimony is directed against. In such case, the informant or witness shall be subject to prosecution and the enjoyment of all rights and benefits previously accorded him under this Act or any other law, decree or order shall be deemed terminated. In case an informant or witness under this Act fails or refuses to testify without just cause, and when lawfully obliged to do so, or should he/she violate any condition accompanying such immunity as provided above, his/her immunity shall be removed and he/she shall likewise be subject to contempt and/or criminal prosecution, as the case may be, and the enjoyment of all rights and benefits previously accorded him under this Act or in any other law, decree or order shall be deemed terminated. In case the informant or witness referred to under this Act falls under the applicability of this Section hereof, such individual cannot avail of the provisions under Article VIII of this Act (Sec.
(Sec. 25).
Immunity from prosecution and punishment, coverage Immunity from Prosecution and Punishment. – Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the provisions of Republic Act No. 6981 or the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act of 1991, any person who has violated Sections 7, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 19, Article II of this Act, who voluntarily gives information about any violation of Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 13, and 16, Article II of this Act as well as any violation of the offenses mentioned if committed by a drug syndicate, or any information leading to the whereabouts, identities and arrest of all or any of the members thereof; and who willingly testifies against such persons as described above, shall be exempted from prosecution or punishment for the offense with reference to which his/her information of testimony were given, and may plead or prove the giving of such information and testimony in bar
of such prosecution: Provided, That the following conditions concur: (1) The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the persons described above; (2) Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State; (3) Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material points; (4) the informant or witness has not been previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, except when there is no other direct evidence available for the State other than the information and
34).
Minor offenders
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Suspension of Sentence of a First-Time Minor Offender. – An accused who is over fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense mentioned in Section 11 of this Act, but not more than eighteen (18) years of age at the time when judgment should have been promulgated after having been found guilty of said offense, may be given the benefits of a suspended sentence, subject to the following conditions: (a) He/she has not been previously convicted of violating any provision of this Act, or of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended; or of the Revised Penal Code; or of any special penal laws; (b) He/she has not been previously committed to a Center or to the care of a DOH-accredited physician; and (c) The Board favorably recommends that his/her sentence be suspended. While under suspended sentence, he/she shall be under the supervision and rehabilitative surveillance of the Board, under such conditions that the court may impose for a period ranging from six (6) months to eighteen (18) months. Upon
recommendation of the Board, the court may commit the accused under suspended sentence to a Center, or to the care of a DOH-accredited physician for at least six (6) months, with after-care and follow-up program for not more than eighteen (18) months. In the case of minors under fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of any offense penalized under this Act, Article 192 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1179 shall apply, without prejudice to the application of the provisions of this Section (Sec. 66). Discharge After Compliance with Conditions of Suspended Sentence of a First-Time Minor Offender. – If the accused first time minor offender under suspended sentence complies with the applicable rules and regulations of the Board, including confinement in a Center, the court, upon a favorable recommendation of the Board for the final discharge of the accused, shall
discharge the accused and dismiss all proceedings. Upon the dismissal of the proceedings against the accused, the court shall enter an order to expunge all official records, other than the confidential record to be retained by the DOJ relating to the case. Such an order, which shall be kept confidential, shall restore the accused to his/her status prior to the case. He/she shall not be held thereafter to be guilty of perjury or of concealment or misrepresentation by reason of his/her failure to acknowledge the case or recite any fact related thereto in response to any inquiry made of him for any purpose (Sec. 67). Privilege of Suspended Sentence to be Availed of Only Once by a First-Time Minor Offender. – The privilege of suspended sentence shall be availed of only once by an accused drug dependent who is a first-time offender over fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the violation of Section 15 of this Act but not more than eighteen (18) years of age at the time when judgment should have been promulgated (Sec. 68). Promulgation of Sentence for First-Time Minor Offender. – If the accused first-time minor offender violates any of the conditions of his/her suspended sentence, the applicable rules and regulations of the Board exercising supervision and rehabilitative surveillance over him, including the rules and regulations of the Center should confinement be required, the court shall pronounce judgment of
conviction and he/she shall serve sentence as any other convicted person (Sec. 69). Probation or Community Service for a First-Time Minor Offender in Lieu of Imprisonment. – Upon promulgation of the sentence, the court may, in its discretion, place the accused under probation, even if the sentence provided under this Act is higher than that provided under existing law on probation, or impose community service in lieu of imprisonment. In case of probation, the supervision and rehabilitative surveillance shall be undertaken by the Board through the DOH in coordination with the Board of Pardons and Parole and the Probation Administration. Upon compliance
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with the conditions of the probation, the Board shall submit a written report to the court recommending termination of probation and a final discharge of the probationer, whereupon the court shall issue such an order. The community service shall be complied with under conditions, time and place as may be determined by the court in its discretion and upon the recommendation of the Board and shall apply only to violators of Section 15 of this Act. The completion of the community service shall be under the supervision and rehabilitative surveillance of the Board during the period required by the court. Thereafter, the Board shall render a report on the manner of compliance of said community service. The court in its discretion may require extension of the community service or order a final discharge. In both cases, the judicial records shall be covered by the provisions of Sections 60 and 64 of this Act. If the sentence promulgated by the court requires imprisonment, the period spent in
the Center by the accused during the suspended sentence period shall be deducted from the sentence to be served (Sec. 70). Application / Non
application of RPC provisions (Sec. 98, R.A. 9165) cf. Art. 10, RPC Limited Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. – Notwithstanding any law, rule or regulation to the contrary, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3814), as amended, shall not apply to the provisions of this Act, except in the case of minor offenders. Where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death provided herein shall be reclusion perpetua to death (Sec. 98). Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. — Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary (Art. 10, RPC).
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006 (R.A. 9344); ALSO REFER TO CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE (P.D. 603, AS AMENDED) Definition of child in conflict with the law “Child in Conflict with the Law” refers to a child who is alleged as, accused of, or adjudged as, having committed an offense under Philippine laws (Sec. 4[e]). Minimum age of criminal responsibility A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act. A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act. The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws (Sec. 6). Determination of age The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a child may be determined from the child’s birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her
favor. Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law prior to the filing of the information in any appropriate court may file a case in a summary proceeding for the determination of age before the Family Court which shall decide the case within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the appropriate pleadings of all interested parties. If a case has been filed against the child in conflict with the law and is pending in the appropriate court, the person shall file a motion
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to determine the age of the child in the same court where the case is pending. Pending hearing on the said motion, proceedings on the main case shall be suspended. (Sec. 7). Exemption from criminal liability A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act. A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act. The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws (Sec. 6).
adult shall not be considered an offense and shall not be punished if committed by a child (Sec. 57). Offenses Not Applicable to Children. – Persons below eighteen (18) years of age shall be exempt from prosecution for the crime of vagrancy and prostitution under Section 202 of the Revised Penal Code, of mendicancy under Presidential Decree No. 1563, and sniffing
of rugby under Presidential Decree No. 1619, such prosecution being inconsistent with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Provided, That said persons shall undergo appropriate counseling and treatment program (Sec. 58). Exemption from the Application of Death Penalty. – The provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and other special laws notwithstanding, no death penalty shall be imposed upon children in conflict with the law (Sec. 59).
Status Offenees. – Any conduct not considered an offense or not penalized if committed by an ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004 (R.A. 9262) Battered woman syndrome “Battered Woman Syndrome” refers to a scientifically defined pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms found in women living in battering relationships as a result of cumulative abuse (Sec. 3C[c]). The battered woman syndrome is characterized by the cycle of violence, which has three phases: (1) Tension-building phase – minor battering occurs (verbal, physical abuse or other form of hostile behavior). The woman tries to pacify the batterer but this placatory/passive behavior legitimizes her belief that the man has the right to abuse her. At some point, violence ―spirals out of control‖ and leads to acute battering incident. (2) Acute battering incident – characterized by brutality, destructiveness and sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the
attack and the terrible pain. Acute battering incidents are often very savage and out of control, that bystanders or intervenors likely to get hurt. (3) Tranquil, loving, or nonviolent phase – the couple experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. The battered woman syndrome is a form of selfdefense which is a justifying circumstance. In order to absolve the offender, the defense must prove that all the three phases of cycle of violence have occurred at least twice. If the invocation of self-defense fails, the battered woman syndrome gives rise to two mitigating circumstances: (1) psychological paralysis or diminution of freedom of
action, intelligence or intent analogous to illness that diminishes exercise of will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts, and (2) passion and obfuscation, of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation.
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4. PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE
Art. 16. Who are criminally liable. — The following are criminally liable for grave and less grave felonies: 1. Principals. 2. Accomplices. 3. Accessories. The following are criminally liable for light felonies: 1. Principals 2. Accomplices. Art. 17. Principals. — The following are considered principals: 1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act; 2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it; 3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished. Art. 18. Accomplices. — Accomplices are those persons who, not being included in Art. 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. Art. 19. Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners: 1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime. 2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery. 3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. Art. 20. Accessories
who are exempt from criminal liability. — The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article. Under the Revised Penal Code, when more than one person participated in the commission of the crime, the law looks into their participation because in punishing offenders, the Revised Penal Code classifies them as: (1) principal; (2) accomplice; or (3) accessory. This classification is true only under the Revised Penal Code and is not used under special laws, because the penalties under the latter are never graduated. Do not use the term principal when the crime committed is a violation of special law. Only use the term ―offender.‖ Also only classify offenders when more than one took part in the commission of the crime to determine the proper penalty to be imposed. So, if only one person committed a crime, do not use principal. Use the ―offenders,‖ ―culprits,‖ or the ―accused.‖ When a problem is encountered where there are several participants in the crime, the first thing to find out is if there is a conspiracy. If there is, as a general rule, the criminal liability of all will be the same, because the act of one is the act of all. However, if the participation of one is so insignificant, such that even without his cooperation, the crime would be committed just as well, then notwithstanding the existence of a conspiracy, such offender will be regarded only as an accomplice. The reason for this ruling is that the law favors a milder form of criminal liability if the act of the participant does not demonstrate a clear perversity. As to the liability of the participants in a felony, the Code takes into consideration whether the felony committed is grave, less grave, or light. When the felony is grave, or less grave, all participants are criminally liable. But where the felony is only light only the principal and the accomplice are liable. The accessory is not.
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But even the principal and the accomplice will not be liable if the felony committed is only light and the same is not consummated unless such felony is against persons or property. If they are not and the same is not consummated, even the principal and the accomplice are not liable. Therefore it is only when the light felony is against person or property that criminal liability attaches to the principal or accomplice, even though the felony is only attempted or frustrated, but accessories are not liable for liable for light felonies. Principal by indispensable distinguished from an accomplice cooperation
the legs of the victim merely facilitated the penetration but even without it the son would have penetrated. The basis is the importance of the cooperation to the consummation of the crime. If the crime could hardly be committed without such cooperation, then such cooperation would bring about a principal. But if the cooperation merely facilitated or hastened the consummation of the crime, this would make the cooperator merely an accomplice. In a case where the offender was running after the victim with a knife. Another fellow came and blocked the way of the victim and because of this, the one chasing the victim caught up and stabbed the latter at the back. It was held that the fellow who blocked the victim is a principal by indispensable cooperation because if he did not block the way of the victim, the offender could not have caught up with the latter. In another case, A was mauling B. C, a friend of B tried to approach but D stopped C so that A was able to continuously maul B. The liability of the fellow who stopped the friend from approaching is as an accomplice. Understandably he did not cooperate in the mauling, he only stopped to other fellow from stopping the mauling. In case of doubt, favor the lesser penalty or liability. Apply the doctrine of pro reo. Principal by inducement Concept of the inducement – one strong enough that the person induced could hardly resist. This is tantamount to an irresistible force compelling the person induced to carry out the execution of the crime. Ill advised language is not enough unless he
who made such remark or advice is a co-conspirator in the crime committed. While in the course of a quarrel, a person shouted to A, ―Kill him! Kill him.‖ A killed the other fellow. Is the person who shouted criminally liable. Is that inducement? No. It must be strong as irresistible force. There was a quarrel between two families. One of the sons of family A came out with a shotgun. His mother then shouted, ―Shoot!‖. He shot and killed someone. Is the mother liable? No. Examples of inducement:
It is not just a matter of cooperation, it is more than if the crime could hardly be committed. It is not that the crime would not be committed because if that is what you would imply it becomes an ingredient of the crime and that is not what the law contemplates. In the case of rape, where three men were accused, one was on top of the woman, one held the hands, one held the legs, the Supreme Court ruled that all participants are principals. Those who held the legs and arms are principals by indispensable cooperation. The accused are father and son. The father told his son that the only way to convince the victim to marry him is to resort to rape. So when they saw the opportunity the young man grabbed the woman, threw her on the ground and placed himself on top of her while the father held both legs of the woman and spread them. The Supreme Court ruled that the father is liable only as an accomplice. The point is not just on participation but on the importance of participation in committing the crime. In the first situation, the facts indicate that if the fellow who held the legs of the victim and spread them did not do so, the offender on top could hardly penetrate because the woman was strong enough to move or resist. In the second situation, the son was much bigger than the woman so considering the strength of the son and the victim, penetration is possible even without the assistance of the father. The son was a robust farm boy and the victim undernourished. The act of the father in holding
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―I will give you a large amount of money.‖ ―I will not marry you if you do not kill B‖(let us say he really loves the inducer). They practically become co-conspirators. Therefore you do not look into the degree of inducement anymore. In People v. Balderrama, Ernesto shouted to his younger brother Oscar, ―Birahin mo na, birahin mo na.‖ Oscar stabbed the victim. It was held that there was no conspiracy. Joint or simultaneous action per se is not indicia of conspiracy without showing of common design. Oscar has no rancor with the victim for him to kill the latter. Considering that Ernesto had great moral ascendancy and influence over Oscar being much older, 35 years old, than the latter, who was 18 yrs old, and it was Ernesto who provided his allowance, clothing as well as food and shelter, Ernesto is principal by inducement. In People v. Agapinay, 186 SCRA 812, the one who uttered ―Kill him, we will bury him,‖ while the felonious aggression was taking place cannot be held liable as principal by inducement. Utterance was said in the excitement of the hour, not a command to be obeyed. In People v. Madali, 188 SCRA 69, the son was mauled. The family was not in good graces of the neighborhood. Father challenged everybody and when neighbors approached, he went home to get a rifle. The shouts of his wife ―Here comes another, shoot him‖ cannot make the wife the principal by inducement. It is not the determining cause of the crime in the absence of proof that the words had great dominance and influence over the husband. Neither is the wife’s act of beaming the victim with a flashlight indispensable to the commission of the killing. She assisted her husband in taking good aim, but such assistance merely facilitated the felonious act of shooting. Considering that it was not so dark and the husband could have accomplished the deed without his wife’s help, and considering further that doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused, the liability of the wife is only that of an accomplice. Accessories Two situations where accessories are not criminally liable:
(1) When the felony committed is a light felony; (2) When the accessory is related to the principal as spouse, or as an ascendant, or descendant or as brother or sister whether legitimate, natural or adopted or where the
accessory is a relative by affinity within the same degree, unless the accessory himself profited from the effects or proceeds of the crime or assisted the offender to profit therefrom. One cannot be an accessory unless he knew of the commission of the crime. One must not have participated in the commission of the crime. The accessory comes into the picture when the crime is already consummated. Anyone who participated before the consummation of the crime is either a principal or an accomplice. He cannot be an accessory. When an offender has already involved himself as a principal or accomplice, he cannot be an accessory any further even though he performs acts pertaining to an accessory. Accessory as a fence The Revised Penal Code defines what manners of participation shall render an offender liable as an accessory. Among the enumeration is ―by profiting themselves or by assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime‖. So the accessory shall be liable for the same felony committed by the principal. However, where the crime committed by the principal was robbery or theft, such participation of an accessory brings about criminal liability under Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law). One who knowingly profits or assists the principal to profit by the effects of robbery or theft is not just an accessory to the crime, but principally liable for fencing under Presidential Decree No. 1612. Any person who, with intent to gain, acquires and/or sell, possesses, keeps or in any manner deals with any article of value which he knows or should be known to him to be the proceeds of robbery or theft is considered a ―fence‖ and incurs criminal liability for ―fencing‖ under said decree. The penalty is higher than that of a mere accessory to the crime of robbery or theft. Likewise, the participation of one who conceals the effects of robbery or theft gives rise to criminal liability for ―fencing‖, not simply of an accessory under paragraph 2 of Article 19 of the Code. Mere possession of any article of value
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which has been the subject of robbery or theft brings about the presumption of ―fencing‖. Presidential Decree No. 1612 has, therefore, modified Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code. Questions & Answers 1. May one who profited out of the proceeds of estafa or malversation be prosecuted under the Anti-Fencing Law? No. There is only a fence when the crime is theft or robbery. If the crime is embezzlement or estafa, still an accessory to the crime of estafa, not a fence. 2. If principal committed robbery by snatching a wristwatch and gave it to his wife to sell, is the wife criminally liable? Can she be prosecuted as an accessory and as a fence? The liability of the wife is based on her assisting the principal to profit and that act is punishable as fencing. She will no longer be liable as an accessory to the crime of robbery. In both laws, Presidential Decree No. 1612 and the Revised Penal Code, the same act is the basis of liability and you cannot punish a person twice for the same act as that would go against double jeopardy. Acquiring the effects of piracy or brigandage It is relevant to consider in connection with the criminal liability of accessories under the Revised Penal Code, the liability of persons acquiring property subject of piracy or brigandage. The act of knowingly acquiring or receiving property which is the effect or the proceeds of a crime generally brings about criminal liability of an accessory under Article 19, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. But if the crime was piracy of brigandage under Presidential Decree No. 533 (Anti-piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974), said act constitutes the crime of abetting piracy or abetting brigandage as the case may be, although the penalty is that for an accomplice, not just an accessory, to the piracy or brigandage. To this end, Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides that any person who knowingly and in any manner…
acquires or receives property taken by such pirates or brigands or in any manner derives benefit therefrom… shall be considered as an accomplice of the principal offenders and be punished in accordance with the Rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code. It shall be presumed that any person
who does any of the acts provided in this Section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. Although Republic Act No. 7659, in amending Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, incorporated therein the crime of piracy in Philippine territorial waters and thus correspondingly superseding Presidential Decree No. 532, Section 4 of the Decree which punishes said acts as a crime of abetting piracy or brigandage, still stands as it has not been repealed nor modified, and is not inconsistent with any provision of Republic Act No. 7659. Destroying the corpus delicti When the crime is robbery or theft, with respect to the second involvement of an accessory, do not overlook the purpose which must be to prevent discovery of the crime. The corpus delicti is not the body of the person who is killed, even if the corpse is not recovered, as long as that killing is established beyond reasonable doubt, criminal liability will arise and if there is someone who destroys the corpus delicti to prevent discovery, he becomes an accessory. Harboring or concealing an offender In the third form or manner of becoming an accessory, take note that the law distinguishes between a public officer harboring, concealing or assisting the principal to escape and a private citizen or civilian harboring concealing or assisting the principal to escape. In the case of a public officer, the crime committed by the principal is immaterial. Such officer becomes an accessory by the mere fact that he helped the principal to escape by harboring or concealing, making use of his public function and thus abusing the same. On the other hand, in case of a civilian, the mere fact that he harbored concealed or assisted the principal to escape does not ipso facto make him
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an accessory. The law requires that the principal must have committed the crime of treason, parricide, murder or attempt on the life of the Chief
Executive. If this is not the crime, the civilian does not become an accessory unless the principal is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. Even if the crime committed by the principal is treason, or murder or parricide or attempt on the life of the Chief Executive, the accessory cannot be held criminally liable without the principal being found guilty of any such crime. Otherwise the effect would be that the accessory merely harbored or assisted in the escape of an innocent man, if the principal is acquitted of the charges. Illustration: Crime committed is kidnapping for ransom. Principal was being chased by soldiers. His aunt hid him in the ceiling of her house and aunt denied to soldiers that her nephew had ever gone there. When the soldiers left, the aunt even gave money to her nephew to go to the province. Is aunt criminally liable? No. Article 20 does not include an auntie. However, this is not the reason. The reason is because one who is not a public officer and who assists an offender to escape or otherwise harbors, or conceals such offender, the crime committed by the principal must be either treason, parricide murder or attempt on the life of the Chief executive or the principal is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. The crime committed by the principal is determinative of the liability of the accessory who harbors, conceals knowing that the crime is committed. If the person is a public officer, the nature of the crime is immaterial. What is material is that he used his public function in assisting escape. However, although under paragraph 3 of Article 19 when it comes to a civilian, the law specifies the crimes that should be committed, yet there is a special law which punishes the same act and it does not specify a particular crime. Presidential Decree No. 1829, which penalizes obstruction of apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders, effective January 16, 1981, punishes acts commonly referred to as ―obstructions of justice‖. This Decree penalizes under Section 1(c) thereof, the act, inter alia, of ―(c) Harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of any person he knows or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has
committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction.‖ Here, there is no specification of the crime to be committed by the offender for criminal liability to be incurred
for harboring, concealing, or facilitating the escape of the offender, and the offender need not be the principal – unlike paragraph 3, Article 19 of the Code. The subject acts may not bring about criminal liability under the Code, but under this decree. Such an offender if violating Presidential Decree No. 1829 is no longer an accessory. He is simply an offender without regard to the crime committed by the person assisted to escape. So in the problem, the standard of the Revised Penal Code, aunt is not criminally liable because crime is kidnapping, but under Presidential Decree No. 1829, the aunt is criminally liable but not as an accessory. Whether the accomplice and the accessory may be tried and convicted even before the principal is found guilty There is an earlier Supreme Court ruling that the accessory and accomplice must be charged together with the principal and that if the latter be acquitted, the accomplice and the accessory shall not be criminally liable also, unless the acquittal is based on a defense which is personal only to the principal. Although this ruling may be correct if the facts charged do not make the principal criminally liable at all, because there is no crime committed. Yet it is not always true that the accomplice and accessory cannot be criminally liable without the principal first being convicted. Under Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, it is required that all those involved in the commission of the crime must be included in the information that may be filed. And in filing an information against the person involved in the commission of the crime, the law does not distinguish between principal, accomplice and accessory. All will be accused and whether a certain accused will be principal or accomplice or accessory will depend on what the evidence would show as to his involvement in the crime. In other words, the liability of the accused will depend on the quantum of evidence adduced by the prosecution against the particular accused. But the prosecutor must initiate proceedings versus the principal.
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Even if the principal is convicted, if the evidence presented against a supposed accomplice or a supposed accessory does not meet the required proof beyond reasonable doubt, then said accused will be acquitted. So the criminal liability of an accomplice or accessory does not depend on the criminal liability of the principal but depends on the quantum of evidence. But if the evidence shows that the act done does not constitute a crime and the principal is acquitted, then the supposed accomplice and accessory should also be acquitted. If there is no crime, then there is no criminal liability, whether principal, accomplice, or accessory. Under paragraph 3, Article 19, take note in the case of a civilian who harbors, conceals, or assists the escape of the principal, the law requires that the principal be found guilty of any of the specified crimes: treason, parricide, etc. The paragraph uses the particular word ―guilty‖. So this means that before the civilian can be held liable as an accessory, the principal must first be found guilty of the crime charged, either treason, parricide, murder, or attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive. If the principal is DECREE PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS (P.D. 1829) Punishable acts under Sec. 1 Any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases are punished by committing any of the following acts: (1) Preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from reporting the commission of any offense or the identity of any offender/s by means of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force or threats; (2) Altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object with intent to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official proceedings in criminal cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases; (3) Harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or
acquitted, that means he is not guilty and therefore, the civilian who
harbored, concealed or assisted in the escape did not violate art. 19. That is as far as the Revised Penal Code is concerned. But not Presidential Decree No. 1829. This special law does not require that there be prior conviction. It is a malum prohibitum, no need for guilt, or knowledge of the crime. In Taer v. CA, accused received from his coaccused two stolen male carabaos. Conspiracy was not proven. Taer was held liable as an accessory in the crime of cattle rustling under Presidential Decree No. 533. [Taer should have been liable for violation of the Anti-fencing law since cattle rustling is a form of theft or robbery of large cattle, except that he was not charged with fencing.] In Enrile v. Amin, a person charged with rebellion should not be separately charged under Presidential Decree No. 1829. The theory of absorption must not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses punished under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense. suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction; (4) Publicly using a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime, evading prosecution or the execution of a judgment, or concealing his true name and other personal circumstances for the same purpose or purposes; (5) Delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of process or court orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscal’s offices, in Tanodbayan, or in the courts; (6) Making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to effect the course or outcome of the investigation of, or official proceedings in criminal cases; (7) Soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit in consideration of abstaining from, discontinuing, or impeding the prosecution of a criminal offender; (8) Threatening directly or indirectly another with the infliction of any wrong upon his person, honor or property or that of any immediate member or members of his family in order to prevent such person
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from appearing in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or imposing a condition, whether lawful or unlawful, in order to prevent a person from appearing in the investigation of, or in official proceedings in criminal cases; (9) Giving of false or fabricated information to mislead or prevent the law enforcement agencies from apprehending the offender or from protecting the life or property of the victim; or fabricating information from the data gathered in confidence by investigating authorities for purposes of background investigation and not for publication and publishing or disseminating the same to mislead the investigator or the court. If any of these is penalized by any other law with a high penalty, the higher penalty shall be imposed. Compare with Article 20, RPC (accessories exempt from criminal liability) (1) Art. 19. Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or
accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners: 1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime. 2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery. 3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. (2) Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. — The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article (by profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime).
5. PENALTIES
General Principles (g) Must be correctional. (1) Art. 21. Penalties that may be imposed. — No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission. (2) Judicial conditions for penalty: (a) Must be productive of suffering but the limit is the integrity of human personality; (b) Must be proportionate to the crime in the sense that different penalties are prescribed for different felonies; (c) Must be personal as it must be imposed only upon the criminal and no other; (d) Must be legal as it must be the consequence of a judgment according to law; (e) Must be certain so that one cannot escape from it; (f) Must be equal in the sense that it applies to all persons regardless of circumstances; Purposes (1) The purpose of the State in punishing crimes is to secure justice. The State has an existence of its own to maintain a conscience of its own to assert, and moral principles to be vindicated. Penal justice must therefore be exercised by the State in the service and satisfaction of a duty and rests primarily on the moral rightfulness of the punishment inflicted. (2) Padilla gave five theories justifying penalty: (a) Prevention – The State must punish the criminal to prevent or suppress the danger to the State and to the public arising from the criminal acts of the offender; (b) Correction or reformation – The object of punishment in criminal cases is to correct and reform, as the State has the
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duty to take care of and reform the criminal; (c) Exemplarity – The criminal is punished to serve as an example to deter others from committing crimes; (d) Social defense – The State has the right to punish the criminal as a measure of a self-defense so as to protect society from the wrong caused by
the criminal; and (e) Justice – The absolute theory of penalty rests on the theory that crime must be punished by the State as an act of retributive justice, a vindication of absolute right and moral law violated by the criminal. ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY (R.A. 9346) (1) The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, RA 8177 (Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection) is hereby repealed. RA 7659 (Death Penalty Law) and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly (Sec. 1, RA 9346). (2) In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed: (a) The penalty of reclusion perpetua when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC; (b) The penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC; (3) Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of the Act shall not be eligible for parole under the ISLAW. Measures of prevention not considered as penalty The following are the measures of prevention or safety which are not considered penalties under Article 24: (1) The arrest and temporary detention of accused persons as well as their detention by reason of insanity or imbecility or illness requiring their confinement in a hospital. (2) The commitment of a minor to any of the institutions mentioned in art. 80 for the
purposes specified therein. (3) Suspension from the employment or public office during the trial or in order to institute proceedings. (4) Fines and other corrective measures which, in the exercise of their administrative disciplinary powers, superior officials may impose upon their subordinates. (5) Deprivation of rights and reparations which the civil laws may establish in penal form. Why does the Revised Penal Code specify that such detention shall not be a penalty but merely a preventive measure? This article gives justification for detaining the accused. Otherwise, the detention would violate the constitutional provision that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law. And also, the constitutional right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. Correlating Article 24 with Article 29 Although under Article 24, the detention of a person accused of a crime while the case
against him is being tried does not amount to a penalty, yet the law considers this as part of the imprisonment and generally deductible from the sentence. When will this credit apply? If the penalty imposed consists of a deprivation of liberty. Not all who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be given a credit Under Article 24, preventive imprisonment of an accused who is not yet convicted, but by express provision of Article24 is not a penalty. Yet Article 29, if ultimately the accused is convicted and the penalty imposed involves deprivation of liberty, provides that the period during which he had undergone preventive detention will be deducted from the sentence, unless he is one of those disqualified under the law. So, if the accused has actually undergone preventive imprisonment, but if he has been convicted for two or more crimes whether he is a recidivist or not, or when he has been previously summoned but failed to surrender and so the court has to issue a warrant for his arrest, whatever credit he is entitled to shall be forfeited. If the offender is not disqualified from the credit
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or deduction provided for in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, then the next thing to determine is whether he signed an undertaking to abide by the same rules and regulations governing convicts. If he signed an undertaking to abide by the same rules and regulations governing convicts, then it means that while he is suffering from preventive imprisonment, he is suffering like a convict, that is why the credit is full. But if the offender did not sign an undertaking, then he will only be subjected to the rules and regulations governing detention prisoners. As such, he will only be given 80% or 4/5 of the period of his preventive detention. From this provision, one can see that the detention of the offender may subject him only to the treatment applicable to a detention prisoner or to the treatment applicable
to convicts, but since he is not convicted yet, while he is under preventive imprisonment, he cannot be subjected to the treatment applicable to convicts unless he signs and agrees to be subjected to such disciplinary measures applicable to convicts. Detention prisoner has more freedom within the detention institution rather than those already convicted. The convicted prisoner suffers more restraints and hardship than detention prisoners. Under what circumstances may a detention prisoner be released, even though the proceedings against him are not yet terminated? Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code has been amended by a Batas Pambansa effective that tool effect on September 20, 1980. This amendment is found in the Rules of Court, under the rules on bail in Rule 114 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the same treatment exactly is applied there. In the amendment, the law does not speak of credit. Whether the person is entitled to credit is immaterial. The discharge of the offender from preventive imprisonment or detention is predicated on the fact that even if he would be found guilty of the crime charged, he has practically served the sentence already, because he has been detained for a period already equal to if not greater than the maximum penalty that would be possibly be imposed on him if found guilty. If the crime committed is punishable only by destierro, the most the offender may be held under preventive imprisonment is 30 days, and whether the proceedings are terminated or not, such detention prisoner shall be discharged. Understand the amendment made to Article 29. This amendment has been incorporated under Rule 114 precisely to do away with arbitrary detention. Proper petition for habeas corpus must be filed to challenge the legality of the detention of the prisoner. Questions & Answers If the offender has already been released, what is the use of continuing the proceedings? The proceedings will determine whether the accused is liable or not. If he was criminally liable, it follows that he is also civilly liable. The civil liability must be determined. That is why the trial must go on.
DURATION AND EFFECT OF PENALTIES
Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. — Any person sentenced to any of the perpetual penalties shall be pardoned after undergoing the penalty for thirty years,
unless such person by reason of his conduct or some other serious cause shall be considered by the Chief Executive as unworthy of pardon. Reclusion temporal. — The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be from twelve years and one day to twenty years. Prision mayor and temporary
disqualification. — The duration of the penalties of prision mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case its duration shall be that of the principal penalty. Prision correccional, suspension, and destierro. — The duration of the penalties of prision correccional, suspension and destierro shall be from six months and one
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day to six years, except when suspension is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, its duration shall be that of the principal penalty. Arresto mayor. — The duration of the penalty of arresto mayor shall be from one month and one day to six months. Arresto menor. — The duration of the penalty of arresto menor shall be from one day to thirty days. Bond to keep the peace. — The bond to keep the peace shall be required to cover such period of time as the court may determine. Art. 28. Computation of penalties. — If the offender shall be in prison, the term of the duration of the temporary penalties shall be computed from the day on which the judgment of conviction shall have become final. If the offender be not in prison, the term of the duration of the penalty consisting of deprivation of liberty shall be computed from the day that the offender is placed at the disposal of the judicial authorities for the enforcement of the penalty. The duration of the other penalties shall be computed only from the day on which the
defendant commences to serve his sentence. Art. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. — Offenders who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment, if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases: 1. When they are recidivists or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; and 2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily. If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment. (As amended by Republic Act 6127, June 17, 1970).
Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to or more than the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review. In case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment. (As amended by E.O. No. 214, July 10, 1988). Section Two. — Effects of the penalties according to their respective nature Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. — The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects: 1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held even if conferred by popular election. 2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be elected to such office. 3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the rights mentioned. In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence. 4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held. Art. 31.
Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification. — The penalties of perpetual or temporal special disqualification for public office, profession or calling shall produce the following effects: 1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected; 2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or during the term of the sentence according to the extent of such disqualification. Art. 32. Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the
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exercise of the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification. Art. 33. Effects of the penalties of suspension from any public office, profession or calling, or the right of suffrage. — The suspension from public office, profession or calling, and the exercise of the right of suffrage shall disqualify the offender from holding such office or exercising such profession or calling or right of suffrage during the term of the sentence. The person suspended from holding public office shall not hold another having similar functions during the period of his suspension. Art. 34. Civil interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos. Art.
35. Effects of bond to keep the peace. — It shall be the duty of any person sentenced to give bond to keep the peace, to present two sufficient sureties who shall undertake that such person will not commit the offense sought to be prevented, and that in case such offense be committed they will pay the amount determined by the court in the judgment, or otherwise to deposit such amount in the office of the clerk of the court to guarantee said undertaking. The court shall determine, according to its discretion, the period of duration of the bond. Should the person sentenced fail to give the bond as required he shall be detained for a period which shall in no case exceed six months, is he shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed thirty days, if for a light felony. Art. 36. Pardon; its effect. — A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold
public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon. A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence. Art. 37. Cost; What are included. — Costs shall include fees and indemnities in the course of the judicial proceedings, whether they be fixed or unalterable amounts previously determined by law or regulations in force, or amounts not subject to schedule. Art. 38. Pecuniary liabilities; Order of payment. — In case the property of the offender should not be sufficient for the payment of all his pecuniary liabilities, the same shall be met in the following order: 1. The reparation of the damage caused. 2. Indemnification of consequential damages. 3. The fine. 4. The cost of the proceedings. Art. 39. Subsidiary penalty. — If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine mentioned in the paragraph 3 of the nest preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each eight pesos, subject to the following rules: 1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision correccional or arresto and fine, he shall remain under confinement until his fine referred to in the preceding paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no case shall it continue for more than one year, and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the prisoner. 2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the
subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen days, if for a light felony. 3. When the principal imposed is higher than prision correccional, no subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit. 4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a penal institution, but such penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during the period
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of time established in the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer the same deprivations as those of which the principal penalty consists.chan robles virtual law library 5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by reason of his insolvency shall not relieve him, from the fine in case his financial circumstances should improve. (As amended by RA 5465, April 21, 1969). Reclusion perpetua What is the duration of reclusion perpetua? Do not answer Article 27 to this The proper answer would be that perpetua has no duration because indivisible penalty and indivisible have no durations. question. reclusion this is an penalties
place designated in the sentence, not less than 25 Km. However, the court cannot extend beyond 250 Km. If the convict should enter the prohibited places, he commits the crime of evasion of service of sentence under Article 157. But if the convict himself would go further from which he is vanished by the court, there is no evasion of sentence because the 240-Km. limit is upon the authority of the court in vanishing the convict. Under the Revised Penal Code, destierro is the penalty imposed in the following situations: 1. When a legally married person who had surprised his or her spouse in the act of sexual intercourse with another and while in that act or immediately
thereafter should kill or inflict serious physical injuries upon the other spouse, and/or the paramour or mistress. This is found in Article 247. 2. In the crime of grave threat or light threat, when the offender is required to put up a bond for good behavior but failed or refused to do so under Article 284, such convict shall be sentenced to destierro so that he would not be able to carry out his threat. 3. In the crime of concubinage, the penalty prescribed for the concubine is destierro under Article 334. 4. Where the penalty prescribed by law is arresto mayor, but the offender is entitled privileged mitigating circumstance and lowering the prescribed penalty by one degree, the penalty one degree lower is destierro. Thus, it shall be the one imposed. Civil Interdiction Civil interdiction is an accessory penalty. Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence: (1) The rights of parental authority, or guardianship either as to the person or property of any ward; (2) Marital authority; (3) The right to manage his property; and (4) The right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos. Can a convict execute a last will and testament? Yes.
Under Article 27, those sentenced to reclusion perpetua shall be pardoned after undergoing the penalty for 30 years, unless such person, by reason of his conduct or some other serious cause, shall be considered by the Chief Executive as unworthy of pardon. Under Article 70, which is the Three-Fold Rule, the maximum period shall in no case exceed 40 years. If a convict who is to serve several sentences could only be made to serve 40 years, with more reason, one who is sentenced to a singly penalty of reclusion perpetua should not be held for more than 40 years. The duration of 40 years is not a matter of provision of law; this is only by analogy. There is no provision of the Revised Penal Code that one sentenced to reclusion perpetua cannot be held in jail for 40 years and neither is there a decision to this effect. Destierro What is the duration of destierro? The duration of destierro is from six months and one day, to six year, which is the same as that of prision correcional and suspension. Destierro is a principal penalty. It is a punishment whereby a convict is vanished to a certain place and is prohibited from entering or coming near that
PRIMARY CLASSIFICATION OF PENALTIES
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Principal penalties and accessory penalties The penalties which are both principal and accessory penalties are the following: (1) Perpetual or disqualification; (2) Perpetual or disqualification. Questions & Answers 1. If the penalty of suspension is imposed as an accessory, what is the duration? temporary temporary absolute special (1) Article 40. Death – perpetual absolute disqualification, and civil interdiction during 30 years following date of sentence; (2) Article 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and perpetual absolute disqualification; (3) Article 42. Prision mayor – temporary absolute disqualification perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage; (4) Article 43. Prision correccional – suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and perpetual special disqualification from the rights of suffrage if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed 18 months. (5) Article 44. Arresto – suspension of the right to hold office and the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence. There are accessory penalties which are true to other principal penalties. An example is the penalty of civil interdiction. This is an accessory penalty and, as provided in Article 34, a convict sentenced to civil interdiction suffers certain disqualification during the term of the sentence. One of the disqualifications is that of making a conveyance of his property inter vivos. Illustration: A has been convicted and is serving the penalty of prision mayor. While serving sentence, he executed a deed of sale over his only parcel of land. A creditor moved to annul the sale on the ground that the convict is not qualified to execute a deed of conveyance inter vivos. If
you were the judge, how would you resolve the move of the creditor to annul the sale? Civil interdiction is not an accessory penalty in prision mayor. The convict can convey his property. Questions & Answers What accessory penalty is common to all principal penalties?
Its duration shall be that of the principal penalty.
2. If the penalty of temporary disqualification is imposed as principal penalty, what is the duration?
The duration is six years and one day to 12 years.
3. What do we refer to if it is perpetual or temporary disqualification?
We refer to disqualification.
the
duration
of
the
4. What do we refer to if it is special or absolute disqualification?
We refer to the nature of the disqualification.
The classification of principal and accessory is found in Article 25. In classifying the penalties as principal and accessory, what is meant by this is that those penalties classified as accessory penalties need not be stated in the sentence. The accessory penalties follow the principal penalty imposed for the crime as a matter of course. So in the imposition of the sentence, the court will specify only the principal penalty but that is not the only penalty which the offender will suffer. Penalties which the law
considers as accessory to the prescribed penalty are automatically imposed even though they are not stated in the judgment. As to the particular penalties that follow a particular principal penalty, Articles 40 to 45 of the Revised Penal Code shall govern. If asked what are the accessory penalties, do not just state the accessory penalties. State the principal penalty and the corresponding accessory penalties. Penalties in which other accessory penalties are inherent:
Confiscation or forfeiture on the instruments or proceeds of the crime. Bond to keep the peace
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One of the principal penalties common to the others is bond to keep the peace. There is no crime under the Revised Penal Code which carries this penalty. Bond for good behavior Bond for good behavior is prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the crimes of grave threats and light threats under Article 234. You cannot find this penalty in Article 25 because Article 25 only provides for bond to keep the peace. Remember that no felony shall be punished by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission pursuant to Article 21. Questions & Answers 1. If bond to keep the peace is not the same as bond for good behavior, are they one and the same bond that differ only in name? No. The legal effect of each is entirely different. The legal effect of a failure to post a bond to keep the peace is imprisonment either for six months or 30 days, depending on whether the felony committed is grave or less grave on one hand, or it is light only on the other hand. The legal effect of failure to post a bond for good behavior is not imprisonment but destierro under Article 284. Thus, it is clear that the two bonds are not the same considering that the legal effect or the failure to
put up the bond is not the same. Divisible and indivisible penalties
deterring crimes or not? This should be the premise of your reasoning. Designation of penalty Since the principal penalties carry with them certain accessory penalties, the courts are not at liberty to use any designation of the principal penalty. So it was held that when the penalty should be reclusion perpetua, it is error for the court to use the term ―life imprisonment‖. In other words, the courts are not correct when they deviate from the technical designation of the principal penalty, because the moment they deviate from this designation, there will be no corresponding accessory penalties that will go with them. Illustration: When the judge sentenced the accused to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, but instead of saying reclusion perpetua, it sentenced the accused to life imprisonment, the designation is wrong.
Reclusion perpetua as modified
Before the enactment of Republic Act No. 7659, which made amendments to the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of reclusion perpetua had no fixed duration. The Revised Penal Code provides in Article 27 that the convict shall be pardoned after undergoing the penalty for thirty years, unless by reason of his conduct or some other serious cause, he is not deserving of pardon. As amended by Section 21 of Republic Act No. 7659, the same article now provides that the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be from 20 years to 40 years. Because of this, speculations arose as to whether it made reclusion perpetua a divisible penalty. As we know, when a penalty has a fixed duration, it is said to be divisible and, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 65 and 76, should be divided into three equal portions to form one period of each of the three portions. Otherwise, if the penalty has no fixed duration, it is an indivisible penalty. The nature of the penalty as divisible or indivisible is decisive of the proper penalty to be imposed under the Revised Penal Code inasmuch as it determines whether the rules in Article 63 or the rules in Article 64 should be observed in fixing the penalty.
When we talk of period, it is implying that the penalty is divisible. If,
after being given a problem, you were asked to state the period in which the penalty of reclusion perpetua is to be imposed, remember that when the penalty is indivisible, there is no period. Do not talk of period, because when you talk of period, you are implying that the penalty is divisible because the period referred to is the minimum, the medium, and the maximum. If it is indivisible, there is no such thing as minimum, medium and maximum. The capital punishment You were asked to state whether you are in favor or against capital punishment. Understand that you are not taking the examination in Theology. Explain the issue on the basis of social utility of the penalty. Is it beneficial in
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Thus, consistent with the rule mentioned, the Supreme Court, by its First Division, applied Article 65 of the Code in imposing the penalty for rape in People v. Conrado Lucas, GR No. 108172-73, May 25, 1994. It divided the time included in the penalty of reclusion perpetua into three equal portions, with each portion composing a period as follows: Minimum – 20 years and one day, to 26 years and eight months; Medium – 26 years, eight months and one day, to 33 years and four months; Maximum – 34 years, four months and one day, to 40 years. Considering the aggravating circumstance of relationship, the Court sentenced the accused to imprisonment of 34 years, four months and one day of reclusion perpetua, instead of the straight penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court. The appellee seasonably filed a motion for clarification to correct the duration of the sentence, because instead of beginning with 33 years, four months and one day, it was stated as 34 years, four months and one day. The issue of whether the amendment of Article 27 made reclusion perpetua a divisible penalty was raised, and because the issue is one of first impression and momentous importance, the
First Division referred the motion to the Court en banc. In a resolution promulgated on January 9, 1995, the Supreme Court en banc held that reclusion perpetua shall remain as an indivisible penalty. To this end, the resolution states: After deliberating on the motion and reexamining the legislation history of RA 7659, the Court concludes that although Section 17 of RA 7659 has fixed the duration of Reclusion Perpetua from twenty years (20) and one (1) to forty 40 years, there was no clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty. It shall then remain as an indivisible penalty. Verily, if reclusion perpetua was classified as a divisible penalty, then Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code would lose its reason and basis for existence. To illustrate, the first paragraph of Section 20 of the amended RA No. 6425 provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death whenever
the dangerous drugs involved are of any of the quantities stated herein. If Article 63 of the Code were no longer applicable because reclusion perpetua is supposed to be a divisible penalty, then there would be no statutory rules for determining when either reclusion perpetua or death should be the imposable penalty. In fine, there would be no occasion for imposing reclusion perpetua as the penalty in drug cases, regardless of the attendant modifying circumstances. Now then, if Congress had intended to reclassify reclusion perpetua as divisible penalty, then it should have amended Article 63 and Article 76 of the Revised Penal Code. The latter is the law on what are considered divisible penalties under the Code and what should be the duration of the periods thereof. There are, as well, other provisions of the Revised Penal Code involving reclusion perpetua, such as Article 41 on the accessory penalties thereof and paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 61, which have not been touched by a corresponding amendment. Ultimately, the question arises: ―What then may be the reason for the amendment fixing the duration of reclusion perpetua?‖ This question was answered in the same case of People v. Lucas by quoting pertinent portion of the decision in People v. Reyes, 212 SCRA 402, thus: The imputed duration of thirty (30) years for reclusion perpetua, thereof, is only to serve as the basis for determining the convict’s eligibility for pardon or for the application of the three-fold rule in the service of penalties. Since, however, in all the
graduated scales of penalties in the Code, as set out in Article 25, 70 and 21, reclusion perpetua is the penalty immediately next higher to reclusion temporal, it follows by necessary implication that the minimum of reclusion perpetua is twenty (20) years and one (1) day with a maximum duration thereafter to last for the rest of the convict’s natural life, although, pursuant to Article 70, it appears that the maximum period for the service of penalties shall not exceed
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forty (40) years. It would be legally absurd and violative of the scales of penalties in the Code to reckon the minimum of Reclusion Perpetua at thirty (30) years since there would thereby be a resultant lacuna whenever the penalty exceeds the maximum twenty (20) years of Reclusion Temporal but is less than thirty (30) years. Subsidiary penalty Is subsidiary penalty an accessory penalty? No. If the convict does not want to pay fine and has so many friends and wants to prolong his stay in jail, can he stay there and not pay fine? No. After undergoing subsidiary penalty and the convict is already released from jail and his financial circumstances improve, can he be made to pay? Yes, for the full amount with deduction. Article 39 deals with subsidiary penalty. There are two situations there: (1) When there is a principal penalty of imprisonment or any other principal penalty and it carries with it a fine; and (2) When penalty is only a fine. Therefore, there shall be no subsidiary penalty for the non-payment of damages to the offended party. This subsidiary penalty is one of important matter under the title of penalty. A subsidiary penalty is not an accessory penalty. Since it is not an accessory penalty, it must be expressly stated in the sentence, but the sentence does not specify the period of subsidiary penalty because it will only be known if the convict cannot pay the fine. The sentence will
merely provide that in case of non-payment of the fine, the convict shall be required to save subsidiary penalty. It will then be the prison authority who will compute this. So even if subsidiary penalty is proper in a case, if the judge failed to state in the sentence that the convict shall be required to suffer subsidiary penalty in case of insolvency to pay the fine, that convict cannot be required to suffer the accessory penalty. This particular legal point is a bar problem. Therefore, the judgment of the court must state this. If the judgment is silent, he
cannot suffer any subsidiary penalty. The subsidiary penalty is not an accessory penalty that follows the principal penalty as a matter of course. It is not within the control of the convict to pay the fine or not and once the sentence becomes final and executory and a writ of execution is issued to collect the fine, if convict has property to levy upon, the same shall answer for the fine, whether he likes it or not. It must be that the convict is insolvent to pay the fine. That means that the writ of execution issued against the property of the convict, if any, is returned unsatisfied. In People v. Subido, it was held that the convict cannot choose not to serve, or not to pay the fine and instead serve the subsidiary penalty. A subsidiary penalty will only be served if the sheriff should return the execution for the fine on the property of the convict and he does not have the properties to satisfy the writ. Questions & Answers The penalty imposed by the judge is fine only. The sheriff then tried to levy the property of the defendant after it has become final and executory, but it was returned unsatisfied. The court then issued an order for said convict to suffer subsidiary penalty. The convict was detained, for which reason he filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that his detention is illegal. Will the petition prosper? Yes. The judgment became final without statement as to subsidiary penalty, so that even if the convict has no money or property to satisfy the fine, he cannot suffer subsidiary penalty because the latter is not an accessory and so it must be expressly stated. If the court overlooked to provide for subsidiary penalty in the sentence and its attention was later called to that effect, thereafter, it tried to modify the sentence to include subsidiary penalty after period to appeal had already elapsed, the addition of subsidiary penalty will be null and void. This is tantamount to
double jeopardy. If the fine is prescribed with the penalty of imprisonment or any deprivation of liberty, such imprisonment should not be higher than six years or prision correccional. Otherwise, there is no subsidiary penalty. When is subsidiary penalty applied
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(1) If the subsidiary penalty prescribed for the non-payment of fine which goes with the principal penalty, the maximum duration of the subsidiary penalty is one year, so there is no subsidiary penalty that goes beyond one year. But this will only be true if the one year period is higher than 1/3 of the principal penalty, the convict cannot be made to undergo subsidiary penalty more than 1/3 of the duration of the principal penalty and in no case will it be more than 1 year – get 1/3 of the principal penalty – whichever is lower. (2) If the subsidiary penalty is to be imposed for nonpayment of fine and the principal penalty imposed be fine only, which is a single penalty, that means it does not go with another principal penalty, the most that the convict will be required to undergo subsidiary imprisonment is six months, if the felony committed is grave or less grave, otherwise, if the felony committed is slight, the maximum duration of the subsidiary penalty is only 15 days. There are some who use the term subsidiary imprisonment. The term is wrong because the penalty is not only served by imprisonment. The subsidiary penalty follows the nature of the principal penalty. If the principal penalty is destierro, this being a divisible penalty, and a penalty with a fixed duration, the non-payment of the fine will bring about subsidiary penalty. This being a restriction of liberty with a fixed duration under Article 39 for the nonpayment of fine that goes with the destierro, the convict will be required to undergo subsidiary penalty and it will also be in the form of destierro.
Illustration: A convict was sentenced to suspension and fine. This is a penalty where a public officer anticipates public duties, he entered into the performance of public office even before he has complied with the required formalities. Suppose the convict cannot pay the fine, may he be required to undergo subsidiary penalty? Yes, because the penalty of suspension has a fixed duration. Under Article 27, suspension and destierro have the same duration as prision correccional. So the duration does not exceed six years. Since it is a penalty with a fixed duration under Article 39, when there is a subsidiary penalty, such shall be 1/3 of the
period of suspension which in no case beyond one year. But the subsidiary penalty will be served not by imprisonment but by continued suspension. If the penalty is public censure and fine even if the public censure is a light penalty, the convict cannot be required to pay the fine for subsidiary penalty for the non-payment of the fine because public censure is a penalty that has no fixed duration. Do not consider the totality of the imprisonment the convict is sentenced to but consider the totality or the duration of the imprisonment that the convict will be required to serve under the Three-Fold Rule. If the totality of the imprisonment under this rule does not exceed six years, then, even if the totality of all the sentences without applying the Three-Fold Rule will go beyond six years, the convict shall be required to undergo subsidiary penalty if he could not pay the fine. Illustration: A collector of NAWASA collected from 50 houses within a certain locality. When he was collecting NAWASA bills, the charges of all these consumers was a minimum of 10. The collector appropriated the amount collected and so was charged with estafa. He was convicted. Penalty imposed was arresto mayor and a fine of P200.00 in each count. If you were the judge, what penalty would you impose? May the convict be required to undergo subsidiary penalty in case he is insolvent to pay the fine? The Three-Fold Rule should not applied by the court. In this case of 50 counts of estafa, the penalty imposed was arresto mayor and a fine of P200.00. Arresto mayor + P200.00 x 50. Arresto Mayor is six months x 50 = 25 years. P200.00 x 50 = P10,000.00. Thus, I would impose a penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of P200.00 multiplied by 50 counts and state further that ―as a judge, I am not in the position to apply the Three-Fold Rule because the Three-Fold Rule is to be given effect
when the convict is already serving sentence in the penitentiiary. It is the prison authority who will apply the Three-Fold Rule. As far as the court is concerned, that will be the penalty to be imposed.‖ For the purposes of subsidiary penalty, apply the Three-Fold Rule if the penalty is arresto mayor and a fine of P200.00 multiplied by 3. This
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means one year and six months only. So, applying the Three- Fold Rule, the penalty does not go beyond six years. Hence, for the nonpayment of the fine of P10,000.00, the convict shall be required to undergo subsidiary penalty. This is because the imprisonment that will be served will not go beyond six years. It will only be one year and six months, since in the service
of the sentence, the Three-Fold Rule will apply. It is clearly provided under Article 39 that if the means of the convict should improve, even if he has already served subsidiary penalty, he shall still be required to pay the fine and there is no deduction for that amount which the convict has already served by way of subsidiary penalty.
APPLICATION OF PENALTIES
Art. 46. Penalty to be imposed upon principals in general. — The penalty prescribed by law for the commission of a felony shall be imposed upon the principals in the commission of such felony. Whenever the law prescribes a penalty for a felony is general terms, it shall be understood as applicable to the consummated felony. Art. 47. In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed. — The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed under existing laws, except in the following cases: 1.
When the guilty person be more than seventy years of age. 2. When upon appeal or revision of the case by the Supreme court, all the members thereof are not unanimous in their voting as to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty. For the imposition of said penalty or for the confirmation of a judgment of the inferior court imposing the death sentence, the Supreme Court shall render its decision per curiam, which shall be signed by all justices of said court, unless some member or members thereof shall have been disqualified from taking part in the consideration of the case, in which even the unanimous vote and signature of only the remaining justices shall be required. Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is different from that intended. — In cases in which the felony committed is different from
that which the offender intended to commit, the following rules shall be observed: 1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding to the offense which the accused intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its maximum period. 2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that corresponding to the one which the accused intended to commit, the penalty for the former shall be imposed in its maximum period. 3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be applicable if the acts committed by the guilty person shall also constitute an attempt or frustration of another crime, if the law prescribes a higher penalty for either of the latter offenses, in which case the penalty provided for the attempted or the frustrated crime shall be imposed in its maximum period. Art. 50. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of a frustrated crime. — The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated felony. Art. 51. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of attempted crimes. — A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony. Art. 52.
Penalty to be imposed upon accomplices in consummated crime. — The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the commission of a consummated felony.
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Art. 53. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories to the commission of a consummated felony. — The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the commission of a consummated felony. Art. 54. Penalty to imposed upon accomplices in a frustrated crime. — The penalty next lower in degree than prescribed by law for the frustrated felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the commission of a frustrated felony. Art. 55. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of a frustrated crime. — The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the frustrated felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the commission of a frustrated felony. Art. 56. Penalty to be imposed upon accomplices in an attempted crime. — The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for an attempt to commit a felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in an attempt to commit the felony. Art. 57. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of an attempted crime. — The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the attempted felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the attempt to commit a felony. Art. 58. Additional penalty to be imposed upon certain accessories. — Those accessories falling within the terms of paragraphs 3 of Article 19 of this Code who should act with abuse of their public functions, shall suffer the additional penalty of absolute perpetual disqualification if the principal offender shall be guilty of a grave felony, and that of absolute temporary disqualification if he shall be guilty of a less grave felony. Art. 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of
failure to commit the crime because the means employed or the aims sought are impossible. — When the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts for the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by such
person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to 500 pesos. Art. 60. Exception to the rules established in Articles 50 to 57. — The provisions contained in Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code shall not be applicable to cases in which the law expressly prescribes the penalty provided for a frustrated or attempted felony, or to be imposed upon accomplices or accessories. Art. 61. Rules for graduating penalties. — For the purpose of graduating the penalties which, according to the provisions of Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as principals of any frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the following rules shall be observed: 1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the penalty next lower in degrees shall be that immediately following that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71 of this Code. 2. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties, or of one or more divisible penalties to be impose to their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale. 3. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of one or two indivisible penalties and the maximum period of another divisible penalty, the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the medium and minimum periods of the proper divisible penalty and the maximum periods of the proper divisible penalty and the maximum period of that immediately following in said respective graduated scale. 4. when the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of several periods, corresponding to different divisible penalties, the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the period immediately following the minimum
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prescribed and of the two next following, which shall be taken from the penalty prescribed, if possible; otherwise from the penalty immediately following in the above mentioned respective graduated scale. 5. When the law prescribes a penalty for a crime in some manner not especially provided for in the four preceding rules, the courts, proceeding by analogy, shall impose corresponding penalties upon those guilty as principals of the frustrated felony, or of attempt to commit the same, and upon accomplices and accessories. Section Two. — Rules for the application of penalties with regard to the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and habitual delinquency. Art. 62. Effect of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of habitual delinquency. — Mitigating or aggravating circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be taken into account for the purpose of diminishing or increasing the penalty in conformity with the following rules: 1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty.
5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects: (a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided by law for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods; (b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods; and (c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty
provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two penalties to be imposed upon the offender, in conformity herewith, shall in no case exceed 30 years. For the purpose of this article, a person shall be deemed to be habitual delinquent, is within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener. Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. — In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed. In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof: 1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied. 2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. 3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating
2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstance inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the commission thereof. 3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the moral attributes of the offender, or from his private relations with the offended party, or from any other personal cause, shall only serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant. 4. The circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act or their cooperation therein.
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circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. 4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the court shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation. Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. — In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of Articles 76 and 77, the court shall observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are not mitigating or aggravating circumstances: 1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period. 2. When only a mitigating circumstances is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its minimum period. 3. When an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its maximum period. 4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall reasonably offset those of one class against the other according to their relative weight. 5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the number and nature of such circumstances. 6. Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating circumstances, the courts shall not
impose a greater penalty than that prescribed by law, in its maximum period. 7. Within the limits of each period, the court shall determine the extent of the penalty according to the number and nature of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and the greater and lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime. If crime committed is parricide, penalty is reclusion perpetua. The accused, after committing parricide, voluntarily surrendered and pleaded guilty of the crime charged upon arraignment. It was also established that he was intoxicated, and no aggravating circumstances were present. What penalty would you impose? Reclusion perpetua, because it is an indivisible penalty. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstance, penalty to be imposed shall be one degree lower to be imposed in the proper period. Do not apply this when there is one aggravating circumstance. Illustration: There are about four mitigating circumstances and one aggravating circumstance. Court offsets the aggravating circumstance against the mitigating circumstance and there still remains three mitigating circumstances. Because of that, the judge lowered the penalty by one degree. Is the judge correct? No. In such a case when there are aggravating circumstances, no matter how many mitigating circumstances there are, after offsetting, do not go down any degree lower. The penalty prescribed by law will be the penalty to be imposed, but in the minimum period. Cannot go below the minimum period when there is an aggravating circumstance. Go into the lowering of the penalty by one degree if the penalty is divisible. So do not apply the rule in paragraph 5 of Article 64 to a case where the penalty is divisible. Article 66 When there are mitigating circumstance and
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aggravating circumstance and the penalty is only fine, when it is only ordinary mitigating circumstance and aggravating circumstance, apply Article 66. Because you determine the imposable fine on the basis of the financial resources or means of the offender. But if the penalty would be lowered by
degree, there is a privileged mitigating circumstance or the felony committed is attempted or frustrated, provided it is not a light felony against persons or property, because if it is a light felony and punishable by fine, it is not a crime at all unless it is consummated. So, if it is attempted or frustrated, do not go one degree lower because it is not punishable unless it is a light felony against person or property where the imposable penalty will be lowered by one degree or two degrees. Penalty prescribed to a crime is lowered by degrees in the following cases: (1) When the crime is only attempted or frustrated If it is frustrated, penalty is one degree lower than that prescribed by law. If it is attempted, penalty is two degrees lower than that prescribed by law. This is so because the penalty prescribed by law for a crime refers to the consummated stage. (2) When the offender is an accomplice or accessory only Penalty is one degree lower in the case of an accomplice. Penalty is two degrees lower in the case of an accessory. This is so because the penalty prescribed by law for a given crime refers to the consummated stage. (3) When there is a privilege mitigating circumstance in favor of the offender, it will lower the penalty by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law depending on what the particular provision of the Revised Penal Code states. (4) When the penalty prescribed for the crime committed is a divisible penalty and there are two or more ordinary mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances whatsoever, the penalty next lower in degree shall be the one imposed. (5) Whenever the provision of the Revised Penal Code specifically lowers the penalty by one or two degrees than what is ordinarily
prescribed for the crime committed. Penalty commonly imposed by the Revised Penal Code may be by way of imprisonment or by way of fine or, to a limited extent, by way of destierro or disqualification, whether absolute or special. In the matter of lowering the penalty by degree, the reference is Article 71. It is necessary to know the chronology under Article 71 by simply knowing the scale. Take note that destierro comes after arresto mayor so the penalty one degree lower than arresto mayor is not arresto menor, but destierro. Memorize the scale in Article 71. In Article 27, with respect to the range of each penalty, the range of arresto menor follows arresto mayor, since arresto menor is one to 30 days or one month, while arresto mayor is
one month and one day to six months. On the other hand, the duration of destierro is the same as prision correccional which is six months and one day to six years. But be this as it is, under Article 71, in the scale of penalties graduated according to degrees, arresto mayor is higher than destierro. In homicide under Article 249, the penalty is reclusion temporal. One degree lower, if homicide is frustrated, or there is an accomplice participating in homicide, is prision mayor, and two degrees lower is prision correccional. This is true if the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code is a whole divisible penalty — one degree or 2 degrees lower will also be punished as a whole. But generally, the penalties prescribed by the Revised Penal Code are only in periods, like prision correcional minimum, or prision correcional minimum to medium. Although the penalty is prescribed by the Revised Penal Code as a period, such penalty should be understood as a degree in itself and the following rules shall govern: (1) When the penalty prescribed by the Revised Code is made up of a period, like prision correccional medium, the penalty one degree lower is prision correccional minimum, and the penalty two degrees lower is arresto mayor maximum. In other words, each degree will be made up of only one period because the penalty prescribed is
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also made up only of one period. (2) When the penalty prescribed by the Code is made up of two periods of a given penalty, every time such penalty is lowered by one degree you have to go down also by two periods. Illustration: If the penalty prescribed for the crime is prision correccional medium to maximum, the penalty one degree lower will be arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum, and the penalty another degree lower will be arresto mayor minimum to medium. Every degree will be composed of two
periods. (3) When the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code is made up of three periods of different penalties, every time you go down one degree lower, you have to go down by three periods.
With respect to the penalty of fine, if the fine has to be lowered by degree either because the felony committed is only attempted or frustrated or because there is an accomplice or an accessory participation, the fine is lowered by deducting 1/4 of the maximum amount of the fine from such maximum without changing the minimum amount prescribed by law.
Illustration: If the penalty prescribed is a fine ranging from P200.00 to P500.00, but the felony is frustrated so that the penalty should be imposed one degree lower, 1/4 of P500.00 shall be deducted therefrom. This is done by deducting P125.00 from P500.00, leaving a difference of P375.00. The penalty one degree lower is P375.00. To go another degree lower, P125.00 shall again be deducted from P375.00 and that would leave a difference of P250.00. Hence, the penalty another degree lower is a fine ranging from P200.00 to P250.00. If at all, the fine has to be lowered further, it cannot go lower than P200.00. So, the fine will be imposed at P200.00. This rule applies when the fine has to be lowered by degree. Article 66 In so far as ordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstance would affect the penalty which is in the form of a fine, Article 66 of the Revised Penal Code shall govern. Under this article, it is discretionary upon the court to apply the fine taking into consideration the financial means of the offender to pay the same. In other words, it is not only the mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances that the court shall take into consideration, but primarily, the financial capability of the offender to pay the fine. For the same crime, the penalty upon an accused who is poor may be less than the penalty upon an accused committing the same crime but who is wealthy . For instance, when there are two offenders who are co-conspirators to a crime, and their penalty consists of a fine only, and one of them is wealthy while the other is a pauper, the court may impose a higher penalty upon the wealthy person and a lower fine for the pauper. Penalty for murder under the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal maximum to death. So, the penalty would be reclusion temporal maximum – reclusion perpetua – death. This
Illustration: The penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium, the penalty one degree lower is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium. Another degree lower will be arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional medium. These rules have nothing to do with mitigating or aggravating circumstances. These rules refer to the lowering of penalty by one or two degrees. As to how mitigating or aggravating circumstances may affect the penalty, the rules are found in Articles 63 and 64. Article 63 governs when the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code is indivisible. Article 64 governs when the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code is divisible. When the penalty is indivisible, no matter how many ordinary mitigating circumstances there are, the prescribed penalty is never lowered by degree. It takes a privileged mitigating circumstance to lower such penalty by degree. On the other hand, when the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code is divisible, such penalty shall be lowered by one degree only but imposed in the proper period, when there are two or more ordinary mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance whatsoever. Article 75 – Fines
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penalty made up of three periods. The Three-Fold Rule Under this rule, when a convict is to serve successive penalties, he will not actually serve the penalties imposed by law. Instead, the most severe of the penalties imposed on him shall be multiplied by three and the period will be the only term of the penalty to be served by him. However, in no case should the penalty exceed 40 years. This rule is intended for the benefit of the convict and so, you will only apply this provided the sum total of all the penalties imposed would be greater than the product of the most severe penalty
multiplied by three but in no case will the penalties to be served by the convict be more than 40 years. Although this rule is known as the Three-Fold rule, you cannot actually apply this if the convict is to serve only three successive penalties. The Three-Fold Rule can only be applied if the convict is to serve four or more sentences successively. If the sentences would be served simultaneously, the Three-Fold rule does not govern. The chronology of the penalties as provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code shall be followed. It is in the service of the penalty, not in the imposition of the penalty, that the Three-Fold rule is to be applied. The three-Fold rule will apply whether the sentences are the product of one information in one court, whether the sentences are promulgated in one day or whether the sentences are promulgated by different courts on different days. What is material is that the convict shall serve more than three successive sentences. For purposes of the Three-Fold Rule, even perpetual penalties are taken into account. So not only penalties with fixed duration, even penalties without any fixed duration or indivisible penalties are taken into account. For purposes of the Three-Fold rule, indivisible penalties are given equivalent of 30 years. If the penalty is perpetual disqualification, it will be given and equivalent duration of 30 years, so that if he will have to suffer several perpetual disqualification, under the Three-Fold rule, you take the most severe and multiply it by three. The Three-Fold
rule does not apply to the penalty prescribed but to the penalty imposed as determined by the court. Illustration: Penalties imposed are – One prision correcional One arresto mayor One prision mayor minimum – 2 years and 4 months 1 month and 1 day to 6 months 6 years and 1 day to 12 years
Do not commit the mistake of applying the Three- Fold Rule in this case. Never apply the Three-Fold rule when there are only three sentences. Even if you add the penalties, you can never arrive at a sum higher than the product of the most severe multiplied by three. The common mistake is, if given a situation, whether the Three-Fold Rule could be applied. If asked, if you were the judge, what penalty would you impose, for purposes of imposing the penalty, the court is not at liberty to apply the Three-Fold Rule, whatever the sum total of penalty for each crime committed, even if it would amount
to 1,000 years or more. It is only when the convict is serving sentence that the prison authorities should determine how long he should stay in jail. INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW (RA 4103, AS AMENDED) The purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence law is to avoid prolonged imprisonment, because it is proven to be more destructive than constructive to the offender. So, the purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law in shortening the possible detention of the convict in jail is to save valuable human resources. In other words, if the valuable human resources were allowed prolonged confinement in jail, they would deteriorate. Purpose is to preserve economic usefulness for these people for having committed a crime — to reform them rather than to deteriorate them and, at the same time, saving the government expenses of maintaining the convicts on a prolonged confinement in jail. If the crime is a violation of the Revised Penal Code, the court will impose a sentence that has a minimum and maximum. The maximum of the indeterminate sentence will be arrived at by
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taking into account the attendant mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances according to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code. In arriving at the minimum of the indeterminate sentence, the court will take into account the penalty prescribed for the crime and go one degree lower. Within the range of one degree lower, the court will fix the minimum for the indeterminate sentence, and within the range of the penalty arrived at as the maximum in the indeterminate sentence, the court will fix the maximum of the sentence. If there is a privilege mitigating circumstance which has been taken in consideration in fixing the maximum of the indeterminate sentence, the minimum shall be based on the penalty as reduced by the privilege mitigating circumstance within the range of the penalty next lower in
degree. If the crime is a violation of a special law, in fixing the maximum of the indeterminate sentence, the court will impose the penalty within the range of the penalty prescribed by the special law, as long as it will not exceed the limit of the penalty. In fixing the minimum, the court can fix a penalty anywhere within the range of penalty prescribed by the special law, as long as it will not be less than the minimum limit of the penalty under said law. No mitigating and aggravating circumstances are taken into account. The minimum and the maximum referred to in the Indeterminate Sentence Law are not periods. So, do not say, maximum or minimum period. For the purposes of the indeterminate Sentence Law, use the term minimum to refer to the duration of the sentence which the convict shall serve as a minimum, and when we say maximum, for purposes of ISLAW, we refer to the maximum limit of the duration that the convict may be held in jail. We are not referring to any period of the penalty as enumerated in Article 71. Courts are required to fix a minimum and a maximum of the sentence that they are to impose upon an offender when found guilty of the crime charged. So, whenever the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable, there is always a minimum and maximum of the sentence that the convict shall serve. If the crime is punished by the Revised Penal Code, the law provides that the maximum shall be arrived at by considering the mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime according to the proper rules of the Revised Penal Code. To fix the maximum,
consider the mitigating and aggravating circumstances according to the rules found in Article 64. This means – (1) Penalties prescribed by the law for the crime committed shall be imposed in the medium period if no mitigating or aggravating circumstance; (2) If there is aggravating circumstance, no mitigating, penalty shall be imposed in the maximum; (3) If there is mitigating circumstance, no aggravating, penalty shall be in the minimum; (4) If there are several mitigating and aggravating circumstances, they shall offset against each other. Whatever remains, apply the rules. (5) If there are two or more mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance, penalty next lower in degree shall be the one imposed. Rule under Art 64 shall apply in determining the maximum but not in determining the minimum. In determining the applicable penalty according to the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, there is no need to mention the number of years, months and days; it is enough that the name of the penalty is mentioned while the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applied. To fix the minimum and the maximum of the sentence, penalty under the Revised Penal Code is not the penalty to be imposed by court because the court must apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The attendant mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime are taken into consideration only when the maximum of the penalty is to be fixed. But in so far as the minimum is concerned, the basis of the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, and go one degree lower than that. But penalty one degree lower shall be applied in the same manner that the maximum is also fixed based only on ordinary mitigating circumstances. This is true only if the mitigating circumstance taken into account is only an ordinary mitigating circumstance. If the mitigating circumstance is privileged, you cannot follow the law in so far as fixing the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is concerned; otherwise, it may happen that the maximum of the indeterminate sentence is lower than its minimum. In one Supreme Court ruling, it was held that for purposes of applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code and not that which may be
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imposed by court. This ruling, however, is obviously erroneous. This is so because such an interpretation runs contrary to the rule of pro reo, which provides that the penal laws should always be construed an applied in a manner liberal or lenient to the offender. Therefore, the rule is, in applying the Indetermiante Sentence Law, it is that penalty arrived at by the court after applying the mitigating and aggravating circumstances that should be the basis. Crimes punished under special law carry only one
penalty; there are no degree or periods. Moreover, crimes under special law do not consider mitigating or aggravating circumstance present in the commission of the crime. So in the case of statutory offense, no mitigating and no aggravating circumstances will be taken into account. Just the same, courts are required in imposing the penalty upon the offender to fix a minimum that the convict should serve, and to set a maximum as the limit of that sentence. Under the law, when the crime is punished under a special law, the court may fix any penalty as the maximum without exceeding the penalty prescribed by special law for the crime committed. In the same manner, courts are given discretion to fix a minimum anywhere within the range of the penalty prescribed by special law, as long as it will not be lower than the penalty prescribed. Disqualification may be divided into three, according to – (1) The time committed; (2) The penalty imposed; and (3) The offender involved. Application on the imposed sentence Rules to determine the indeterminate sentence under the RPC: (1) Minimum – one degree next lower to the penalty imposed. This is determined without considering the attending circumstances to eh penalty prescribed. The term of the minimum is left to the discretion of the court, which is unqualified. The only limitation is that it is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed in the RPC for the offense committed. Where there is a privileged mitigating or the number of mitigating circumstances is such as to entitle the accused to the
penalty next lower in degree, the starting point to determine the minimum o the indeterminate sentence of the indeterminate sentence is the next lower than that prescribed for the offense. (2) Maximum – the penalty imposed as provided by law. The period will depend upon the attending circumstances. Example: homicide in which one mitigating circumstance attended its commission. Maximum – penalty prescribed by law, that is reclusion temporal. The period of that penalty will now depend upon the attending circumstance. Since there is one mitigating and no aggravating it will be in the minimum or reclusion temporal minimum period. Minimum – one degree next lower to reclusion temporal is determined without considering the mitigating circumstance and that will be prision mayor. The range of prision mayor will depend upon the discretion of the Court. The indeterminate penalty is
therefore a minimum of prision mayor (within the range fixed by the court) to a maximum of reclusion temporal minimum period. (3) The Indeterminate Sentence Law cannot be applied if it will result in the lengthening of the sentence of the accused. This will apply only to offenses punished by special laws. Coverage 1. The law covers crimes punishable under the RPC or by special law: (a) Revised Penal Code_ maximum term of indeterminate sentence is the penalty in view of the attending circumstances that can properly be imposed under the RPC. Minimum is one degree lower than the penalty prescribed by the Code. The minimum penalty should be within any period of the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed by law and the maximum should be within the proper period of the penalty where the sentence is a straight penalty. (b) Special law – maximum term of indeterminate sentence shall not exceed the maximum fixed by law and the
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minimum shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by said law. Example: Penalty is one year to five years. Indeterminate Sentence may be 1 year or 3 years to 5 years. 2. The Indeterminate Sentence Law shall not apply to: (1) Persons convicted of offense punishable with death penalty or life imprisonment; (2) Persons convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; (3) Persons convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition, espionage; (4) Persons convicted of piracy; (5) Persons who are habitual delinquents; (6) Persons who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence; (7) Those who have been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive and shall have violated the term thereto; (8) Those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year, but not to those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of the approval of Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Conditions of parole (1) Every prisoner released from confinement on parole by virtue of RA 4103 shall, as such times and in such manner as may be required by the conditions of his parole, as may be designated by the Board for such purpose, report personally to such government officials or other parole officers for a period of surveillance equivalent to the remaining portion of the maximum sentence imposed upon him or until final release and discharge. (2) If during the period of surveillance such parolee shall show himself to be a lawabiding citizen and not violate any laws, he may be issued a final certificate of release and discharge. (3) Whenever any prisoner released on parole, during the period of surveillance, violate any of the conditions of his parole, an order of his re-arrest may be issued and served in any part of the Philippines. In such case, he shall serve the remaining unexpired portion of the maximum sentence for which he was originally committed to prison, unless granted a new parole.
EXECUTION AND SERVICE
Art. 78. When and how a penalty is to be executed. — No penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final judgment. A penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that prescribed by law, nor with any other circumstances or incidents than those expressly authorized thereby. In addition to the provisions of the law, the special regulations prescribed for the government of the institutions in which the penalties are to be suffered shall be observed with regard to the character of the work to be performed, the time of its performance, and other incidents connected therewith, the relations of the convicts among themselves and other persons, the relief which they may receive, and their diet. The regulations shall make provision for the separation of the sexes in different institutions, or at least into different departments and also for the correction and reform of the convicts.
Art. 79. Suspension of the execution and service of the penalties in case of insanity. — When a convict shall become insane or an imbecile after final sentence has been pronounced, the execution of said sentence shall be
suspended only with regard to the personal penalty, the provisions of the second paragraph of circumstance number 1 of Article 12 being observed in the corresponding cases. If at any time the convict shall recover his reason, his sentence shall be executed, unless the penalty shall have prescribed in accordance with the provisions of this Code. The respective provisions of this section shall also be observed if the insanity or imbecility occurs while the convict is serving his sentence. Art. 80. Suspension of sentence of minor delinquents. — Whenever a minor of either sex, under sixteen years of age at the date of the commission of a grave or less grave
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felony, is accused thereof, the court, after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such minor to the custody or care of a public or private, benevolent or charitable institution, established under the law of the care, correction or education of orphaned, homeless, defective, and delinquent children, or to the custody or care of any other responsible person in any other place subject to visitation and supervision by the Director of Public Welfare or any of his agents or representatives, if there be any, or otherwise by the superintendent of public schools or his representatives, subject to such conditions as are prescribed hereinbelow until such minor shall have reached his majority age or for such less period as the court may deem proper. The court, in committing said minor as provided above, shall take into consideration the religion of such minor, his parents or next of kin, in order to avoid his commitment to any private institution not under the control and supervision of the religious sect or denomination to which they belong. The Director of
Public Welfare or his duly authorized representatives or agents, the superintendent of public schools or his representatives, or the person to whose custody or care the minor has been committed, shall submit to the court every four months and as often as required in special cases, a written report on the good or bad conduct of said minor and the moral and intellectual progress made by him. The suspension of the proceedings against a minor may be extended or shortened by the court on the recommendation of the Director of Public Welfare or his authorized representative or agents, or the superintendent of public schools or his representatives, according as to whether the conduct of such minor has been good or not and whether he has complied with the conditions imposed upon him, or not. The provisions of the first paragraph of this article shall not, however, be affected by those contained herein. If the minor has been committed to the custody or care of any of the institutions mentioned in the first paragraph of this article, with the approval of the Director of
Public Welfare and subject to such conditions as this official in accordance with law may deem proper to impose, such minor may be allowed to stay elsewhere under the care of a responsible person. If the minor has behaved properly and has complied with the conditions imposed upon him during his confinement, in accordance with the provisions of this article, he shall be returned to the court in order that the same may order his final release. In case the minor fails to behave properly or to comply with the regulations of the institution to which he has been committed or with the conditions imposed upon him when he was committed to the care of a responsible person, or in case he should be found incorrigible or his continued stay in such institution should be inadvisable, he shall be returned to the court in order that the same may render the judgment corresponding to the crime committed by him. The expenses for the maintenance of a minor delinquent confined in the institution to which he has been committed, shall be borne totally or partially by his parents or relatives or those persons liable to support him, if they are able to do so, in the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case his parents or relatives or those persons liable to support him have not been ordered to pay said expenses or are found indigent and cannot pay said expenses, the municipality in which the offense was
committed shall pay one-third of said expenses; the province to which the municipality belongs shall pay one-third; and the remaining one-third shall be borne by the National Government: Provided, however, That whenever the Secretary of Finance certifies that a municipality is not able to pay its share in the expenses above mentioned, such share which is not paid by said municipality shall be borne by the National Government. Chartered cities shall pay twothirds of said expenses; and in case a chartered city cannot pay said expenses, the internal revenue allotments which may be due to said city shall be withheld and applied in settlement of said indebtedness in accordance with section five hundred and eighty-eight of the Administrative Code.
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Section Two. — Execution of principal penalties. Art. 81. When and how the death penalty is to be executed. — The death sentence shall be executed with reference to any other and shall consist in putting the person under sentence to death by electrocution. The death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of Prisons, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under sentence during electrocution as well as during the proceedings prior to the execution. If the person under sentence so desires, he shall be anaesthetized at the moment of the electrocution. Art. 82. Notification and execution of the sentence and assistance to the culprit. — The court shall designate a working day for the execution but not the hour thereof; and such designation shall not be communicated to the offender before sunrise of said day, and the execution shall not take place until after the expiration of at least eight hours following the notification, but before sunset. During the interval between the notification and the execution, the culprit shall, in
so far as possible, be furnished such assistance as he may request in order to be attended in his last moments by priests or ministers of the religion he professes and to consult lawyers, as well as in order to make a will and confer with members of his family or persons in charge of the management of his business, of the administration of his property, or of the care of his descendants. Art. 83. Suspension of the execution of the death sentence. — The death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy years of age. In this last case, the death sentence shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40. Art. 84. Place of execution and persons who may witness the same. — The execution shall take place in the penitentiary of Bilibid in a space closed to the public view and shall be witnessed only by the priests assisting the offender and by his lawyers, and by his relatives, not exceeding six, if he
so request, by the physician and the necessary personnel of the penal establishment, and by such persons as the Director of Prisons may authorize. Art. 85. Provisions relative to the corpse of the person executed and its burial. — Unless claimed by his family, the corpse of the culprit shall, upon the completion of the legal proceedings subsequent to the execution, be turned over to the institute of learning or scientific research first applying for it, for the purpose of study and investigation, provided that such institute shall take charge of the decent burial of the remains. Otherwise, the Director of Prisons shall order the burial of the body of the culprit at government expense, granting permission to be present thereat to the members of the family of the culprit and the friends of the latter. In no case shall the burial of the body of a person sentenced to death be held with pomp. Art. 86. Reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, prision mayor, prision correccional and arresto mayor. — The penalties of reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, prision mayor, prision correccional and arresto mayor, shall be executed and served in the places and penal establishments provided by the Administrative Code in force or which may be provided by law in the future. Art. 87. Destierro. — Any person sentenced to destierro shall not be permitted to enter the place or places designated in
the sentence, nor within the radius therein specified, which shall be not more than 250 and not less than 25 kilometers from the place designated. Art. 88. Arresto menor. — The penalty of arresto menor shall be served in the municipal jail, or in the house of the defendant himself under the surveillance of an officer of the law, when the court so provides in its decision, taking into consideration the health of the offender and other reasons which may seem satisfactory to it. (1) PROBATION AMENDED) LAW (P.D. 968, AS
Among the different grounds of partial extinction of criminal liability, the most important is probation. Probation is a manner of disposing of an accused who have been convicted by a trial court by placing him under supervision of a
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probation officer, under such terms and conditions that the court may fix. This may be availed of before the convict begins serving sentence by final judgment and provided that he did not appeal anymore from conviction. Without regard to the nature of the crime, only those whose penalty does not exceed six years of imprisonment are those qualified for probation. If the penalty is six years plus one day, he is no longer qualified for probation. If the offender was convicted of several offenses which were tried jointly and one decision was rendered where multiple sentences imposed several prison terms as penalty, the basis for determining whether the penalty disqualifies the offender from probation or not is the term of the individual imprisonment and not the totality of all the prison terms imposed in the decision. So even if the prison term would sum up to more than six years, if none of the individual penalties exceeds six years, the offender
is not disqualified by such penalty from applying for probation. On the other hand, without regard to the penalty, those who are convicted of subversion or any crime against the public order are not qualified for probation. So know the crimes under Title III, Book 2 of the Revised Penal Code. Among these crimes is Alarms and Scandals, the penalty of which is only arresto menor or a fine. Under the amendment to the Probation Law, those convicted of a crime against public order regardless of the penalty are not qualified for probation. May a recidivist be given the benefit of Probation Law? As a general rule, no. Exception: If the earlier conviction refers to a crime the penalty of which does not exceed 30 days imprisonment or a fine of not more than P200.00, such convict is not disqualified of the benefit of probation. So even if he would be convicted subsequently of a crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code as that of the earlier conviction, he is not disqualified from probation provided that the penalty of the current crime committed does not go beyond six years and the nature of the crime committed by him is not against public order, national security or subversion.
Although a person may be eligible for probation, the moment he perfects an appeal from the judgment of conviction, he cannot avail of probation anymore. So the benefit of probation must be invoked at the earliest instance after conviction. He should not wait up to the time when he interposes an appeal or the sentence has become final and executory. The idea is that probation has to be invoked at the earliest opportunity. An application for probation is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the trial court that renders the judgment. For the offender to apply in such court, he should not appeal such judgment. Once he appeals, regardless of the purpose of the appeal, he will be disqualified from applying for Probation, even though he may thereafter withdraw his appeal. If the offender would appeal the conviction of the trial court and the appellate court reduced the penalty to say, less than six years, that convict can still file an application for probation, because the earliest opportunity for him to avail of probation came only after judgment by the appellate court. Whether a convict who is otherwise qualified for probation may be give the benefit of probation or not, the courts are always required to
conduct a hearing. If the court denied the application for probation without the benefit of the hearing, where as the applicant is not disqualified under the provision of the Probation Law, but only based on the report of the probation officer, the denial is correctible by certiorari, because it is an act of the court in excess of jurisdiction or without jurisdiction, the order denying the application therefore is null and void. Consider not only the probationable crime, but also the probationable penalty. If it were the non-probationable crime, then regardless of the penalty, the convict cannot avail of probation. Generally, the penalty which is not probationable is any penalty exceeding six years of imprisonment. Offenses which are not probationable are those against natural security, those against public order and those with reference to subversion. Persons who have been granted of the benefit of probation cannot avail thereof for the second time. Probation is only available once and this may be availed only where the convict starts
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serving sentence and provided he has not perfected an appeal. If the convict perfected an appeal, he forfeits his right to apply for probation. As far as offenders who are under preventive imprisonment, that because a crime committed is not bailable or the crime committed, although bailable, they cannot afford to put up a bail, upon promulgation of the sentence, naturally he goes back to detention, that does not mean that they already start serving the sentence even after promulgation of the sentence, sentence will only become final and executory after the lapse of the 15-day period, unless the convict has waived expressly his right to appeal or otherwise, he has partly started serving sentence and in that case, the penalty will already be final and executory, no right to probation can be applied for. Definition of terms 1. Probation – a disposition under which a defendant, after
conviction and sentence, is released subject to conditions imposed by the court and to the supervision of a probation officer. 2. Probationer – a person placed on probation. 3. Probation officer – one who investigates for the court a referral for probation or supervises a probationer or both. Purpose 1. Probation is only a privilege. So even if the offender may not be disqualified of probation, yet the court believes that because of the crime committed it was not advisable to give probation because it would depreciate the effect of the crime, the court may refuse or deny an application for probation. 2. The purposes of the law are: (a) Promote the correction and rehabilitation of a n offender by providing him with individualized treatment; (b) Provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence; (c) Prevent the commission of offenses; (d) Decongest our jails; and (e) Save the government much needed finance for maintaining convicts in jail. Grant of probation, manner and conditions
1. No application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment or conviction. Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable (Sec. 4). 2. No person shall be placed on probation except upon prior investigation by the probation officer and a determination by the court that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as that of the defendant will be served thereby (Sec. 5). 3. The probation officer shall submit to the court the investigation report on a defendant not later than 60 days from receipt of the order of said court to conduct the investigation. The court shall resolve the application for probation not later than 15 days after receipt of said report. Pending submission of the investigation report and the resolution of the petition, the defendant may be allowed on temporary liberty under his bail filed under the criminal case. Where no bail is filed or that the defendant is incapable of filing one, the court may allow the release of the defendant on recognizance to the custody of a responsible member of the community who shall guarantee his
appearance whenever required by the court (Sec. 7). 4. Every probation order issued by the court shall contain conditions requiring that the probationer shall: (a) Present himself to the probation officer within 72 hours from receipt of probation order designated to undertake his supervision at such place as may be specified in the order; (b) Report to the probation officer at least once a month at such time and place as specified by said officer. The court may also require the probationer to: (c) Cooperate with a program of supervision; (d) Meet his family responsibilities; (e) Devote himself to a specific employment and not to change said employment without the prior written approval of the probation officer;
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(f) Undergo medical, psychological or psychiatric examination and treatment and enter and remain in a specified institution, when required for that purpose; (g) Pursue a prescribed secular study or vocational training; (h) Attend or reside in a facility established for instruction, recreation or residence of persons on probation; (i) Refrain from visiting houses of illrepute; (j) Abstain from drinking intoxicating beverages to excess; (k) Permit the probation officer or an authorized social worker to visit his home and place of work; (l) Reside at premises approved by it and not to change his residence without his prior written approval; or (m) Satisfy any other conditions related to the rehabilitation of the defendant and not unduly restrictive of his liberty or incompatible with his freedom of conscience (Sec. 10). 5. Discretionary conditions – The trial court which approved the application for probation may impose any condition which may be constructive to the correction of the offender, provided the same would not violate the constitutional rights of the offender and subject to this two restrictions: (1) the conditions imposed should not be unduly restrictive of
the probationer; and (2) such condition should not be incompatible with the freedom of conscience of the probationer Criteria of placing an offender on probation In determining whether an offender may be placed on probation, the court shall consider all information relative to the character, antecedents, environment, mental and physical condition of the offender, and available institutional and community resources. Probation shall be denied if the court finds that: (a) The offender is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or (b) There is undue risk that during the period of probation the offender will commit another crime; or (c) Probation will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed
(Sec. 8).
Disqualified offenders The following are disqualified offenders: (1) Those sentenced to serve maximum term of imprisonment of more than 6 years (6 years or less is the probationable penalty); (2) Those convicted of subversion or any crime against the national security or the public order; (a) Treason (b) Conspiracy and proposal to commit treason (c) Misprision of treason (d) Espionage (e) Inciting to war and giving motives for reprisal (f) Violation of neutrality (g) Correspondence with hostile country (h) Flight to enemy country (i) Piracy and mutiny (j) Rebellion, insurrection, coup, sedition (k) Illegal assemblies and associations (l) Direct/indirect assault, resistance and disobedience (m) Public disorders—Tumults, alarms and scandals (n) Delivery of prisoners from jail (o) Evasion of service of sentence (p) Quasi-recidivism (3) Those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or fine of not less than 200 pesos; (4) Those who have been once on probation under the provisions of PD 968; (5) Those who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of PD 968 became applicable pursuant to Sec. 33 thereof (Sec. 9); (6) Those entitled to the benefits under the provisions of PD 603 and similar laws; (7) Those who have perfected an appeal because appeal and probation are mutually exclusive remedies. Period of probation (1) The period of probation of a defendant sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than one year shall not exceed two years, and in all other cases, said period shall not
exceed six years.
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(2) When the sentence imposes a fine only and the offender is made to serve subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the period of probation shall not be less than nor be more than twice the total number of days of subsidiary imprisonment as computed at the rate established in Art. 39 of the RPC. Imprisonment of Not more than one year Probation Not exceeding two (2) years One (1) year to six (6) Not exceeding six (6) years years Fine with subsidiary imprisonment As computed under Art. Twice the period 39 computed Arrest of probationer At the time during probation, the court may issue a warrant for the arrest of a probationer for any serious violation of the conditions of the probation. The probationer, once arrested and detained, shall immediately be brought before the court for a hearing of the violation charged. The defendant may be admitted to bail pending such hearing. In such case, the provisions regarding release on bail of persons charged with a crime shall be applicable to probationers arrested under this provision. In the hearing, which shall be summary in nature, the probationer shall have the right to be informed of the violation charged and adduce evidence in his favor. The court shall not be bound by the technical rules of evidence but may inform itself of all the facts which are material and relevant to ascertain the veracity of the charge. The State shall be represented by a prosecuting officer in any contested hearing. If the violation is established, the court may revoke or continue his probation and modify the conditions thereof. If revoked, the court shall order the probationer to serve sentence originally imposed. An order revoking the grant of probation or modifying the terms and conditions thereof shall not be appealable. Termination of probation; exception After the period of
probation and upon consideration of the report and recommendation of the probation officer, the court may order the final discharge of the probationer upon finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of
his probation and thereupon the case if deemed terminated. The final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under RA 9165, regardless of the imposable penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law (Sec. 24, RA 9165). JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006 (R.A. 9344); ALSO REFER TO CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE (P.D. 603, AS AMENDED) Definition of child in conflict with the law Child in conflict with law refers to a child who is alleged as, accused of, or adjudged as, having committed an offense under Philippine laws. (b) Exemption from criminal liability A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act. A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act. The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws (Sec. 6). Juvenile justice and welfare system Juvenile Justice and Welfare System refers to a system dealing with children at risk and children in conflict with the law, which provides childappropriate proceedings, including programs and services for prevention, diversion, rehabilitation, re-integration and aftercare to ensure their normal growth and development (Sec. 4[m]).
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“Diversion” refers to an alternative, childappropriate process of determining the responsibility and treatment of a child in conflict with the law on the basis of his/her social, cultural, economic, psychological or educational background without resorting to formal court proceedings. “Diversion Program” refers to the program that the child in conflict with the law is required to undergo after he/she is found responsible for an
offense without proceedings.
resorting
to
formal
court
“Intervention” refers to a series of activities which are designed to address issues that caused the child to commit an offense. It may take the form of an individualized treatment program which may include counseling, skills training, education, and other activities that will enhance his/her psychological, emotional and psycho-social well-being.
6. MODIFICATION AND EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Art. 23. Effect of pardon by the offended party. — A pardon of the offended party does not extinguish criminal action except as provided in Article 344 of this Code; but civil liability with regard to the interest of the injured party is extinguished by his express waiver. TOTAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict,
as to the personal penalties and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. 2. By service of the sentence; 2. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects; 3. By absolute pardon; 4. By prescription of the crime; 5. By prescription of the penalty; 6. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this Code. Art. 90. Prescription of crime. — Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty years. Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years. Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years. The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year. The crime of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months. Light offenses prescribe in two months. When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made the basis of the application of the rules contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of this article. (As amended by RA 4661, approved June 19, 1966). Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago. Art. 92. When and how penalties prescribe. — The penalties imposed by final sentence prescribe as follows: 1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years; 2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years; 3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the penalty of arresto mayor, which prescribes in five years; 4. Light penalties, in one year. Art. 93. Computation of the prescription of penalties. — The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country with which this Government
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has no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the expiration of the period of prescription. PARTIAL LIABILITY EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL
following the issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe to in said article. Art. 99. Who grants time allowances. — Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of Prisons shall grant allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be revoked. Always provide two answering this question. classifications when
Art. 94. Partial Extinction of criminal liability. — Criminal liability is extinguished partially: 1. By conditional pardon; 2. By commutation of the sentence; and 3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is serving his sentence. Art. 95. Obligation incurred by person granted conditional pardon. — Any person who has been granted conditional pardon shall incur the obligation of complying strictly with the conditions imposed therein otherwise, his non-compliance with any of the conditions specified shall result in the revocation of the pardon and the provisions of Article 159 shall be applied to him. Art. 96. Effect of commutation of sentence. — The commutation of the original sentence for another of a different length and nature shall have the legal effect of substituting the latter in the place of the former. Art. 97. Allowance for good conduct. — The good conduct of any prisoner in any penal institution shall entitle him to the following deductions from the period of his sentence: 1. During the first two years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of five days for each month of good behavior; 2. During the third to the fifth year,
inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of eight days for each month of good behavior; 3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of ten days for each month of good behavior; and 4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of fifteen days for each month of good Art. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. — A deduction of one-fifth of the period of his sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded the service of his sentence under the circumstances mentioned in Article 58 of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours
Criminal liability is totally extinguished as follows: (1) By the death of the convict as to personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment (2) By service of sentence; (3) By amnesty which completely extinguished the penalty and all its effects; (4) By absolute pardon; (5) By prescription of the crime; (6) By prescription of the penalty; (7) By the marriage of the offended women as in the crimes of rape, abduction, seduction and acts of lasciviousness. Criminal liability is partially extinguished as follows: (1) By conditional pardon; (2) By commutation of sentence; (3) For good conduct, allowances which the culprit may earn while he is serving sentence; (4) Parole; and (5) Probation. Total extinction of criminal liability Among the grounds for total extinction as well as those for partial extinction, you cannot find among them the election to public office. In one case, a public official was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. During the ensuing election, he was nevertheless re-elected by the constituents, one of the defenses raised was that of condonation of the crime by his constituents, that his constituents have pardoned him. The Supreme Court ruled that the re-election to public office is not one of the grounds by which criminal liability is
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extinguished. This is only true to administrative cases but not criminal cases. Death of the offender Where the offender dies before final judgment, his death extinguishes both his criminal and civil liabilities. So while a case is on appeal, the offender dies, the case on appeal will be dismissed. The offended party may file a separate civil action under the Civil Code if any other basis for recovery of civil liability exists as provided under Art 1157 Civil Code. (People v. Bayotas, decided on September 2, 1994) Amnesty and pardon The effects of amnesty as well as absolute pardon are not the same. Amnesty erases not only the conviction but also the crime itself. So that if an offender was convicted for rebellion and he qualified for amnesty, and so he was given an amnesty, then years later he rebelled again and convicted, is he a recidivist? No. Because the amnesty granted to him erased not only the conviction but also the effects of the conviction itself. Suppose, instead of amnesty, what was given was absolute pardon, then years later, the offended was again captured and charged for rebellion, he was convicted, is he a recidivist? Yes. Pardon, although absolute does not erase the effects of conviction. Pardon only excuses the convict from serving the sentence. There is an exception to this and that is when the pardon was granted when the convict had already served the sentence such that there is no more service of sentence to be executed then the pardon shall be understood as intended to erase the effects of the conviction. So if the convict has already served the sentence and in spite of that he was given a pardon that pardon will cover the effects of the crime and therefore, if he will be subsequently convicted for a felony embracing the same title as that crime, he cannot be considered a recidivist, because the pardon wipes out the effects of the crime. But if he was serving sentence when he was pardoned, that pardon will not wipe out the effects of the crime, unless the language of the pardon absolutely relieve the offender of all the effects thereof. Considering that recidivism does not prescribe, no matter how long ago was the
first conviction, he shall still be a recidivist. Illustrations: When the crime carries with it moral turpitude, the offender even if granted pardon shall still remain disqualified from those falling in cases where moral turpitude is a bar. Pedro was prosecuted and convicted of the crime of robbery and was sentenced to six years imprisonment or prision correccional. After serving sentence for three years, he was granted absolute pardon. Ten years later, Pedro was again prosecuted and convicted of the crime of theft, a crime embraced in the same title, this time he shall be a recidivist. On the other hand, if he has served all six years of the first sentence, and his name was included in the list of all those granted absolute pardon, pardon shall relieve him of the effects of the crime, and therefore even if he commits theft again, he shall not be considered a recidivist. In Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr., 170 SCRA 191, it was held that absolute pardon does not ipso facto entitle the convict to reinstatement to the public office forfeited by reason of his conviction. Although pardon restores his eligibility for appointment to that office, the pardoned convict must reapply for the new appointment . Pardon becomes valid only when there is a final judgment. If given before this, it is premature and hence void. There is no such thing as a premature amnesty, because it does not require a final judgment; it may be given before final judgment or after it. Prescription of crimes; Prescription of penalties Prescription of the crime begins, as a general rule on the day the crime was committed, unless the crime was concealed, not public, in which case, the prescription thereof would only commence from the time the offended party or the government learns of the commission of the crime. ―Commission of the crime is public‖ — This does not mean alone that the crime was within public knowledge or committed in public. Illustration: In the crime of falsification of a document that was registered in the proper registry of the
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government like the Registry of Property or the Registry of Deeds of the Civil registry, the falsification is deemed public from the time the falsified document was registered or recorded in such public office so even though, the offended party may not really know of the falsification, the prescriptive period of the crime shall already run from the moment the falsified document was recorded in the public registry. So in the case where a deed of sale of a parcel of land which was falsified was recorded in the corresponding Registry of Property, the owner of the land came to know of the falsified transaction only after 10 years, so he brought the criminal action only then. The Supreme Court ruled that the crime has already prescribed. From the moment the falsified document is registered in the Registry of Property, the prescriptive period already commenced to run. When a crime prescribes, the State loses the right to prosecute the offender, hence, even though the offender may not have filed a motion to quash on this ground the trial court, but after conviction and during the appeal he learned that at the time the case was filed, the crime has already prescribed, such accused can raise the question of prescription even for the first time on appeal, and the appellate court shall have no jurisdiction to continue, if legally, the crime has indeed prescribed. The prevailing rule now is, prescription of the crime is not waivable, the earlier jurisprudence to the contrary had already been abrogated or overruled. Moreover, for purposes of prescription, the period for filing a complaint or information may not be extended at all, even though the last day such prescriptive period falls on a holiday or a Sunday. For instance, light felony prescribes in 60 days th or two months. If the 60 day falls on a Sunday, the filing of the complaint on the succeeding Monday is already fatal to the prosecution of the crime because the crime has already prescribed. The rules on Criminal Procedure for purposes of prescription is that the filing of the complaint even at the public prosecutor’s office suspends the running of the prescriptive period, but not the filing with the barangay. So the earlier rulings to the contrary are already abrogated by express provision of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The prescription of the crime is
interrupted or
suspended – (1) When a complaint is filed in a proper barangay for conciliation or mediation as required by Chapter 7, Local Government Code, but the suspension of the prescriptive period is good only for 60 days. After which the prescription will resume to run, whether the conciliation or mediation is terminated for not; (2) When criminal case is filed in the prosecutor’s office, the prescription of the crime is suspended until the accused is convicted or the proceeding is terminated for a cause not attributable to the accused. But where the crime is subject to Summary Procedure, the prescription of the crime will be suspended only when the information is already filed with the trial court. It is not the filing of the complaint, but the filing of the information in the trial which will suspend the prescription of the crime. On the prescription of the penalty, the period will only commence to run when the convict has begun to serve the sentence. Actually, the penalty will prescribe from the moment the convict evades the service of the sentence. So if an accused was convicted in the trial court, and the conviction becomes final and executory, so this fellow was arrested to serve the sentence, on the way to the penitentiary, the vehicle carrying him collided with another vehicle and overturned, thus enabling the prisoner to escape, no matter how long such convict has been a fugitive from justice, the penalty imposed by the trial court will never prescribe because he has not yet commenced the service of his sentence. For the penalty to prescribe, he must be brought to Muntinlupa, booked there, placed inside the cell and thereafter he escapes. Whether it is prescription of crime or prescription of penalty, if the subject could leave the Philippines and go to a country with whom the Philippines has no extradition treaty, the prescriptive period of the crime or penalty shall remain suspended whenever he is out of the country. When the offender leaves for a country to which the Philippines has an extradition treaty, the running of the prescriptive period will go on even if the offender leaves Philippine territory for that country. Presently the Philippines has an
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extradition treaty with Taiwan, Indonesia, Canada, Australia, USA and Switzerland. So if the offender goes to any of these countries, the prescriptive period still continues to run. In the case of the prescription of the penalty, the moment the convict commits another crime while he is fugitive from justice, prescriptive period of the penalty shall be suspended and shall not run in the meantime. The crime committed does not include the initial evasion of service of sentence that the convict must perform before the penalty shall begin to prescribe, so that the initial crime of evasion of service of sentence does not suspend the prescription of penalty, it is the commission of other crime, after the convict has evaded the service of penalty that will suspend such period. Marriage In the case of marriage, do not say that it is applicable for the crimes under Article 344. It is only true in the crimes of rape, abduction, seduction and acts of lasciviousness. Do not say that it is applicable to private crimes because the term includes adultery and concubinage. Marriages in these cases may even compound the crime of adultery or concubinage. It is only in the crimes of rape, abduction, seduction and acts of lasciviousness that the marriage by the offender with the offended woman shall extinguish civil liability, not only criminal liability of the principal who marries the offended woman, but also that of the accomplice and accessory, if there are any. Co-principals who did not themselves directly participate in the execution of the crime but who only cooperated, will also benefit from such marriage, but not when such co-principal himself took direct part in the execution of the crime. Marriage as a ground for extinguishing civil liability must have been contracted in good faith.
The offender who marries the offended woman must be sincere in the marriage and therefore must actually perform the duties of a husband after the marriage, otherwise, notwithstanding such marriage, the offended woman,
although already his wife can still prosecute him again, although the marriage remains a valid marriage. Do not think that the marriage is avoided or annulled. The marriage still subsists although the offended woman may re-file the complaint. The Supreme Court ruled that marriage contemplated must be a real marriage and not one entered to and not just to evade punishment for the crime committed because the offender will be compounding the wrong he has committed. Partial extinction of criminal liability Good conduct allowance This includes the allowance for loyalty under Article 98, in relation to Article 158. A convict who escapes the place of confinement on the occasion of disorder resulting from a conflagration, earthquake or similar catastrophe or during a mutiny in which he has not participated and he returned within 48 hours after the proclamation that the calamity had already passed, such convict shall be given credit of 1/5 of the original sentence from that allowance for his loyalty of coming back. Those who did not leave the penitentiary under such circumstances do not get such allowance for loyalty. Article 158 refers only to those who leave and return. Parole This correspondingly extinguishes service of sentence up to the maximum of the indeterminate sentence. This is the partial extinction referred to, so that if the convict was never given parole, no partial extinction.
B. Book II (Articles 114-365), including related Special Laws 1. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY (114-123)
Crimes against national security 1. Treason (Art. 114); 2. Conspiracy and proposal to commit treason (Art. 115); 3. Misprision of treason (Art. 116); and
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4. Espionage (Art. 117). Crimes against the law of nations 1. Inciting to war or giving motives for reprisals (Art. 118); 2. Violation of neutrality (Art. 119); 3. Corresponding with hostile country (Art. 120); 4. Flight to enemy’s country (Art. 121); and 5. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas (Art. 122). The crimes under this title can be prosecuted even if the criminal act or acts were committed outside the Philippine territorial jurisdiction. However, prosecution can proceed only if the offender is within Philippine territory or brought to the Philippines pursuant to an extradition treaty. This is one of the instances where the Revised Penal Code may be given extraterritorial application under Article 2 (5) thereof. In the case of crimes against the law of nations, the offender can be prosecuted whenever he may be found because the crimes are regarded as committed against humanity in general. Article 114. Treason Elements 1. Offender is a Filipino or resident alien; 2. There is a war in which the Philippines is involved; 3. Offender either – (a) levies war against the government; or (b) adheres to the enemies, giving them aid or comfort within the Philippines or elsewhere
Almost all of these are crimes committed in times of war, except the following, which can be committed in times of peace: (1) Espionage, under Article 114 – This is also covered by Commonwealth Act No. 616 which punishes conspiracy to commit espionage. This may be committed both in times of war and in times of peace. (2) Inciting to War or Giving Motives for Reprisals, under Article 118 – This can be committed even if the Philippines is not a participant. Exposing the Filipinos or their properties because the offender performed an unauthorized act, like those who recruit Filipinos to participate in the gulf war. If they involve themselves to the war, this crime is committed. Relevant in the cases of Flor Contemplacion or Abner Afuang, the police officer who stepped on a Singaporean flag. (3) Violation of Neutrality, under Article 119 – The Philippines is not a party to a war but there is a war going on. This may be committed in the light of the Middle East war.
Requirements of levying war 1. Actual assembling of men; 2. To execute a treasonable design by force; 3. Intent is to deliver the country in whole or
in part to the enemy; and 4. Collaboration with foreign enemy or some foreign sovereign Two ways of proving treason 1. Testimony of at least two witnesses to the same overt act; or 2. Confession of accused in open court.
Article 115. Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit Treason Elements of conspiracy to commit treason 1. There is a war in which the Philippines is involved; 2. At least two persons come to an agreement to – (a) levy war against the government; or (b) adhere to the enemies, giving them aid or comfort; 3. They decide to commit it. Article 116. Misprision of Treason Elements of proposal to commit treason 1. There is a war in which the Philippines is involved; 2. At least one person decides to – (a) levy war against the government; or (b) adhere to the enemies, giving them aid or comfort; 3. He proposes its execution to some other persons.
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Elements 1. Offender owes allegiance to the government, and not a foreigner; 2. He has knowledge of conspiracy to commit treason against the government; 3. He conceals or does not disclose and make known the same as soon as possible to the governor or fiscal of the province in which he resides, or the mayor or fiscal of the city in which he resides. While in treason, even aliens can commit said crime because of the amendment to the article, no such amendment was made in misprision of treason. Misprision of treason is a crime that may be committed only by citizens of the Philippines. The essence of the crime is that there are persons who conspire to commit treason and the offender knew this and failed to make the necessary report to the government within the earliest possible time. What is required is to report it as soon as possible. The criminal liability arises if the treasonous activity was still at the conspiratorial stage. Because if the treason
already erupted into an overt act, the implication is that the government is already aware of it. There is no need to report the same. This is a felony by omission although committed Article 117. Espionage Acts punished (1) By entering, without authority therefore, a warship, fort or naval or military establishment or reservation to obtain any information, plans, photograph or other data of a confidential nature relative to the defense of the Philippines; Elements (a) Offender enters any of the places mentioned; (b) He has no authority therefore; (c) His purpose is to obtain information, plans, photographs or other data of a confidential nature relative to the
with dolo, not with culpa. The persons mentioned in Article 116 are not limited to mayor, fiscal or governor. Any person in authority having equivalent jurisdiction, like a provincial commander, will already negate criminal liability. Whether the conspirators are parents or children, and the ones who learn the conspiracy is a parent or child, they are required to report the same. The reason is that although blood is thicker than water so to speak, when it comes to security of the state, blood relationship is always subservient to national security. Article 20 does not apply here because the persons found liable for this crime are not considered accessories; they are treated as principals. In the 1994 bar examination, a problem was given with respect to misprision of treason. The text of the provision simply refers to a conspiracy to overthrow the government. The examiner failed to note that this crime can only be committed in times of war. The conspiracy adverted to must be treasonous in character. In the problem given, it was rebellion. A conspiracy to overthrow the government is a crime of rebellion because there is no war. Under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of misprision of rebellion.
defense of the Philippines. (2) By disclosing to the representative of a foreign nation the contents of the articles, data or information referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 117, which he had in his possession by reason of the public office he holds. Elements (a) Offender is a public officer; (b) He has in his possession the articles, data or information referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 117, by reason of the public office he holds; (c) He discloses their contents to a representative of a foreign nation.
Article 118. Inciting to War or Giving Motives for Reprisals Elements 1. Offender performs unlawful or unauthorized acts; 2. The acts provoke or give occasion for – (a) a war involving or liable to involve the Philippines; or
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(b) exposure of Filipino citizens to reprisals on their persons or property. Article 119. Violation of Neutrality Elements 1. There is a war in which the Philippines is not involved; 2. There is a regulation issued by a competent authority to enforce neutrality; 3. Offender violates the regulation. National security should be interpreted as including rebellion, sedition and subversion. Article 120. Correspondence with Hostile Country Elements 1. It is in time of war in which the Philippines is involved; 2. Offender makes correspondence with an enemy country or territory occupied by enemy troops; 3. The correspondence is either – (a) prohibited by the government; (b) carried on in ciphers or conventional signs; or (c) containing notice or information which might be useful to the enemy. Article 121. Elements 1. There is a war in which the Philippines is involved; 2. Offender must be owing allegiance to the government; 3. Offender attempts to flee or go to enemy country; 4. Going to the enemy country is prohibited by competent authority. Flight to Enemy’s Country In crimes against the law of nations, the offenders can be prosecuted anywhere in the world because these crimes are considered as against humanity in general, like piracy and mutiny. Crimes against national security can be tried only in the Philippines, as there is a need to bring the offender here before he can be made to suffer the consequences of the law. The acts against national security may be committed abroad and still be punishable under our law, but it cannot be tried under foreign law. The Revised Penal Code does not treat rebellion,
sedition and subversion as crimes against national security, but more of crimes against public order because during the time that the Penal Code was enacted, rebellion was carried out only with bolos and spears; hence, national security was not really threatened. Now, the threat of rebellion or internal wars is serious as a national threat.
Article 122. Piracy in general and Mutiny on the High Seas or in Philippine Waters Acts punished as piracy 1. Attacking or seizing a vessel on the high seas or in Philippine waters; 2. Seizing in the vessel while on the high seas or in Philippine waters the whole or part of its cargo, its equipment or personal belongings of its complement or passengers. Elements of piracy 1. The vessel is on the high seas or Philippine waters; 2. Offenders are neither members of its complement nor passengers of the vessel; 3. Offenders either – a. attack or seize a vessel on the high seas or in Philippine waters; or b. seize in the vessel while on the high seas or in Philippine waters the whole or part of its cargo, its equipment or personal belongings of its complement or passengers; 4. There is intent to gain. Originally, the crimes of piracy and mutiny can only be committed in the high seas, that is, outside Philippine territorial waters. But in August 1974, Presidential Decree No. 532 (The Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974) was issued, punishing piracy, but not mutiny, in Philippine territorial waters. Thus came about two kinds of piracy: (1) that which is punished under the Revised Penal Code if committed in the high seas; and (2) that which is punished under Presidential Decree No. 532 if
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committed in Philippine territorial waters. Amending Article 122, Republic Act No. 7659 included therein piracy in Philippine waters, thus, pro tanto
superseding Presidential Decree No. 532. As amended, the article now punishes piracy, as well as mutiny, whether committed in the high seas or in Philippine territorial waters, and the penalty has been increased to reclusion perpetua from reclusion temporal. But while under Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy in Philippine waters could be committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of a vessel, under the amended article, piracy can only be committed by a person who is not a passenger nor member of the complement of the vessel irrespective of venue. So if a passenger or complement of the vessel commits acts of robbery in the high seas, the crime is robbery, not piracy. Note, however, that in Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532, the act of aiding pirates or abetting piracy is penalized as a crime distinct from piracy. Said section penalizes any person who knowingly and in any manner aids or protects pirates, such as giving them information about the movement of the police or other peace officers of the government, or acquires or receives property taken by such pirates, or in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or who directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy. Also, it is expressly provided in the same section that the offender shall be considered as an accomplice of the principal offenders and punished in accordance with the Revised Penal Code. This provision of Presidential Decree No. 532 with respect to piracy in Philippine water has not been incorporated in the Revised Penal Code. Neither may it be considered repealed by Republic Act No. 7659 since there is nothing in the amendatory law is inconsistent with said section. Article 123. Qualified Piracy Elements 1. The vessel is on the high seas or Philippine waters: 2. Offenders may or may not be members of its complement, or passengers of the vessel; 3. Offenders either – (a) attack or seize the vessel; or
Apparently, there is still the crime of abetting piracy in Philippine waters under Presidential Decree No. 532. Considering that the essence of piracy is one of robbery, any taking in a vessel with force upon things or with violence or intimidation against person is employed will always be piracy. It cannot co-exist with the crime of robbery. Robbery, therefore, cannot be committed on board a vessel. But if the taking is without violence or intimidation on persons of force upon things, the crime of piracy cannot be
committed, but only theft. Elements of mutiny 1. The vessel is on the high seas or Philippine waters; 2. Offenders are either members of its complement, or passengers of the vessel; 3. Offenders either – (a) attack or seize the vessel; or (b) seize the whole or part of the cargo, its equipment, or personal belongings of the crew or passengers. Mutiny is the unlawful resistance to a superior officer, or the raising of commotions and disturbances aboard a ship against the authority of its commander. Distinction between mutiny and piracy As to offenders Mutiny is committed by members of the complement or the passengers of the vessel. Piracy is committed by persons who are not members of the complement or the passengers of the vessel. In piracy, the criminal intent is for gain.
As to criminal intent
In mutiny, there is no criminal intent.
(b) seize the whole or part of the cargo, its equipment., or personal belongings of the crew or passengers; 4. The preceding were committed under any of the following circumstances: (a) whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or firing upon the same;
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(b) whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims without means of saving themselves; or (c) whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, physical injuries or rape. If any of the circumstances in Article123 is present, piracy is qualified. Take note of the specific crimes involve in number 4 c (murder, homicide, physical injuries or rape). When any of these crimes accompany piracy, there is no complex crime. Instead,
there is only one crime committed – qualified piracy. Murder, rape, homicide, physical injuries are mere
circumstances qualifying piracy and cannot be punished as separate crimes, nor can they be complexed with piracy. Although in Article 123 merely refers to qualified piracy, there is also the crime of qualified mutiny. Mutiny is qualified under the following circumstances: (1) When the offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves; or (2) When the mutiny is accompanied by rape, murder, homicide, or physical injuries. Note that the first circumstance which qualifies piracy does not apply to mutiny.
A. ANTI-PIRACY AND ANTI- HIGHWAY ROBBERY (P.D.532) Definition of terms Philippine waters – refers to all bodies of water, such as but not limited to seas, gulfs, bays around, between and connecting each of the islands of the Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of its depth, breadth, length or dimension, and all other waters belonging to the Philippines by historic or legal title, including territorial sea, the sea-bed, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction. Vessel – any vessel or watercraft used for transport of passengers and cargo from one place to another through Philippine waters. It shall include all kinds and types of vessels or boats used in fishing. Philippine highway – refers to any road, street, passage, highway and bridges or other parts thereof, or railway or railroad within the Philippines used by persons, or vehicles, or locomotives or trains for the movement or circulation of persons or transportation of goods, articles, or property or both. Piracy – means any attack upon or seize of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters. The offenders shall be considered as pirates. Highway Robbery / Brigandage – the seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the property of another by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things or other unlawful means, committed by any
person on any Philippine highway. Punishable acts 1. Piracy. – any attack upon or seize of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters. Aggravating circumstances, which impose the penalty of death (reclusion perpetua): (a) When physical injuries or other crimes are committed as a result or on the occasion thereof; (b) Rape, murder or homicide if committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy; or (c) When the offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves; or (d) When the seizure is accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel.
2. Highway robbery or brigandage – seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the property of another by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things or other unlawful means,
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committed by any person on any Philippine highway. 3. Aiding pirates or highway robbers / brigands or abetting piracy or highway robbery / brigandage – Any person who knowingly and in any manner aids or protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them information about the movement of police or other peace officers of the
government, or acquires or receives property taken by such pirates or brigands or in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or highway robbery or
brigandage, shall be considered as an accomplice of the principal offenders. Unless the contrary is proven any person who does any of the acts has performed them knowingly.
B. ANTI-HIJACKING LAW (PD 6235) Anti hi-jacking is another kind of piracy which is committed in an aircraft. In other countries, this crime is known as aircraft piracy. Punishable acts (1) Usurping or seizing control of an aircraft of Philippine registry while it is in flight, compelling the pilots thereof to change the course or destination of the aircraft; (2) Usurping or seizing control of an aircraft of foreign registry while within Philippine territory, compelling the pilots thereof to land in any part of Philippine territory; (3) Carrying or loading on board an aircraft operating as a public utility passenger aircraft in the Philippines, any flammable, corrosive, explosive, or poisonous substance; and (4) Loading, shipping, or transporting on board a cargo aircraft operating as a public utility in the Philippines, any flammable, corrosive, explosive, or poisonous substance if this was done not in accordance with the rules and regulations set and promulgated by the Air Transportation Office on this matter. Between numbers 1 and 2, the point of distinction is whether the aircraft is of Philippine registry or foreign registry. The common bar question on this law usually involves number 1. The important thing is that before the anti hi-jacking law can apply, the aircraft must be in flight. If not in flight, whatever crimes committed shall be governed by the Revised Penal Code. The law makes a distinction between aircraft of a foreign registry and of Philippine registry. If the aircraft subject of the hi-jack is of Philippine registry, it should be in flight at the time of the hi-jacking. Otherwise, the anti hi-jacking law will not apply and the crime is still punished under the Revised Penal Code. The correlative crime may be one of grave coercion or grave threat. If somebody is killed, the crime is homicide or murder, as the case may be. If there are some explosives carried there, the crime is destructive arson. Explosives are by nature pyrotechnic. Destruction of property with the use of pyrotechnic is destructive arson. If there is illegally possessed or carried firearm, other special laws will apply. On the other hand, if the aircraft is of foreign registry, the law does not require that it be in flight before the anti hi-jacking law can apply. This
is because aircrafts of foreign registry are considered in transit while they are in foreign countries. Although they may have been in a foreign country, technically they are still in flight, because they have to move out of that foreign country. So even if any of the acts mentioned were committed while the exterior doors of the foreign aircraft were still open, the anti hi-jacking law will already govern. Note that under this law, an aircraft is considered in flight from the moment all exterior doors are closed following embarkation until such time when the same doors are again opened for disembarkation. This means that there are passengers that boarded. So if the doors are closed to bring the aircraft to the hangar, the aircraft is not considered as in flight. The aircraft shall be deemed to be already in flight even if its engine has not yet been started. 1. The pilots of the Pan Am aircraft were accosted by some armed men and were told to proceed to the aircraft to fly it to a foreign destination. The armed men walked with the pilots and went on board the aircraft. But before they could do anything on the aircraft, alert marshals arrested them. What crime was committed?
The criminal intent definitely is to take control of the aircraft, which is hi-jacking. It is a question now of whether the anti-hi-jacking law shall govern. The anti hi-jacking law is applicable in this case. Even if the aircraft is not yet about to fly, the requirement that it be in flight does not hold true
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when in comes to aircraft of foreign registry. Even if the problem does not say that all exterior doors are closed, the crime is hi-jacking. Since the aircraft is of foreign registry, under the law, simply usurping or seizing control is enough as long as the aircraft is within Philippine territory,
without the requirement that it be in flight. Note, however, that there is no hi-jacking in the attempted stage. This is a special law where the attempted stage is not punishable. 2. A Philippine Air Lines aircraft is bound for Davao. While the pilot and co-pilot are taking their snacks at the airport lounge, some of the armed men were also there. The pilots were followed by these men on their way to the aircraft. As soon as the pilots entered the cockpit, they pulled out their firearms and gave instructions where to fly the aircraft. Does the anti hi-jacking law apply?
would apply. The reason for the distinction is that as long as such aircraft has not returned to its home base, technically, it is still considered in transit or in flight. As to numbers 3 and 4 of Republic Act No. 6235, the distinction is whether the aircraft is a passenger aircraft or a cargo aircraft. In both cases, however, the law applies only to public utility aircraft in the Philippines. Private aircrafts are not subject to the anti hi-jacking law, in so far as transporting prohibited substances are concerned. If the aircraft is a passenger aircraft, the prohibition is absolute. Carrying of any prohibited, flammable, corrosive, or explosive substance is a crime under Republic Act No. 6235. But if the aircraft is only a cargo aircraft, the law is violated only when the transporting of the prohibited substance was not done in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the Air Transportation Office in the matter of shipment of such things. The Board of Transportation provides the manner of packing of such kind of articles, the quantity in which they may be loaded at any time, etc. Otherwise, the anti hi-jacking law does not apply. However, under Section 7, any physical injury or damage to property which would result from the carrying or loading of the flammable, corrosive, explosive, or poisonous substance in an aircraft, the offender shall be prosecuted not only for violation of Republic Act No. 6235, but also for the crime of physical injuries or damage to property, as the case may be, under the Revised Penal Code. There will be two prosecutions here. Other than this situation, the crime of physical injuries will be absorbed. If the explosives were planted in the aircraft to blow up the aircraft, the circumstance will qualify the penalty and that is not punishable as a separate crime for murder. The penalty is increased under the anti
hi-jacking law. All other acts outside of the four are merely qualifying circumstances and would bring about higher penalty. Such acts would not constitute another crime. So the killing or explosion will only qualify the penalty to a higher one.
No. The passengers have yet to board the aircraft. If at that time, the offenders are apprehended, the law will not apply because the aircraft is not yet in flight. Note that the aircraft is of Philippine registry. 3. While the stewardess of a Philippine Air Lines plane bound for Cebu was waiting for the passenger manifest, two of its passengers seated near the pilot surreptitiously entered the pilot cockpit. At gunpoint, they directed the pilot to fly the aircraft to the Middle East. However, before the pilot could fly the aircraft towards the Middle East, the offenders were subdued and the aircraft landed. What crime was committed?
The aircraft was not yet in flight. Considering that the stewardess was still waiting for the passenger manifest, the doors were still open. Hence, the anti hi-jacking law is not applicable. Instead, the Revised Penal Code shall govern. The crime committed was grave coercion or grave threat, depending upon whether or not any serious offense violence was inflicted upon the pilot. However, if the aircraft were of foreign registry, the act would already be subject to the anti hijacking law because there is no requirement for foreign aircraft to be in flight before such law C. HUMAN SECURITY ACT OF 2007(R.A. 9372) Punishable acts of terrorism; who are liable Terrorism.- Any person who commits an act punishable under any of the following provisions of the Revised Penal Code:
a. Article 122 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in the Philippine Waters); b. Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);
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c. Article 134-a (Coup d’ Etat), including acts committed by private persons; d. Article 248 (Murder); e. Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention); f. Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction), or under 1. Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson); 2. Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control Act of 1990); 3. Republic Act No. 5207, (Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act of 1968); 4. Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law); 5. Presidential Decree No. 532 (AntiPiracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974); and, 6. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal and Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives) thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall be guilty of the crime of terrorism and shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment, without the benefit of parole as provided for under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended (Sec. 3). Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism. – Persons who conspire to commit the crime of terrorism shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of the crime of terrorism as defined in Section 3 hereof and decide to commit the same (Sec. 4). Accomplice. – Any person who, not being a principal under Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code or a conspirator as defined in Section 4 hereof, cooperates in the execution of either the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism by previous or simultaneous acts shall suffer the penalty of from seventeen (17) years, four months one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment (Sec. 5). Accessory. – Any person who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, and without having participated therein, either as principal or accomplice under Articles 17 and 18 of the Revised Penal Code, takes part subsequent to its commission in any of the following
manner: (a) by profiting himself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (b) by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects, or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; (c) by harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal or conspirator of the crime, shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment. Notwithstanding the above paragraph, the penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of subparagraph (a) (Sec. 6).
2. CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE (124-133) Crimes against the fundamental laws of the State 1. Arbitrary detention (Art. 124); 2. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities (Art. 125); 3. Delaying release (Art. 126); 4. Expulsion (Art. 127); 5. Violation of domicile (Art. 128); 6. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally obtained (Art. 129); 7. Searching domicile without witnesses (Art. 130); 8. Prohibition, interruption, and dissolution of peaceful meetings (Art. 131); 9. Interruption of religious worship (Art. 132); and
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10. Offending the religious feelings (Art. 133); Crimes under this title are those which violate the Bill of Rights accorded to the citizens under the Constitution. Under this title, the offenders are public officers, except as to the last crime – offending the religious feelings under Article 133, which refers to any person. The public officers who may be held liable are
only those acting under supposed exercise of official functions, albeit illegally. In its counterpart in Title IX (Crimes Against Article 124. Arbitrary Detention Elements 1. Offender is a public officer or employee; 2. He detains a person; 3. The detention is without legal grounds. Meaning of absence of legal grounds 1. No crime was committed by the detained; 2. There is no violent insanity of the detained person; and 3. The person detained has no ailment which requires compulsory confinement in a hospital. The crime of arbitrary detention assumes several forms: (1) Detaining a person without legal grounds under; (2) Having arrested the offended party for legal grounds but without warrant of arrest, and the public officer does not deliver the arrested person to the proper judicial authority within the period of 12, 18, or 36 hours, as the case may be; or (3) Delaying release by competent authority with the same period mentioned in number 2. Distinction between arbitrary detention and illegal detention 1. In arbitrary detention -The principal offender must be a public officer. Civilians can commit the crime of arbitrary detention except when they conspire with a public officer committing this crime, or become an accomplice or accessory to the crime committed by the public officer; and The offender who is a public officer has a duty which carries with it the authority to detain a person. 2. In illegal detention -The principal offender is a private person.
Personal Liberty and Security), the offenders are private persons. But private persons may also be liable under this title as when a private person conspires with a public officer. What is required is that the principal offender must be a public officer. Thus, if a private person conspires with a public officer, or becomes an accessory or accomplice, the private person also becomes liable for the same crime. But a private person acting alone cannot commit the crimes under Article 124 to 132 of this title.
But a public officer can commit the crime of illegal detention when he is acting in a private capacity or beyond the scope of his official duty, or when he becomes an accomplice or accessory to the crime committed by a private person. The offender, even if he is a public officer, does not include as his function the power to arrest and detain a person, unless he
conspires with a public officer committing arbitrary detention. Note that in the crime of arbitrary detention, although the offender is a public officer, not any public officer can commit this crime. Only those public officers whose official duties carry with it the authority to make an arrest and detain persons can be guilty of this crime. So, if the offender does not possess such authority, the crime committed by him is illegal detention. A public officer who is acting outside the scope of his official duties is no better than a private citizen. In a case decided by the Supreme Court a Barangay Chairman who unlawfully detains another was held to be guilty of the crime of arbitrary detention. This is because he is a person in authority vested with the jurisdiction to maintain peace and order within his barangay. In the maintenance of such peace and order, he may cause the arrest and detention of troublemakers or those who disturb the peace and order within his barangay. But if the legal basis for the apprehension and detention does not exist, then the detention becomes arbitrary. Whether the crime is arbitrary detention or illegal detention, it is necessary that there must be an actual restraint of liberty of the offended party. If there is no actual restraint, as the offended party may still go to the place where he wants to go, even though there have been warnings, the crime of arbitrary detention or illegal detention is
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not committed. threat.
There is either grave or light
However, if the victim is under guard in his movement such that there is still restraint of liberty, then the crime of either arbitrary or illegal
detention is still committed. Distinction between arbitrary detention and unlawful arrest (1) As to offender In arbitrary detention, the offender is a public officer possessed with authority to make arrests. In unlawful arrest, the offender may be any
person. (2) As to criminal intent In arbitrary detention, the main reason for detaining the offended party is to deny him of his liberty. In unlawful arrest, the purpose is to accuse the offended party of a crime he did not commit, to deliver the person to the proper authority, and to file the necessary charges in a way trying to incriminate him. When a person is unlawfully arrested, his subsequent detention is without legal grounds.
Article 125. Delay in the Delivery of Detained Persons to the Proper Judicial Authorities Elements 1. Offender is a public officer or employee; 2. He detains a person for some legal ground; 3. He fails to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within – (a) 12 hour for light penalties; (b) 18 hours for correctional penalties; and (c) 36 hours for afflictive or capital penalties. This is a form of arbitrary detention. At the beginning, the detention is legal since it is in the pursuance of a lawful arrest. However, the detention becomes arbitrary when the period thereof exceeds 12, 18 or 36 hours, as the case may be, depending on whether the crime is punished by light, correctional or afflictive penalty or their equivalent. The period of detention is 12 hours for light offenses, 18 hours for correctional offences and 36 hours for afflictive offences, where the accused may be detained without formal charge. But he must cause a formal charge or application to be filed with the proper court before 12, 18 or 36 hours lapse. Otherwise he has to release the person arrested. Note that the period stated herein does not include the nighttime. It is to be counted only when the prosecutor’s office is ready to receive the complaint or information. This article does not apply if the arrest is with a warrant. The situation contemplated here is an arrest without a warrant. When a person is arrested without a warrant, it means that there is no case filed in court yet. If the arresting officer would hold the arrested person there, he is actually depriving the arrested of his right to bail. As long as there is no charge in the court yet, the arrested person cannot obtain bail
because bail may only be granted by the court. The spirit of the law is to have the arrested person delivered to the jurisdiction of the court. If the arrest is by virtue of a warrant, it means that there is already a case filed in court. When an information is filed in court, the amount of bail recommended is stated. The accused person is not really denied his right to bail. Even if he is interrogated in the police precinct, he can already file bail. Note that delivery of the arrested person to the proper authorities does not mean physical delivery or turn over of arrested person to the court. It simply means putting the arrested person under the jurisdiction of the court. This is done by filing the necessary complaint or information against the person arrested in court within the period specified in Article 125. The purpose of this is for the court to determine whether the offense is bailable or not and if bailable, to allow him the right to bail. Under the Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, the arrested person can demand from the arresting officer to bring him to any judge in the place where he was arrested and post the bail here. Thereupon, the arresting officer may release him. The judge who granted the bail will just forward the litimus of the case to the court trying his case. The purpose is in order to deprive the arrested person of his right to post the bail. Under the Revised Rules of Court, when the person arrested is arrested for a crime which gives him the right to preliminary investigation
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and he wants to avail his right to a preliminary investigation, he would have to waive in writing his rights under Article 125 so that the arresting officer will not immediately file the case with the court that will exercise jurisdiction over the case. If he does not want to waive this in writing, the arresting officer will have to comply with Article 125 and file the case
immediately in court Article 126. Delaying Release Acts punished 1. Delaying the performance of a judicial or executive order for the release of a prisoner; 2. Unduly delaying the service of the notice of such order to said prisoner; 3. Unduly delaying the proceedings upon any petition for the liberation of such person. Elements 1. Offender is a public officer or employee; 2. There is a judicial or executive order for the Article 127. Expulsion Acts punished 1. Expelling a person from the Philippines; 2. Compelling a person to change his residence. Elements 1. Offender is a public officer or employee; 2. He either – (a) expels any person from the Philippines; or (b) compels a person to change residence; 3, Offender is not authorized to do so by law. Article 128. Violation of Domicile 1. Entering any dwelling against the will of the owner thereof; 2. Searching papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent of such owner; or 3. Refusing to leave the premises, after having surreptitiously entered said dwelling and after having been required to leave the same Common elements 1. Offender is a public officer or employee; 2. He is not authorized by judicial order to enter the dwelling or to make a search therein for papers or other effects. Circumstances qualifying the offense
without preliminary investigation. In such case, the arrested person, within five days after learning that the case has been filed in court without preliminary investigation, may ask for preliminary investigation. In this case, the public officer who made the arrest will no longer be liable for violation of Article 125.
release of a prisoner or detention prisoner, or that there is a proceeding upon a petition for the liberation of such person; 3. Offender without good reason delays – (a) the service of the notice of such order to the prisoner; (b) the performance of such judicial or executive order for the release of the prisoner; or (c) the proceedings upon a petition for the release of such person.
The essence of this crime is coercion but the specific crime is ―expulsion‖ when committed by a public officer. If committed by a private person, the crime is grave coercion. In Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil 778, the mayor
of the City of Manila wanted to make the city free from prostitution. He ordered certain prostitutes to be transferred to Davao, without observing due processes since they have not been charged with any crime at all. It was held that the crime committed was expulsion.
1. If committed at nighttime; or 2. If any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime are not returned immediately after the search made by offender. Under Title IX (Crimes against Personal Liberty and Security), the corresponding article is qualified trespass to dwelling under Article 280. Article 128 is limited to public officers. The public officers who may be liable for crimes against the fundamental laws are those who are possessed of the authority to execute search warrants and warrants of arrests. Under Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court, when a person to be arrested enters a premise
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and closes it thereafter, the public officer, after giving notice of an arrest, can break into the premise. He shall not be liable for violation of domicile. There are only three recognized instances when search without a warrant is considered valid, and, therefore, the seizure of any evidence done is also valid. Outside of these, search would be invalid and the objects seized would not be admissible in evidence. (1) Search made incidental to a valid arrest; (2) Where the search was made on a moving vehicle or vessel such that the exigency of the situation prevents the searching officer from securing a search warrant; (3) When the article seized is within plain view of the officer making the seizure without making a search therefore. There are three ways of committing the violation of Article 128: (1) By simply entering the dwelling of another if such entering
is done against the will of the occupant. In the plain view doctrine, public
Article 365. Imprudence and Negligence Quasi-offenses punished 1. Committing through reckless imprudence any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave or less grave felony or light felony; 2. Committing through simple imprudence or negligence an act which would otherwise constitute a grave or a less serious felony; 3. Causing damage to the property of another through reckless imprudence or simple imprudence or negligence; 4. Causing through simple imprudence or negligence some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony. Distinction between reckless imprudence and negligence: The two are distinguished only as to whether the danger that would be impending is easily perceivable or not. If the danger that may result from the criminal negligence is clearly perceivable, the imprudence is reckless. If it could hardly be perceived, the criminal negligence would only be simple. There is no more issue on whether culpa is a crime in itself or only a mode of incurring criminal liability. It is practically settled that criminal negligence is only a modality in incurring criminal liability. This is so because under Article 3, a felony may result from dolo or culpa. Since this is the mode of incurring criminal liability, if there is only one carelessness, even if there are several results, the accused may only be prosecuted under one count for the criminal negligence. So there would only be one information to be filed, even if the negligence may bring about resulting injuries which are slight. Do not separate the accusation from the slight physical injuries from the other material result of the negligence. If the criminal negligence resulted, for example, in homicide, serious physical injuries and slight physical injuries, do not join only the homicide and serious physical injuries in one information for the slight
physical injuries. You are not complexing slight when you join it in the same information. It is just that you are not splitting the criminal negligence because the real basis of the criminal liability is the negligence. If you split the criminal negligence, that is where double jeopardy would arise.
II. Jurisprudence— Pertinent Supreme Court decisions promulgated up to June 30, 2010 III. Excluded Topics
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1. All Special Penal Laws and Supreme Court Decisions not pertinent to the above outlined topics are excluded. 2. Penalties of Specific Crimes.
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