Basic elements that a coal mine’s safety management system must provide
Discuss about the Coal Mining for Forestry, Mining and Energy Union.
- The management should provide the analysis of the potential hazards in the mines.
- The management should report and give recorded information regarding the safety and health of the miners.
- The management should perform the risk assessment and identification
- The management should control and manage the hazards identified
- The risk assessment should have regards to the surrounding features that may be hazardous if interfered with by the mining activity.
- The risk assessment should consider any other workings near or at the proposed mining site
- Considerations about the stability of the pillar should be made.
- The make of the expected gas should be brought to attention.
- The geological structure regarding to the proposed workings should be known during the risk assessment.
- Considerations of the anticipated extraction method and sequence should be assessed.
- There should be an assessment of the ventilation method, the method used in spontaneous combustion control, and support and strata methods.
- The risk management should cover the support methods responsible for the golf area edges control in the mining site.
- The management should also look on the plant fitness with its controls required at the site.
The Moura district has experienced three catastrophes that has led to the loss of 36 lives (Mine Safety Institute of Australia, 2012). The first disaster took place in the year 1975 at Kianga Mine claiming 13 lives. This was as a result of an explosion caused by the spontaneous combustion. The second disaster was experienced at Moura No 4 Mine in the year 1986 claiming 12 lives (Thorpe, 2016). The explosion is said to have been caused by either a flame safety lamp or a frictional ignition. The last disaster, the focus of my investigation, took place at Moura No 2 Mine in 1994 claiming 11 lives (Roberts, 2015).
At the Moura No 2 Mine, there was a first explosion where 10 men of the 21 who were working underground managed to escape to the surface. Later a more violent explosion followed resulting to the abandoning of the attempts made to recover and rescue the miners (Queensland Government, 2014). The explosions are said to have begun from the 512 Panel, caused by the failure to identify, and efficiently prevent, a heating coal. Methane, which accumulated in the panel, was hence ignited causing a huge explosion.
In addition to the explosions, there were other factors that may have led to fatalities in the mines. they include:
- The failure to curb the spread of the heat. This may have been as a result of loose coal left behind after mining. Also lack of supports of the roofs that resulted in their falling down covering some loose coal hence preventing proper ventilation. There could also be some areas in the goaf that may have insufficiently been ventilated hence resulting to breeding of the heating (Weiss, 2006).
- The failure to recognize the existence of the heating itself. People in the mine had inadequate knowledge on spontaneous combustion. Despite that, the little knowledge they had was rarely applied. This involved the inability to use the available equipment effectively for example the on-site gas chromatograph, which provides information about the 512 panel just before the explosion, was never used(Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union. United Mine Workers Division, Construction, Forestry and Mining Employees Union. United Mine Workers Division, United Mineworkers Federation of Australia, Miners Federation (Australia), 2007).
- The failure to seal the accumulation of the methane in the panel thereby treating the heating. There was accumulation of methane gas in the panels where coal mining took place and it was mandatory for them to be sealed in case of a heating to prevent explosion. This never happened since there was a leak in the panel which led to an explosion.
- The failure to communicate effectively, also evaluating and capturing most tell-tale signs for a larger period of time. There was lack of maintenance of proper reporting and communication channels thereby losing opportunities of response by the ones responsible(Peetz, 2010). The key personnel never paid attention to the relevant information and hence failed to act upon when need arose.
- The inability to remove people from the mine site even when the threats were foreseen(Brune, 2010). There was no decision made precisely citing whether or not the workforce to remain at the site or evacuate.
I would build a strong management system that would be able to deal with the spontaneous combustion risk. This would be achieved through repeated risk assessment of the area. There would be clear definition of roles played by the individuals in the management in the whole operation and this would help build a strong and effective communication system to prevent accidents from happening. To achieve this there would be thorough auditing of the system operation and integrity to improve attendance and efficiency of the operations (Yang, 2011).
There would be plans to adopt standards that would cater for the management, prevention and risk control. The most common risks that would be looked into include spontaneous combustion, ventilation, emergency evacuation, methane drainage, strata control and gas management. I would create action plans to tackle identified risks. Adequate training for risk identification and control will take place. Dependable procedures will also be in place with the end goal of meeting quality assurance standards.
Education of the workforce on matters communication would be fundamental to curb the instances like that in Moura No 2 (Smith, 2016). There would be training on how to identify indicators relating to certain mine hazards and also familiarizing themselves with the risks in the gases encountered.
Requirements of site senior executive (SSE) in relation to risk assessments
I would develop guidelines that would initiate best technology for filter self-rescuers and other alternatives. There would also be designated escape routes that would be used by both those with the self-rescuers and those without. The escape routes would be oxygen based so as to minimize the number of casualties in the event of an explosion or fire.
There would be gas monitoring system protocols that would alert the miners in case of a leak. The protocols involved include setting alarms which would detect any leakage of gas and alert the workforce. It would also define the authorized personnel in setting the alarms and noting down any changes that would have been made.
A spreadsheet showing the ore reserves (tonnages and grade)
The extent of copper deposit is determined by creating polygons at the sampling points that will assist in calculating the area of influence of the ore. In the problem above, the area of the polygons was given. Then the volume is determined by multiplication of the surface area with the depth average depth of the holes. Tonnage is calculated by the multiplication of the volume found above with the tonnage factor that was given. Finally, the value of the ore was calculated by finding the average of all the grade values.
In the spreadsheet below, the following calculations aided in determining the tonnages and the grade of the copper ores:
- Area = the given polygon area
- Volume = area × the average depth of the holes
- Tonnage = volume × tonnage factor
Tonnage factor was given as 0.443 m3/ton
The average depth was calculated using the depth ranges given.
The ore value was calculated and found to be 0.647162162%
The tonnage value was found to be 425386.0205 tons
References
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Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union. United Mine Workers Division, Construction, Forestry and Mining Employees Union. United Mine Workers Division, United Mineworkers Federation of Australia, Miners Federation (Australia), 2007. Common Cause. Australia: Miners Federation of Australia.
Mine Safety Institute of Australia, 2012. Mine Safety Institute of Australia. [Online] Available at: https://www.mineaccidents.com.au/mine-accident/26/kianga-no-1-mine-explosion-1975
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Peetz, D. M. G., 2010. Women of the Coal Rushes. Sydney: UNSW Press.
Queensland Government, 2014. Report on an Accident at Moura NO 2 Underground Mine on Sunday, 7 August 1994, Australia: Queensland Government publications.
Roberts, A., 2015. Mining community still lives nightmare 21 years after explosion. [Online] Available at: https://www.abc.net.au/local/videos/2015/07/08/4269518.htm
[Accessed 19 May 2018].
Smith, W. G., 2016. Management Obligations for Health and Safety. Florida: CRC Press.
Thorpe, A., 2016. Moura No. 4 mining disaster remembered. [Online] Available at: https://www.centraltelegraph.com.au/news/Moura-no4-mining-disaster-remembered/3065309/ [Accessed 19 May 2018].
Weiss, S. E. C. L. K., 2006. Evaluation of Explosion-Resistant Seals, Stoppings, and Overcast for Ventilation Control in Underground Coal Mining, Worcester: NOSH-Publications.
Yang, B., 2011. Regulatory Governance and Risk Management: Occupational Health and Safety in the Coal Mining Industry. Abingdon: Routledge.
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