Literature Review
HAZOP is a systematic and organized approach to analyzing systems and responding with potential hazards. As a method for detecting potential risks, HAZOP is used. Systematic implementation of management policies, processes, and practices can be summed up in this definition. Identifying, assessing, evaluating, measuring, and reviewing risk are all part of risk management (Chastain et al. 2017). A risk management programme includes a risk assessment. A company’s current risk management plan is a more comprehensive effort aimed at limiting exposure to danger and preventing errors. When deviations from design conditions in industrial process plants have an impact on safety and operability, a technique called Hazard and Operability (HazOp) can be used to assess the risk and operational issues. It may be applied at any stage of a plant’s life cycle. The purpose of this study is to offer a quick review of the literature on the HazOp risk assessment tool. As a hybrid approach, HazOp and the usage of risk matrix offer structure, process and criteria, as well as the ability to priorities risk in order to give more precise planned project information.
HazOp is a systematic method used by many threats assessment teams to detect possible dangers and operational issues in a process or system. A Hazop study examines a hazardous processing facility’s design and operation. All conceivable deviations from normal safe operation that might lead to any danger, environmental risk, operational difficulties, etc. are identified using this tool. Each aspect of the process must be examined in detail in a hazard and operability study. This is an effort to identify the possible conditions in which the element could impede the overall process’s operability. A HAZOP requires a certain set of data to be collected. For starters, as demonstrated by the importance of P&IDs (Cagno, Caron and Mancini 2020). This is the foundation for either continuing or new plant research. In addition, batch and continuously sheet operating systems are required. The batch process is a transitional stage between sampling, pausing, and restarting processes, as well as a step in the operating method. Additional functions such as cleaning and maintenance are also carried out by this machine. Continuous processes, on the other hand, include reactors, columns, exchangers, pumps, and pipes.
Arena, Criscione and Trapani (2018) stated in research, HazOp analysis technique and Colored petri net formalism has been integrated into a single tool to aid in the analysis of HazOp brainstorming sessions. It was utilized in that project to model the behavior of a few chemical plant components in the event of certain abnormalities. The plant’s behavior has been simulated to demonstrate its capacity to model more complicated components, simulate a wide range of failures, and hence reduce the overall time necessary to complete the study compared to a typical HazOp assessment technique.
According to Choi and Byeon (2020) In order to examine systematic risk and efficiently apply HSE engineering, the HazOp systematic risk assessment approach and a quantitative risk derivation method, which is also an advantage of the SIL, are used in conjunction with the SIL. The investigation is divided into four stages: A portion of a solution styrene butadiene rubber (SSBR) factory was employed as a case study for this project. Following the risk assessment, they provided the HSE engineering method that should be used to reduce the likelihood of a hazard occurring. This suggested HSE-HazOp is significant because it provides a systematic analysis approach for the operator’s safety, which is lacking in the current risk analysis methods for HSE engineering.
Solukloei et al. (2022) proposes a hybrid strategy that combines a fuzzy hazard and Operability technique, an Ant Colony System (ACS), and fuzzy set theory to assess the risk of fire, explosion, and hazardous discharge in process industries. An improved risk assessment may be made using the fuzzy-HAZOP approach, which incorporates additional risk factors. The fuzzy set concept is used to eliminate vagueness, ambiguity, inaccuracy, and uncertainty in expert evaluations by using the ACS technique to offer complete rules that take into consideration the intricate links between operating parameter variations and safety control failures. Use of our hybrid approach in the gas refinery business is shown. For combined fire, explosion, and hazardous release risk assessment, it surpasses the fuzzy set technique. Experts may also use our technique in other areas where it is necessary to evaluate the combined risk of fire, explosion, and hazardous discharge.
Suhardi et al. (2018) examined hazard and operability analysis with the identification of possible hazards in establishments that work with highly dangerous materials and find their research in the primary focus was on eliminating any potential sources of catastrophic events, such as explosions, fires, or poisonous releases. For this project, the HazOp method is expanded, and the typical Hazop research is made available to a broader audience. Using this paradigm, the author proposes a method for systematically assessing the economic, health, and environmental consequences of a chemical process and prioritizing the risk based on hazards or deviations from normal operation. One method alone won’t get the best results at work, and the future should focus on using many RAA methods at the same time. A well-considered RAA strategy that incorporates a broad range of risk assessment methods will help able industries achieve significant outcomes in risk assessment. According to the authors, the use of an alternative paradigm proposed in this study might assist companies with preventing occupational risk. Additional RAA frameworks and applications in other sectors are on the horizon.
According to Ahn and Chang (2017) traditional hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP) aims to find and offer preventive measures to possible risks operating concerns in process. According to multi-factor risk assessment, quantitative HAZOP studies may also be utilized to determine the hazards. Using a methodical methodology, qualitative HAZOP analysis aims to identify potential deviations from normal operations and verify that enough protections are in place to help avoid incidents with possibilities for causing deviations from safe conditions. Rather than just assessing the likelihood and severity of each possible scenario, quantitative HAZOP allows for the selection of the most critical preventative measures that should be put in place, rather than relying only on qualitative methods.
According to Kletz (2018) One of the PHA techniques most often used by risk management professionals is the HazOp mythos. The process companies will continue to use it for a long time to come, according to the author. However, the approach must be modified in order to respond to its application in highly complex establishments in order to handle new issues within the present process sector. It will be possible to use this approach in more complicated facilities after it has been upgraded. As shown in a recent paper, improvements to this technique will enable it to be quickly tailored to meet the needs of present and future processes. This research revealed that the majority of the authors interviewed believe that the HazOp approach is a reliable method for detecting process parameter abnormalities. In addition, its structured approach provides the required assistance to make it simpler to determine the causes and effects by utilizing the expertise of a diverse team or databases from expert systems. Because of the use of cutting-edge technology, today’s procedures are more complicated than ever before. That is the primary reason why the Hazop technique cannot satisfy the needs of following process threat assessment in the typical manner (Galalizadeh et al. 2020). But the emerging trend among Hazop experts is the creation and deployment of intelligent Hazop research. As a result of the production of simulation methods, as well as the use of the specialized software, risk assessments may be completed quickly and cheaply. Individuals will no longer be required to assist expert systems as they get more and more accurate over time.
Pujiono, Tama and Efranto (2019) discuss, most of the work in conducting a HAZOP analysis is made easier by employing a standard reporting form. Follow-up activities are carried out after the signing of the document and production of the study’s report, respectively. The recorded risk assessment is likely to be modified by the risk assessment team in response to variables such as regulatory requirements, business documentation rules, and the need for prioritizing of the risks. The conclusion of the HAZOP analysis is signaled at this step. The outputs and findings of the research should then be recorded in accordance with the nature of the risks identified in the study as well as the documentation rules of the particular companies involved. The HAZOP assessment should be checked to confirm that a procedure is in place and that all allocated activities have been completed successfully (Jing et al. 2018). As a system life cycle stage, HAZOP is comprised of many phases that are helpful for identifying and analyzing risks in processes, equipment’s, and facilities. In accordance with the findings of Hyatt (2018), all six steps are effective and important in aiding risk identification investigations. The phases are as follows: the idea stage, the development stage, the realization stage, the usage stage, the retirement stage and the enhancement stage. The realization and enhancement phases are the two most successful stages out of the six mentioned.
Fuentes-Bargues et al. (2017) stated that the preparation phase includes determining the scope of the research, deciding on a method of recording, calculating time, and putting together a timeline. It enables the team to select the appropriate guiding words for the issue statement. Plant models serve as a framework for an investigation of the many aspects of a process. The team identifies the operational parameters, such as pressure, vibration, temperature, flow rate, and others, for each component of the system. Activities in this phase are designed to guarantee that the HAZOP analysis is properly prepared. Identification and placement of accompanying data and information, determination of research outputs, audience and user groups, as well as programme management planning are all part of this process. As part of this step, researchers need to agree on a standard way to write up their findings. In order to pick just those HAZOP guiding words that are relevant to the scope and issue statement, the hazard assessment teams must identify all of them (Abbasi et al. 2019). A good HAZOP guide word selection permits the following stage to proceed. Once this step has been completed successfully, the HAZOP process may go on to the next level.
Conclusion
In Conclusion, an overview of the existing research on the Hazop risk assessment tool is provided in this discussion. The HazOp has a structure, procedures, and a methodical approach that contribute to its success. Finding dangers in chemical processing plants is usually accomplished through the use of a technique called a Hazard and Operatability Study. With this collaboration and rigorous danger identification, the strategy is successful, as previously described. Besides the team leader, members with specific process expertise make up the group. Instrument designers, service technicians, process designers, operatives, and safety experts are all roles they may do. There must be a lot of design information available to begin the HAZOP analysis, including such P&IDs, flowsheets, and a description of the processes. Pressure, temperatures, and flow variations must be studied by the team under the leadership of the team facilitators to ensure proper operation. It is necessary to employ sequence and regulated information in computer-controlled facilities while executing HAZOP. This information includes the functional design requirements for the facility as well as determinism charts. In addition to process charts and graphs and related information including such mass and energy balances, plant layouts, including technical drawings, research and innovation reports are also necessary.
References
Abbasi, S., Bakhtom, S., Ziaei, M. and Arghami, S., 2019. Comparison of risk assessment using HAZOP and ETBA techniques: case study of a gasoline refinery unit in iran.
Ahn, J. and Chang, D., 2017. Fuzzy-based HAZOP study for process industry. Journal of hazardous materials, 317, pp.303-311.
Arena, D., Criscione, F. and Trapani, N., 2018. Risk assessment in a chemical plant with a CPN-HAZOP Tool. IFAC-PapersOnLine, 51(11), pp.939-944.
Cagno, E., Caron, F. and Mancini, M., 2020. Risk analysis in plant commissioning: the Multilevel Hazop. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 77(3), pp.309-323.
Chastain, J.W., Delanoy, P., Devlin, C., Mueller, T. and Study, K., 2017. Beyond HAZOP and LOPA: Four different company approaches. Process Safety Progress, 36(1), pp.38-53.
Choi, J.Y. and Byeon, S.H., 2020. HAZOP methodology based on the health, safety, and environment engineering. International journal of environmental research and public health, 17(9), p.3236.
Fuentes-Bargues, J.L., González-Cruz, M., González-Gaya, C. and Baixauli-Pérez, M., 2017. Risk analysis of a fuel storage terminal using HAZOP and FTA. International journal of environmental research and public health, 14(7), p.705.
Galalizadeh, S., Karimi, H., Malekmohammadi, B., Sadeghi, A. and Shirzadi, S., 2020. Environmental risk assessment and mapping of oil installations to Chamshir Dam water basin using GIS and HAZOP method. International Journal of Risk Assessment and Management, 23(3-4), pp.207-222.
Hyatt, N., 2018. Guidelines for process hazards analysis (PHA, HAZOP), hazards identification, and risk analysis. CRC press.
Jing, S., Liu, X., Cheng, C., Shang, X. and Xiong, G., 2018, June. A HAZOP based model for safety management risk assessment in petrochemical plants. In Proceeding of the 11th World Congress on Intelligent Control and Automation (pp. 3551-3555). IEEE.
Kletz, T., 2018. HAZOP and HAZAN: identifying and assessing process industry hazards. CRC Press.
Marhavilas, P.K., Filippidis, M., Koulinas, G.K. and Koulouriotis, D.E., 2019. The integration of HAZOP study with risk-matrix and the analytical-hierarchy process for identifying critical control-points and prioritizing risks in industry–A case study. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 62, p.103981.
Pujiono, B.N., Tama, I.P. and Efranto, R.Y., 2019. Analisis Potensi Bahaya Serta Rekomendasi Perbaikan Dengan Metode Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) Melalui Perangkingan OHS Risk Assessment and Control (Studi Kasus: Area PM-1 PT. Ekamas Fortuna). Jurnal Rekayasa dan Manajemen Sistem Industri, 1(2), p.127643.
Solukloei, H.R.J., Nematifard, S., Hesami, A., Mohammadi, H. and Kamalinia, M., 2022. A fuzzy-HAZOP/ant colony system methodology to identify combined fire, explosion, and toxic release risk in the process industries. Expert Systems with Applications, 192, p.116418.
Suhardi, B., Laksono, P.W., Rohani, J.M. and Ching, T.S., 2018. Analysis of the potential hazard identification and risk assessment (HIRA) and hazard operability study (HAZOP): case study. International Journal of Engineering & Technology, 7(3.24), pp.1-7.
Suhardi, B., Laksono, P.W., Rohani, J.M. and Ching, T.S., 2018. Analysis of the potential hazard identification and risk assessment (HIRA) and hazard operability study (HAZOP): case study. International Journal of Engineering & Technology, 7(3.24), pp.1-7.
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