Background of the Vietnamese War
The consequences of the Vietnamese war decided the end of the imperialistic approach of the Western capitalist forces in Southern Asia.
On the 1st of August, 1946, President Truman declared before the US citizen his decision of rendering help for freedom and independence of the Vietnamese. However, a section of the US government did not support President Truman’s decision. They held the view that the statutory French rule of Thierry d’Angenlieu in French Indochina (that is the areas of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia), would have helped to gain support of the provincial government of the French in Vietnam. The French would have naturally curbed the domination of the increasingly belligerent United Soviet union of Russia in Vietnam. The French supposed that the direct influence of the American in the Vietnamese matter was not required. They strictly opposed the working of the United States advisory group in Vietnam.
Discussion
Truman’s government in America held the opinion that the US needed to play a more vital role alongside coordination of the requisition, procurement alongside dissemination of supplies and other equipment (Sean, 2017). Accordingly President Truman dispatched an advisory group for Saigon. The imposition of the advisory group from the American end did not win positive responses from the French. In contrast Garrow (2015), opined that the French saw the voluntary US participation as infiltration for the cause of colonisation. In the November of the same year, the French attacked the custom office in the Haiphong port, adjacent to Hanoi. In the consecutive month, the French, claiming that they have been counter attacked, bombarded Haiphong resulting in fatalities of over 6000. This resulted in terrible strife between the French and the Vietnamese. Ho Chi Minh gave threat of a counter strike to the French
The French went further. They started to disregard the regulations and deeds of the MAAG and did not take the Americans as their strategic ally in Vietnam. They had also developed a strategy of non-cooperation with the Americans by refusing to keep the Americans updated about their current operations and the future possibilities of their operations. As an outcome, it so happened by the end of 1952 that USWA was bearing about one third of the expenses of the war that the French had waged. On the contrary, they had little or no influence over the military policy that the French had formulated, and hardly had any influence on the way the French planned the war in Vietnam.
French and American Involvement
The scene was different, back in France. According to Hernandez (2016), French government was losing the soil under their feet in their homeland and this had to have an impact upon the Vietnamese war. The leftist section of France thoroughly and vehemently despised the war policy of the French at Vietnam calling it a dirty war or la sale guerre. In 1949, the French proclaimed the land of Vietnam an independent state under the leadership of Bao Dai. The National army of Vietnam was formed. In the words of Ho & Violette (2018), the Vietnamese rulers who were particularly loyal to the French had received preferential treatment form the French and rewarded with tracts of land and preferential government positions
In 1950, Viet Minh became active again, as the Chinese were sending troops to North Korea. The French forts that were located near the border were destroyed by Viet Minh with the aides of the Chinese troops. The advanced artillery of the French were an additional advantage for them. The likes of napalm dropping or air mobility or paratroopers kept them much in advance than the Vietnamese in the war. However, the Vietnamese were backed by the desire of a large section of the civilians who were determined to end foreign rule in their land. Finally the French domination on the Vietnamese soil was deteriorating.
In the words of Ho & Violette (2018), the French were engrossed with their position in Cambodia also. The Cambodians claimed that if the French did not give complete independence to the Cambodians, they would turn to guerrilla warfare that would return large number of casualties. On the other hand in Vietnam, the French had major concentration of their force near the Laos border, in a small village called Dien Bien Phu. Meanwhile the Americans had sent 10 more B-26 aircrafts along with 200 more US aircraft machineries that strengthened the artillery strength of the US militants in the Indo-China region. In the views of (Jacobsen, 2017), this artillery instillation strengthened the Viet Minh and they were able to shell the French out of their Bread bowl Dien Bien Phu with finesse.
Now the French began to sense the heat of the forest fire aroused from the smoke flakes that they had once slipped in the Vietnam. Now they resorted to seek military aid from President Eisenhower. The French wanted help particularly from the seventh fleet of the US. On the contrary, Jacobsen (2017), reports that the US strictly turned down the French request on two grounds. Firstly President Eisenhower was extremely dissatisfied with the military agenda that the French had adopted in Vietnam.
French Involvement in Indochina
In the words of Kayhan and Ozlem (2015). The United States actually started to take interest in the affairs in the matters of Asia after the Pearl Harbour Attack incident in the 1940s. Co-incidentally in the very same year, the Viet Min regiment was also formed by the Vietnamese in order to confront the Japanese and the French armed attacks. Within 1944, America had posted their agents belonging to the Strategic Services Office (OSS) in companion with the representatives of the Intelligence Agency of America (CIA) in the northern parts of Vietnam (Kayhan & Ozlem, 2015). America was not initially on a rescuing drive. They worked in unison with Ho Chi Minh’s men and the Viet Minh. They helped the US agents by safeguarding the US pilots who downed over the territory of Vietnam and repatriating them. In return to their help, OSS provided the Vietnamese Agencies with armouries and weaponries. This was not however, a strategic collaboration rather a wartime expedience.
However, in the light if the views of Man (2015), it can be opined that Ho Chi Minh had hoped this union with United States would bring help from Washington in order to create an independent Vietnam after the end of the Vietnamese war. According to the opinion of Lovering, 2017), during the middle of the 20the century when Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the freedom of Vietnam, he drew a lot form the American’s self-independence campaign, like the ideals of strong and subtle sense of nationalism, popular self-sovereignty and the ideal of strong determination. However, Kayhan and Ozlem (2015), opines that after the year 1945, the American influence in the Vietnamese arena was much driven by the influences of the Cold War. The Doctrine of Truman started to largely influence American foreign policy. The Doctrine that laid down the spread of communism needed to be stalled and the states that were facing infiltration of the Communists needed to be helped. In this context, the Domino Theory can be highlighted. According to the postulates of the theory communism if given the chance to spread uninterrupted, would include within its periphery the neighbouring countries and would give rise to a mini empire. This was an exclusive truth for the Asian countries where the boundaries were still not clearly defined and strife were common and the central governments had not yet become strong.
As observed by Kayhan and Ozlem (2015, in reality also, the speculations discussed in the above paragraphs were happening. After infiltrating China as well as Northern Korea, Communism was now spreading its wings in the south Asian countries like Cambodia, Vietnam and others (Man, 2015). Hence the Americans now resorted to a reverse strategy in Vietnam. The decided to support the comeback of the French in Vietnam. However, this motive of the American government did not win support from the whole country. Man (2015), also informs that many civilians were of the opinion that in disguise of support and guidance, America was indirectly supporting colonialism to spread in Asia. Instead, they should have let the local government settle their issues as they wanted to. However, the American government saw the French return as a danger of less potential than the Communist infiltration. Therefore, Man (2015), holds the opinion that, in the end, the political context brought America and the French on the same line. After everything the French were still a democratic and capitalist state and fore mostly they were an essential ally in the Cold War. On the contrary, the real motives and ideals of the Viet Minh was still unclear before the Americans (Manning, 2018).
Viet Minh’s Activities in 1950
The movement of the Viet Minh was often intertwined with the Communists’ move. The disposition of Ho Chi Minh was also considered to be similarly unreliable and probably deceitful. It happened that by the end of 1947, America was lending active support to the French in the Vietnam. In the latter part of the following year US president granted an allowance of about 160 million US dollars to support the war efforts of the French. Within 1951, the amount of American help had enhanced to $451 million USD (Mason, 2016). In Vietnam, the French used war artilleries like war ships and fighter air crafts taken in loan from the United States. The agents of the CIA posted in Vietnam were rendering help to the French battalion, for evidence the execution of 750 supply drops in aid of the CEFEO soldiers who were trapped at the Dien Bien Phu. In the end when the French Army at last surrendered before the combined forces of the Viet Minh, America had already made investments worth 3 Billion US Dollars. This was obviously followed the surrender and withdrawal of the French forces from the Vietnamese soil (McMichael, 2015).
This however created chance for the US forces to spread their wings in the territories evacuated by the French. The delegates form America had joined the Geneva Conference, however did not sign the actual agreement. They were thinking of backing up a nationalistic and democratic nation state in South Vietnam. In the views of Kayhan and Ozlem (2015), the help from the Americans would enable the South Vietnamese to act as a buffer in the charge against the Communist lurking in the North Vietnam. According to the Geneva accords Vietnam was to remain split for 2 years up to 1956 (Michaels, Jeffrey and Gawthorpe, 2015). After that an election was supposed to be held along with subsequent reunification of the country. However, the US politicians wanted the temporary split of the two nations to remain as it was. The Americans was in the hunt for a native South Vietnamese leader instilled with western values and anti-communistic morale who would take up the leadership of the battalion in South Vietnam. America found their desired candidate in the form of a minor figure in the form of Ngo Dinh Diem (Nathan, Andrew and Scobell, 2015). Currently he had been living in America. Diem was backed up sufficiently by the Americans and they also requested the president Bao Dai to make him the Prime Minister of the land.
French Conflict with the Vietnamese
Now in Vietnam, America’s visions were based upon two prospects. The first was the dream of watching Ngo Diem residing at the peak, being the most impactful leader. Another was North Vietnam’s acceptance of the splitting of the two countries. The Americans provided Diem with huge amount of support including arms and ammunitions, huge recognition, significant trade deals, and fore mostly training. Another major truth was that in spite of continuous efforts provided by the Americans none of their motives have been achieved after 1950 also (Nguyen, 2015). The state building campaign if the US military front working in Vietnam had failed miserably. All investments and efforts paid up behind the South Vietnamese state were in vain. The Americans slowly started to lose faith in then potential of the South Vietnam state. At the helm of the power were the brutal nepotisms. Again, on this ethics was developed mostly by the American aid. However, the leaders lacked the power of improvising to realise the plans of the Americans in Vietnam. The military strength of the South Vietnamese had expanded remarkably and was in a remarkable position. However, still they were incapable to save sovereignty of the nation (Shore, 2015).
Again, in the state of Hanoi, slowly the movement by the Lao Dong movement was gaining ground. The motive of the movement was unification by stealth. Backed by external strength, Communist insurgents unleashed a stream of terror attacks in the Southern Vietnam. The major targets of the attack were government facilities, forces and major and reputable figures. Evidently, a major fight between south and North Vietnam was only a trail of time. The American policy for the Vietnamese in the entire 1950s decade and in the initial part of the 1960s incorporated a plan to stay away from direct military involvement (Tan et al. 2017). However, the worsening in the scenarios and an atmosphere of approaching war in the country forced America to change their policies for the Vietnamese. Official military expedition of the Americans in the Vietnamese war continued from 1965 to 1975. The national liberation warfront was created in the 1960s and they challenged the South Vietnamese government. The Civil war broke out in South Vietnam. The forces from Hanoi saw this as a potential opportunity to unite the country under the leadership of their communist rule. The containment strategy that was adapted by the US government in the Vietnam gave the battalion the strength to go all out in order to prevent communism from entering the political domain in Vietnam (Shore, 2015).
US Interest in Asian Affairs
Some serious battlefield confrontations followed. In the year of 1964, some torpedo boats of the Forces of North Vietnam attacked US artilleries located in the Tonkin gulf. The American Congress had declared a resolution that USA could adopt nay measures to repel or reply to any armed attacks on the forces of United States in Vietnam. In 1965, under the patronage of Lyndon Johnson, the US participation in the Vietnamese war had increased quite dramatically. As an outcome, the Rolling Thunder Operation was planned and under the plan consequent bombing campaigns were decided. Consecutive air attacks rocked cities of Northern Vietnam. The American Bomber and other air crafts destroyed the missile basses of the Viet Cong. This was a prompt reply to the intervening Chinese and Soviet artillery helps to the battalion of the Northern Vietnam. The defence missiles of the Soviet origin (SAMS) could not prevent the attack. However, the American civilians were mostly ignorant to the consequences of the happenings at Vietnam. Johnson had deliberately concealed the news from the Americans in fear of the domestic political campaigns being jeopardised. This was followed by a major event in the stream of military attacks. The Tet Offensive program was launched by the North Vietnamese. This attack convinced the US officials that winning the Vietnam War at a reasonable price was almost impossible (Vega, 2015). This decision directly impacted Johnson’s decision of not running re-elections in 1968.
Another eminent episode in the war was the efforts of Richard Nixon to conclude the war in Vietnam. He had made a secret plan to do the same. Nixon, in a planned way expanded the periphery of the war in Laos as well as Cambodia. Other than that, he tried to in still the idea of making a movement for gradual withdrawal of army battalions of America and instead he implied that South Vietnamese armed forces were to be given more prominence. The spread of the sentiment worked. Within 1969, many of the American soldiers in Vietnam were cut into halves.
Then came the Paris Peace Treaty accords. Accordingly, the remaining of the American troops in Vietnam needed to be removed. In 1975, Northern Vietnam was ultimately successful in accomplishing the unification of the country.
Conclusion:
On analysis of the involvement of the two capitalist forces in Vietnam, Vega (2015), has opined that a government that do not possess the capability to successfully rule the country in spite of substantial foreign aid in terms of military and economic assets is evidently not a form of legitimate government. On the contrary, it can be said that the aim of counter intervention is definitely not winning the war. Rather the American intervention laid the foundation to the Civil War that took place in South Vietnam. On analysing the steps that America took in response of the Vietnamese war, it can be easily concluded that the American troops did not have the motive of balancing the sides in the war. Otherwise, they would not have supported the French later. Besides, the efforts of the Americans for stalking communism shows that their interests were strictly political. In the opinion of Vega, 2015), America rather played the role of an open belligerent by participating in the Vietnamese war. The Just War theory can be applied to evaluate the position of the Americans in the Vietnamese war. They could neither justify jus ad bellum that is justice of hoisting the war or that of the jus in Bello, or making justice in the war. They did not have any concern for the Vietnamese people. The French had previously also occupied the Vietnamese land by force. There was no prompting form the side of the Vietnamese. Besides, none of French or America did not follow the code of conduct of warfare. They both attempted to win the war by unfair means. The lives of American soldiers were also laid down on the Vietnamese soil absolutely for vain. The French also. In order to satisfy their capitalist ego, ordered the soldiers to fight until death. In the year of 1961, the contemporary president of the United States, John Kennedy had increased the amount of military advisors by 100. On the other hand, the NLF was spreading their influence among the poor peasant community in Southern Vietnam. In prompt reply, the Americans initiated the Strategic Hamlet campaign. Under this campaign, the villagers were shifted to new territories and were guarded by troops. However this policy of the Americans failed. The prime reason behind the failure was that the soldiers or the government did not take into account the factor of local sentiment. Many of the villagers had resented their uprooting from their own grounds and counter-protested the step taken by the Americans. The efforts of the American and the French can be seen as necessarily political and imperial. The unification of Vietnam was indeed a great blow to the imperialist approach of the capitalist nations. After the Vietnamese war none of the major and powerful capitalist forces gave ever invaded the South Asian nations. Hence, the Vietnamese war indeed decided the end of the imperialistic approach of the Western capitalist forces in Southern Asia.
American Agents in Vietnam
The Democratic Republican state of Vietnam proclaimed by Ho Chi Minh in 1945, assumed the whole of Vietnam within its scope. This incident occurred in September. Immediately after that, in October 2nd, the French commander arrived at Saigon and started to reside in the southern section of Vietnam. Since the advent of the French in Vietnam, they maintained friendly terms with Ho Chi Minh. In May of next year, the Residual commander of the French in Vietnam, Thierry d’Angenlieu claimed North Vietnam for Ho, and Viet Minh. Besides they also proclaimed South Vietnam as the Provincial republic of Cochin China. The Vietnamese were disheartened and felt that the French had betrayed them. Partnership between the French and the Vietnamese came to a dormancy.
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