Research Findings
Research findings are presented organically and concisely in this Occasional Paper, stressing the common aspects of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from Europe. Brexit Task Force members and contributors performed economic analyses of the possible economic impact of the United Kingdom exiting the European Union (EU) and the European Union area, which is a body responsible for making a presentation before the Committee on International Relations. The Committee of the Central banks in the European Union. The investigation took place during 2017 and the first few months of 2019.
As a result of these numerous assessments, we can better understand how Brexit will affect the EU-UK relationship when it leaves the EU, and (ii) better understand how major macroeconomic transmission channels, including trade, migration, and foreign direct investment, would be affected. Papers in this study did not consider other transmission channels, including financial ties and uncertainty, or the consequences of Brexit on financial stability.
According to this study, there are now more quantitative and qualitative grounds for several generally held assessments of Brexit’s effects. Brexit will cost the United Kingdom much more in lost GDP than it will cost the European Union as a whole. Trade and migration channels are affected by this finding, and it is consistent across different models, methodologies, and circumstances. However, the results might differ depending on which EU Member State you are located. ‘ Because of its close connections to the British economy, Ireland would be especially hard hit. The lower the macroeconomic costs of Brexit, given the approximate departure costs, the better the final relation between the United Kingdom and its EU membership will be. As a result of Brexit, trade and investment obstacles are projected to increase bilateral trade costs and impair inter-European manufacturing value chains and capital allocation in the Member States.
The International Relations Committee’s Brexit Task Force (IRC) conducted analyses of the effects of Brexit on the UK’s economy and trade, the European Union, and the Eurozone economies, which are summarized in this Occasional Paper. Several studies were done and published due to this cooperative effort between 2017 and the first months of 2019.
The researchers considered several different scenarios for the future of the EU-UK relationship after Brexit in these articles, which used a range of research approaches. Various Brexit shock transmission mechanisms, such as trade, migration, and foreign direct investment (FDI), were examined for their role and strength (GVCs). Note that the Brexit mission did not contain financial stability issues, which demanded a different analytical approach in any case, so it’s worth emphasizing. Because they are challenging to incorporate in the analytical techniques used to approximate the economic and trade effect, other potentially crucial Brexit transmission pathways, such as financial ties or trust implications, were also not evaluated.
The UK conducted a referendum on its membership in the European Union on June 23, 2016. As a result of his victory in the 2015 general election, British Prime Minister David Cameron promised the consultation as part of his campaign platform. David Cameron resigned, and Theresa May was elected as the next Prime Minister after the unexpected outcome of the EU referendum (by 52 percent to 48 percent). David Cameron has previously advocated for the UK to remain in the European Union.
Possible Economic Impact of Brexit
To carry out the vote mandated, Prime Minister May triggered Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in March of that year. To ensure that the United Kingdom’s exit was completed by March 30, 2019, a two-year clock started to tick down. Only a unanimous vote of the European Council or the withdrawal of the United Kingdom’s intention to exit the EU may prolong this time.
Indeed, a critical issue in determining how Brexit will affect both countries’ economies is what kind of post-Brexit relationship will emerge between them. Brexit discussions have been plagued by uncertainty due to this problem. Freedom of movement of goods, services, people, capital, and labor is included in the Single Market and the Customs Union. These are the foundations of economic integration among the EU Member States. A wide range of possibilities for the future relationship between the UK and EU emerged once Article 50 was triggered. These approaches may be outlined using the different EU regimes that have been employed in the past to create partnerships with other nations.
Figure 1 depicts the various degrees of separation between the current regimes and the Single Market and Customs Union. EEA members Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway, have one of the closest relationships between the EU and developing countries, participating in the Single Market but not involved in the Customs Union, suggesting that there will be customs inspections at border crossings. There are several types of free trade agreements (FTAs), like the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) negotiated with Canada, allowing considerable reductions in trade barriers for most products but selective access to services. Investment and public procurement are also included in the scope of its coverage. Finally, if the parties cannot agree, their post-Brexit trade relationship will be controlled by WTO regulations. Trade linking the EU and Britain is subject to tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) depending on the MFN status of the exporter.
Various papers reviewed in this Occasional Paper have made particular contributions to the study of the economic impacts of Brexit, which are summarized in this section. Sections on trade, migration, and foreign direct investment (FDI), which relate to the EU’s fundamental values of free flow of goods and services, persons, and capital, have been included in the summaries of the papers to explain the many components of analysis better. First, a review and then a collection of studies on individual countries are included in this section.
Some sections will provide a comprehensive overview of the wide range of official and academic studies on the long-term effects of Brexit on the economy and wellbeing in both Britain and the European Union economies (Bisciari, 2019). Based on model assumptions and transmission channels studied, this research provides a wide range of outcomes.
A comprehensive review is provided about Brexit’s long-term effect on the GDP and well-being of both the UK and EU economies (Bisciari, 2019). For each model and transmission channel studied, this report provides various findings.
This is the first part of a two-part series on the trading channel. It summarizes three publications that analyze the increase in trade costs between the United Kingdom and the European Union due to the return of tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Using existing EU tariffs and applying them to EU exports, Cappariello (2017) calculates the duties EU enterprises would incur if they exported straight to the United Kingdom post-exit. Using data from Byrne and Rice (2018), they assess the effect of NTBs, notably border checks and documentation compliance, on Irish-Britain trade and trade linking the rest of the EU and the United Kingdom. It is estimated that tariffs on intermediate and final items imposed on goods from the EU and the United Kingdom will significantly impact the economy as a result of Brexit.
Effects on Trade, Migration, and Foreign Direct Investment
Papers from Section 2.3 use model simulations to estimate the macroeconomic impact of Brexit through trade and migration channels. A New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model is used by Pisani and Vergara Caffarelli (2018) to analyze various post-Brexit trade regimes between the Eurozone and Britain. The UK and the Eurozone use this method to calculate macroeconomic costs that are significantly larger in the first case. It is estimated that Brexit will harm EU-UK commerce and migration by using gravity models by Campos & Timini (2019). NIESR’s National Institute Global Econometric Model (NiGEM) simulates various trade and migration outcomes in the event of a Brexit for the EU and the UK, according to Berthou et al. (2019).
Over time, trade-in commodities and services will serve as the principal means of transmitting Brexit. To be sure, tariffs and non-tariff obstacles that the UK has been exempt from since joining the EU’s Single Market and Customs Union could reappear in its trade with the EU’s other 27 members. Additional transmission routes (Table 1) and the exchange rate are included in particular research. As a tradable service, financial services are often viewed as a viable option for firms looking to relocate; however, financial stability risks are often overlooked. Short-term repercussions of a chaotic no-deal Brexit and short-term uncertainties aren’t considered because the poll is long-term oriented instead. Unpredicted shock inside the models decreased productivity is also incorporated as a transmission route relevant to the UK.
Bisciari is the source (2019). According to many studies, Brexit has a short-term impact on the economy’s growth rate but has a long-term effect. According to empirical long-term impact studies, the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union leads to reduced income in the economy and welfare for the European Union members and the United Kingdom compared to a scenario whereby the United Kingdom remains in the European Union.
A November analysis on the future relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom elicited many ideas. The survey covers different scenarios that might arise due to the exit. It explains the other consequences from a no-deal scenario, in which trade relations are organized to fit the WTO rules.
CETA, a customs union agreement similar to the one used between the Turkey and European Union, or UK membership in the EEA, like Norway’s membership, are examples of intermediate scenarios. There is a direct correlation between the looser EU-UK economic ties and the more significant losses linked with the UK’s decision to leave.
A “no-deal” exit from the European Union would be even worse for both British and European economies than a negotiated withdrawal(WTO; Table 2).
Since Britain only depicts a small percentage of the European Union, while the European Union holds almost half the United Kingdom exports and imports, the United Kingdom is still much affected. Nonetheless, approximates of Brexit losses vary, particularly for Britain. The intensity of the results is determined by the model specifications and the mechanisms taken into account.
The option of adding other mechanisms other than trade to the United Kingdom will have a much more long-term negative effect on its economy. For example, high levels of the gross domestic product are usually observed in cases where reduced form approaches are used to estimate the level of trade income elasticity compared to models that follow the perfect competition.
Future of EU-UK Relationship
Therefore, reaching a trade agreement between the European Union and the United Kingdom could reduce the gross domestic product losses for both United Kingdom and European Union. Below is a table that shows members of the European Union in contrast to a no-deal case (Table 3).
Cappariello (2017) estimates the tariffs that commodity sellers from the European Union would face when selling to the United Kingdom if a trade agreement is not made between the United Kingdom and the European Union. In this case, Cappiello argues that the United Kingdom would impose a tariff on all imports from the countries in the European Union. The consequence of the tariff on each country will only be determined by its relationship with Britain and its composition of import flow.
The analysis by Cappiello assumes that Britain United will use the MFN tariff rates that the European Union currently uses. Below is a table that shows how the tariffs might be imposed (Table5)
In Brexit, the organization protected different sectors like beverages, food, tobacco, animals, footwear, motor vehicles, and clothing. This means that the exit of the United Kingdom will result in an increased cost of export of cars into the country. European Union road vehicle manufacturers would face tariffs totaling €5.3 billion.
Tariffs would be pretty low in other production companies, mainly chemicals, tools and machinery, which account for a large portion of United Kingdom imports from the EU. Since it is evident that most goods to the united kingdom are delivered through roads which averages a tariff of 9.1 percent annually, therefore the exit might result in a reduced number of sales to the united kingdom.
Conclusion.
The Brexit event was an unpredicted event in history whereby most national central banks and organizations have devoted many resources, time, and energy to understand its implications. The scenarios used in this paper were discussed and analyzed by the different taskforce in the United Kingdom. The paper’s main aim is to understand the impacts of the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union. In the paper, scenario analysis has been used to assess the consequences of Brexit. The technique employs a similar situation to the European Union membership or the United Kingdom situation by concentrating on the economic changes.
The paper shows that the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union will lead to trade barriers, non-tariff barriers, and tariffs among the United Kingdom and the European Union. The consequences of the barriers will be intensified by the chains of the network that connect the united kingdom with the European Union. For instance, the non-tariff and tariff barriers used in the movement of goods between the European Union countries and the United Kingdom will increase production costs, hence fewer profits. Overall, reducing trade and investment will raise bilateral trade costs and impact cross-border capital allocation. The agrees that the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union will result in a loss in trade gains which in the long run may impact negatively on the gross domestic product of Britain’s economy and have a lesser effect on the members of the European Union.
References.
Bisciari, P. (2019): “A survey of the long-term impact of Brexit on the UK and the EU27 economies”, Working Paper Document, No 366, Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique.
Berthou, A., Estrada, A., Harcourt, S., Kadow, A., Roth, M. and de la Serve, ME (2019): “Assessing the macroeconomic impact of Brexit through trade and migration channels,” Occasional Paper Series (Documentos Ocasionales), No 1911, Banco de España.
Byrne, S. and Rice, J. (2018a): “Non-Tariff Barriers and Goods Trade: A Brexit Impact Analysis,” Research Technical Paper, Vol. 2018, No 7, Central Bank of Ireland.
Cappariello, R. (2017): “Brexit: estimating tariff costs for EU countries in a new trade regime with the UK”, Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers), No 381, Banca d’Italia.
Campos, R. and Timini, J. (2019): “An estimation of the effects of Brexit on trade and migration”, Occasional Paper Series (Documentos Ocasionales), No 1912, Banco de España.
Pisani, M. and Vergara Caffarelli, F. (2018): “What will Brexit mean for the British and euro-area economies? A model-based assessment of trade regimes”, Temi di Discussione (Working Papers), No 1163, Banca d’Italia, January