Theories of
Environmental Ethics
9781285028330, Environmental Ethics, Fifth Edition, Desjardins – © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization.
9781285028330, Environmental Ethics, Fifth Edition, Desjardins – © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization.
6
Biocentric Ethics and the
Inherent Value of Life
DISCUSSION: Synthetic Biology and the Value of Life
Does life itself have inherent moral value? Several criteria for moral standing were examined in the previous chapter, including sensation and being conscious. For many observers, such attributes as sensation and consciousness themselves serve a higher end of life, and therefore they conclude that only life itself seems to be plausible candidate for the inherent value that moral standing implies. A “biocentric” ethics is an approach that begins with the inherent value of life as its foundational principle of value. The diversity of life on earth is amazingly
complex. Biological science has been categorizing animal and plant species since before Aristotle began his taxonomy of living organisms more than 2,000 years ago. Current estimates suggest that more than 1.4 million different species have been scientifically categorized.1 But, these categorized species represent only a small percentage of the actual number of species that exist. On the basis of research conducted in tropical forests, some estimates place the number at more than 30 or 40 million species. Biologist E. O. Wilson estimates that invertebrate species alone may number as many as 30 million. Each species contains from a few members (for
example, the California condor) to many billions of members (such as bacteria). Each species exists in an ecological niche in which its members interact with their environment to maintain life. Wilson tells of many highly specialized life-forms. One of my favorite examples of such
specialists living in microniches are the mites that live on the bodies of army ants: one kind is found only on the mandibles of the soldier caste, where it sits and feeds from the mouth of its
host; another kind is found only on the hind foot of the soldier caste, where it sucks blood for a living, and so on through various bizarre configurations.2
Each organism must take in nutrition from its environment to sustain its life and propagate its species. The ability to do this has evolved through millions of years of changing environments via natural selection. This ability, and every other function of living beings, is stored in the genetic code of each organism. Each organism contains 1 million to 10 billion bits of information in its genetic code, representing an enormous genetic library of information developed over billions of years. The diversity of life has inspired scientists, philosophers, and poets for millennia. It is a remarkable phenomenon. But that diversity is being threatened at astonishing rates. Some scientists, including E. O. Wilson, estimate that over 100 species per day, almost 50,000 species each year, become extinct. Fossil records show that extinction has been a fact of
life. But these same fossil records show that the rate of extinctions that are not related to human influence—what scientists call the background extinction rate— is significantly smaller than present extinction rates. Mammals, for example, are becoming extinct at 100 times the
background rate. The present extinction rates for rain forest species and freshwater species are even higher. Without question, the earth is in the midst of the greatest single extinction episode since the one associated with the extinction of dinosaurs 65 million years ago. The difference,
unfortunately, is that this episode is largely due to human factors. Further, estimates suggest that it may take more than 10 million years of life on earth for a natural return to the same number of
species as had existed before human caused extinctions. But even as many natural life forms are
facing extinction, human technology has reached a point where new life forms are being designed and created artificially. In the emerging field of synthetic biology, scientists and engineers are designing biological objects, ranging from small strands of DNA to entire genomes, cells, and organisms. This technology promises to transform medicine, energy, industry, and the environment while it also raises fundamental philosophical and ethical
questions. Broadly understood, synthetic biology is a field in which biology merges with
engineering to design biological entities that otherwise do not exist in nature. In more traditional genetic engineering, naturally occurring genes are recombined and manipulated to create a genetically engineered organism, for example by repairing a genetic malfunction or transferring
some biological function to another organism. In contrast synthetic biology involves the use of DNA, genes, cells, or organisms that have been synthesized by humans. In May 2010, a team of scientists at the J. Craig Venter Institute announced the following: the successful construction of the first self-replicating, synthetic bacterial cell. The team synthesized the 1.08 million base pair chromosome of a modified Mycoplasma mycoides genome. The synthetic cell is called Mycoplasma mycoides JCVI-syn1.0 and is the proof of principle that genomes can be designed in the computer, chemically made in the laboratory and transplanted into a recipient cell to produce a new self-replicating cell controlled only by the synthetic genome. The Venter Institute goes on to describe that this genome was “constructed from four bottles of chemicals that make up DNA.”3 To many observers, this announcement meant that humans had succeeded in creating life itself from four bottles of chemicals. Various definitions of synthetic biology have been offered, including: “the design and construction of new biological parts, devices, and systems, and the re-design of existing, natural biological systems for useful purposes. (Synthetic Biology.org)” “Synthetic biology … can broadly be described as the design and construction
of novel artificial biological pathways, organisms or devices, or the redesign of existing natural biological systems. (UK Royal Society).” “Synthetic biology is the engineering of biology: the synthesis of complex, biologically based (or inspired) systems which display functions that do
not exist in nature. This engineering perspective may be applied at all levels of the hierarchy of biological structures – from individual molecules to whole cells, tissues and organisms. In essence, synthetic biology will enable the design of ‘biological systems’ in a rational and systematic way.” (European Commission)4 So, on one hand, life on earth is undergoing
mass extinctions, most of which are strongly influenced, if not caused, by human activities. On the other hand, humans are on the verge of major breakthrough in creating life in the laboratory.
These two phenomena challenge us to consider the proper stance that humans ought to take towards the natural world, and in specific towards other living beings. The loss of biological diversity raises a variety of value questions. What does it matter, for example, that a mite living
only on the mandible of the soldier caste of army ants becomes extinct? What is the value of life? Traditionally, many instrumental justifications have been given to support the preservation of this biodiversity. Tremendous medicinal, agricultural, economic, and scientific potential lies in
the variety and diversity of life. However, such achievements are exactly the primary goal of synthetic biology. Thus, it may well be that we can achieve those goals “in a more rational and systematic” way through synthetic biology than by working with naturally occurring organisms.
If such values could be better served by artificial life forms, then this instrumental justification for biological diversity loses much of its force. But these instrumental values suggest an attitude towards the natural world that views other living objects as mere tools to be used for our own ends. As we discussed in the previous chapter, however, many have argued that living beings
have a value that goes beyond the merely instrumental. Some environmental philosophers
have argued that life itself possesses inherent value, it is to be valued for its own sake and not simply for how we can use it. But does your attitude towards the natural world and towards life change as a result of synthetic biology’s success in creating life in the laboratory?
DISCUSSION TOPICS:
1. Are naturally occurring life forms more or less valuable than artificial ones? Is there an important ethical distinction to be made between life that occurs naturally and life that is created
artificially?
2. Do you think that every living being possesses some inherent value simply due to the fact that it is alive? Why, or why not?
3. Was the creation of a biological organism from four bottles of chemicals more or less wondrous than the species of mite that exists only on the mandibles of ants?
4. Critics of synthetic biology sometimes assert that scientists are “playing God.” What exactly do you think this means? Is it a persuasive criticism?
5. Do artificial organisms have a purpose or good of their own that is independent of the purposes for them that their designers intend?
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 showed how standard ethical principles and concepts can be applied to environmental issues. With this chapter, our focus changes to consider more systematic attempts at developing comprehensive environmental philosophies. These approaches question the wisdom of simply extending traditional ethics, or what we have called ethical extensionism, in favor of more radical shifts in our ethical perspective. The problems with ethical extensionism revolve around three issues. First, despite the work of such philosophers as Singer and
CHAPTER 6 BIOCENTRIC ETHICS AND THE INHERENT VALUE OF LIFE 127
9781285028330, Environmental Ethics, Fifth Edition, Desjardins – © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. Regan, the principles and concepts used in their application often remain narrowly focused. The criteria for moral considerability defended by many philosophers are most clearly found in adult human beings. Critics charge that ethical extensionism gives moral standing only to those animals that most closely resemble adult humans. As a result, these extensions remain fundamentally hierarchical
and, according to critics, beg the question of the moral status of other living things. For example, both Singer and Regan attribute moral standing only to some animals, leaving out a majority of living species. Other living things remain outside the range of moral consideration. This omission strikes many environmentalists as both an ethical and a logical mistake. Second, these extensions remain thoroughly individualistic. Individual animals have standing, but plants, species, habitat, and relations among entities have no standing in their own right. Yet so much of the science of ecology stresses the interconnectedness of nature. Ecology emphasizes such wholes as species, biotic diversity, ecological communities, ecosystems, and biological, chemical, and geological cycles. Relations, communities, systems, and processes play a
major role in the science of ecology. Unfortunately, standard ethical theories have little room for such concerns. Indeed, we need only remember Regan’s dismissal of the ethical focus on communities as “environmental fascism” to see how unreceptive these standard ethical views can be. To some environmentalists, this is the perfect example of a perspective caught in the grasp of a philosophical theory and ignoring the facts of science. Finally, these extensions are not, nor were they intended as, comprehensive environmental ethics. Philosophers applied ethics to specific problems as the latter arose and as they were perceived, making little or no attempt to build a coherent and comprehensive theory of environmental ethics. This narrow focus has had two unhappy results. First, the extension of ethics to cover, for example, the rights of animals can provide no guidance for many other environmental issues, such as global warming and pollution. Second, extensionism tends to remain critical and negative. It often tells us what is wrong with various policies and actions but seldom offers guidelines about what the alternative “good life”
should be. The chapters that follow present a survey of attempts to develop more systematic
environmental ethics. Much of the recent philosophical work on the environment breaks with standard ethical theory and strives to rethink the relationship between humans and nature. Indeed, some of these emerging schools of thought might more appropriately be described as environmental philosophies than as ethics. As philosophers seek a comprehensive account of the place of human beings in their natural environment, they must address more than merely ethical questions. The following topics become important when we begin to rethink ethics in this way: metaphysics (nature and the natural; the ontological status of systems, relations, species, and so forth), epistemology (the logical relation between descriptive and normative claims), aesthetics (beauty and intrinsic value), and political philosophy (civil disobedience and environmental justice). Let us, then, put aside the role of the philosopher who approaches environmental
problems armed with a previously articulated ethical theory. Instead, let 128 PART III THEORIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 9781285028330, Environmental Ethics, Fifth Edition, Desjardins – © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. us adopt the point of view of an environmentalist (or, more simply, of a concerned citizen) seeking to articulate, develop, and defend a coherent and comprehensive
environmental philosophy. No rational person can reflect on such challenges as global climate change and mass extinctions without some concern and distress. But to understand the goals of an environmental philosophy, we need to go beyond the stage of merely reacting. We need to examine the source of our concern. Why exactly are we troubled by these facts? Why should we be troubled by them? These questions seem to have no single answer. In some cases, our distress
grows from our awareness that such environmental destruction poses a clear danger to human beings and thus raises familiar ethical concerns. In other cases, the way we treat the environment offends spiritual, aesthetic, or cultural values. In yet other cases, we seem to be causing direct moral harm to natural objects themselves. The goal of many environmental philosophers is to provide a single systematic principle or theory that can account for these various concerns.
Achieving such a goal would require work not only in ethics but also in metaphysics,
epistemology, aesthetics, and political philosophy. Still other philosophers conclude that no such systematic account is possible and argue instead for a position called moral pluralism.5
6 .2 INSTRUMENTAL VALUE AND INTRINSIC VALUE
One way to understand the philosophical shift that is occurring among environmental philosophers is to contrast questions of morality with more general questions of value. Morality, narrowly understood, has always taken human well-being and the relationship between humans as its focus. Morality seeks to understand the rights and responsibilities of humans, human well-being, and the good life for human beings. Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that philosophers have difficulty granting environmental concerns moral consideration. Environmental concerns simply do not fit within the traditional domain of morality. But understood more broadly, philosophical ethics asks more general questions about the good life and about human flourishing. These questions involve wider concerns of value. From this perspective, environmental concerns are more legitimately ethical concerns, because they raise a wide variety of value questions that establish norms for how we ought to live. Not all value questions concern moral value (narrowly understood). We also recognize aesthetic, spiritual, scientific, and cultural values as worthy and deserving of respect.6 Thus, central to a comprehensive environmental philosophy is a consideration of the nature and scope of value. A full account of value determines the ethical domain by helping to define what objects have moral relevance or what objects deserve consideration. Ethics is concerned with how we should live, how we should act, and the kind of persons we should be. Defining the full scope of CHAPTER 6 BIOCENTRIC ETHICS AND THE INHERENT VALUE OF LIFE 129 9781285028330, Environmental Ethics, Fifth Edition, Desjardins – © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. these “shoulds” is to give an account of all that has value or worth. Consider the example described in the preceding discussion case.
Uncounted species of insects are becoming extinct as a result of destruction of the rain forest. Many people find the wanton destruction of diverse life-forms offensive. But what exactly is wrong with causing the extinction of millions of insects? Insects do not feel pain, are not conscious, and are not subjects-of-a-life. They are not, in any obvious way, moral beings. What seems to be wrong is that something of value is lost—indeed perhaps wantonly destroyed—by human activity. Too often these values are lost for the sake of greed or out of sheer ignorance. A similar explanation might be given for the destruction of the rain forest itself, as well as for the loss of wilderness areas, wetlands, trees, lakes, oceans, fish, and plants. Why value insects? Why protect a wilderness area? Why care about plants? As we noted in Chapter 2, some religious traditions are exploring ways to answer these questions from theological starting points, but
how are they to be answered philosophically? The shift from an ethics of animal welfare to a more holistic environmental philosophy can perhaps best be understood as a shift from a narrow conception of morality and moral value to a broader concern with value itself. Philosophers often have discussed moral value in terms of interests. Among the philosophers considered in the last chapter, Joel Feinberg, Christopher Stone, Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and Kenneth Goodpaster all use the concept of interests to decide what sorts of things deserve moral consideration. To say that an object has interests is to say that it has a “sake of its own” (Feinberg), a “worth” in its own right (Stone), a “welfare” of its own (Bentham and Singer), “inherent value” (Regan), or its own “well-being” (Goodpaster). All this is to say that these objects have a value or worth that is independent of the value and worth ascribed to them by human beings. This implies that we do something wrong when we treat an object that has a value in itself and of its own as though it has value only in relation to us. This difference is typically expressed in the important distinction between instrumental and intrinsic value. Instrumental value is a function of usefulness. An object with instrumental value possesses that value, because it can be used to attain something else of value. A pencil is valuable, because I can write with it. A dollar bill is valuable, because I can use it to buy something. The instrumental value of an object lies not in the object itself
but in the uses to which that object can be put. When such an object no longer has use, or when it can be replaced by something of more effective or greater use, it has lost its value and can be ignored or discarded. Thinking of natural objects in terms of “resources” is to treat them as having instrumental value. For example, Gifford Pinchot’s conservation movement
emphasized the instrumental value of forests and wilderness areas. We should protect and conserve the wilderness, because it is the repository of vast resources that humans can use. Pinchot and other progressives argued that the value of national resources was too often unfairly distributed or wasted, which is to say improperly used. Many other environmental concerns rest on the instrumental value of the environment. Clean air and water are valued, because without
them human health and well-being are jeopardized. The preservation of plant
130 PART III THEORIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
9781285028330, Environmental Ethics, Fifth Edition, Desjardins – © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. and animal species is valued by many because of the vast potential therein for medical and agricultural uses. Virtually any utilitarian or economic proposal is based on the instrumental value of nature. The stewardship tradition in religious ethics also has a strong instrumental predisposition. Likewise, synthetic biologists view the life forms that they are creating as valuable in this instrumental sense. Appealing to the instrumental value of the environment can be an effective political strategy. Public opinion is often most responsive to claims of lost opportunities, wasted resources, and the like. Yet an environmental ethics that is based solely on the instrumental value of the environment may prove unstable. As human interests and needs change, so too will human uses for the environment. The instrumental value of the Colorado River as a water and hydroelectric power source for southern California will quickly override its instrumental
value as a scenic wilderness or recreation area. Emphasizing only the instrumental
value of nature means, in effect, that the environment is held hostage by the interests and needs of humans, and it immediately evokes the necessity to make trade-offs among competing human interests. An object has inherent or intrinsic value, on the other hand, when it is valuable
in itself and is not valued simply for its uses.7 The value of such objects is intrinsic to them. To say that an object is intrinsically valuable is to say that it has a good of its own and that what is good for it does not depend on outside factors. Thus its value would be a value found or recognized rather than given. Not all things that we value are valued instrumentally. Some things we value, because we recognize in them a moral, spiritual, symbolic, aesthetic, or cultural importance. We value them for themselves, for what they mean, for what they stand for, and for what they are, not for how they are used. Some examples can help explain this distinction. Think of friendships. If you value a friend only for her usefulness, you have seriously misunderstood friendship, and you would not be a very good friend. Consider also historical monuments
or cultural and aesthetic objects. The Liberty Bell, the Taj Mahal, and Michelangelo’s David possess value far beyond their usefulness. Clearly, many of our environmental concerns rest on the intrinsic value that we recognize in nature. Life itself, in the view of many, is intrinsically valuable, no matter what form it takes. Wilderness areas, scenic landscapes, and national parks are valued by many people, because, like the Liberty Bell, they are a part of our national
heritage and history. (This is essentially the argument Mark Sagoff made, which we examined in Chapter 3.) Grizzly bears may have little instrumental value, but many people value knowing that the bears still exist in Yellowstone National Park. The symbolic value of the bald eagle transcends any instrumental value it might have. Undeveloped and unexplored wilderness areas are highly valued, even by people who will never visit, explore, or use these areas. John Muir’s
disagreement with Gifford Pinchot was a disagreement between one who saw an intrinsic value in wilderness (Muir) and one who did not (Pinchot). Muir spoke of the great sequoia groves as a cathedral, suggesting that they possess a spiritual and religious value far above their economic usefulness. When we say that human activity degrades the environment, we are often referring to the loss of or disrespect for intrinsic value. When sections of the CHAPTER 6 BIOCENTRIC ETHICS AND THE INHERENT VALUE OF LIFE 131 9781285028330, Environmental Ethics, Fifth Edition, Desjardins – © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. Grand Canyon are eroded by flooding caused by water released from hydroelectric dams upriver, when acid rain eats away at ancient architecture in Greece and
Rome, or when shorelines are replaced by boardwalks and casinos, human activity destroys some of the intrinsic goods that we find in nature. For a number of philosophers working in environmental ethics, the greatest challenge is to develop an account of intrinsic value that can counter arguments based on instrumental values. As we saw in Chapter 5, John Passmore calls for an emphasis on the sensuous to offset the materialism and greed dominant in modern
culture. After criticizing the dominant economic model (which recognizes only instrumental value), Mark Sagoff summons philosophers to articulate the cultural, aesthetic, historical, and ethical values that underlie our environmental commitments. These values, Sagoff tells us, determine not just what we want as a people but what we are. The development of a more systematic environmental philosophy, then, often involves a shift from a narrow focus on moral standing or moral rights and responsibilities to a more general discussion of value, especially intrinsic value. Unfortunately, appeals to intrinsic value often meet with skepticism. We
seem to lack the language for expressing intrinsic value. Many people think that such value is merely subjective, a matter of personal opinion: “Beauty is in the eye of the beholder.” Thus, when a measurable instrumental value (such as profit) conflicts with intangible and elusive intrinsic value (such as the beauty of a wilderness), the instrumental value too often wins by default. The remainder of this chapter considers various views that reflect the conviction that life itself possesses intrinsic value and that, accordingly, humans have some responsibilities to it.
6.3 BIOCENTRIC ETHICS AND THE REVERENCE FOR LIFE The term biocentric ethics refers to any theory that views all life as possessing intrinsic value. (The word biocentric means life-centered.) Thus, although someone like Tom Regan is willing to attribute an inherent worth to some animals, his view is not biocentric, because it does not include all living things. Kenneth Goodpaster’s focus on life itself as sufficient for moral considerability is biocentric. An early version of a biocentric ethics is Albert Schweitzer’s “reverence for life” principle. Schweitzer (1875–1965) wrote extensively about religion, music, ethics, history, and philosophy. He also, of course, devoted much of his life to bringing medical care to remote and isolated communities in Africa. His ethics, captured in the phrase reverence for life, is an extremely interesting precursor of contemporary biocentric ethics. Schweitzer’s was an active and full life committed to caring and concern for others. Yet he was also a prolific writer, who devoted many volumes to diagnosing the ethical ills of modern society and seeking a cure for them. Reverence for life was the attitude that he believed offered hope to a world beset with conflict. It is worth our while to examine briefly Schweitzer’s diagnosis and cure.8 132 PART III THEORIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 9781285028330, Environmental Ethics, Fifth Edition, Desjardins – © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. Modern industrial society had moved away from a worldview that connected
the goodness of life with the goodness of nature. This belief, which Schweitzer called world-and-life-affirmation, is reminiscent of the natural law tradition in ethics. The rise of science and technology and the industrialized society that accompanied them severed the connection between ethics and nature by viewing nature as an indifferent, value-free, mechanical force. Modern science often views nature as a machine, governed by physical and mechanical laws. There is no good (nor, for that matter, any evil) intrinsic in nature itself. Set adrift in such a world, human ethics is left without foundation. Ethical value becomes no more than personal opinion or sentiment. Modern industrial society, with its wars, impersonal bureaucracies, meaningless work, and cultural decay, is the result of this separation. Schweitzer’s ethical thinking sought to re-establish the bond between nature and ethics. Yet, having spent time traveling in the most remote sections of Africa, Schweitzer did not deceive himself that nature is benign and gentle. He had been made more than aware of the destructive and arbitrary power of nature. He was nonetheless convinced that there was good in nature, an intrinsic value that could help provide a basis for human ethics. The idea that Schweitzer developed to solve this issue is captured by his phrase reverence for life. Schweitzer describes in almost mystical terms the moment that this idea
came to him. While riding on a barge traveling upriver in Africa, “at the very moment when, at sunset, we were making our way through a herd of hippopotamuses, there flashed upon my mind, unforeseen and unsought, the phrase reverence for life.”9 What does reverence for life mean? Schweitzer’s original German phrase was ehrfurcht vor dem leben. Ehrfurcht implies an attitude of awe and wonder. Although reverence perhaps connotes a religious tone that is not present in ehrfurcht, it seems clear that Schweitzer had something like this in mind. The etymological roots of ehrfurcht suggest a combined attitude of honor and fear. It would not be misleading to think of the attitude often inspired by majestic vistas from atop high mountains or the attitude inspired by violent storms. Schweitzer held that the most fundamental fact of human consciousness is the
realization that “I am life which wills to live, in the midst of life which wills to live.”10 Ethics begins when we become fully aware and fully in awe of that fact. The man who has become a thinking being feels a compulsion to give to every will-to-live the same reverence for life that he gives to his own. He experiences that other life in his own. He accepts as being good: to preserve
life, to promote life, to raise to its highest value of life which is capable of development; and as being evil: to destroy life, to injure life, to repress life which is capable of development. This is the absolute, fundamental principle of the moral.11 In our terms, Schweitzer is claiming that all living things have an intrinsic value, a value that commands our awe and reverence. Life is not a neutral, value-free “fact” of the universe. Life is good in itself. It is inspiring and deserving
of respect. CHAPTER 6 BIOCENTRIC ETHICS AND THE INHERENT VALUE OF LIFE 133
9781285028330, Environmental Ethics, Fifth Edition, Desjardins – © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. Critics are quick to caricature the “reverence for life” ethic. Is Schweitzer suggesting that the life of a virus or of bacteria is as worthy as human life? Does he suggest that we treat the life of an ant with as much respect as we treat human life? If not, does he offer any formula for resolving conflicts between human life and the life of, for example, the HIV virus? Would the existence of artificial synthetic life change one’s attitude towards life? Schweitzer lived his life in a manner that many people would find overly demanding. He would go to great lengths to avoid killing even mosquitoes,
going so far as to carry them out of the room rather than swat them. Even when fighting disease-carrying mosquitoes, he was reluctant to kill. He resisted using DDT, for example, because he mistrusted the way it killed indiscriminately. Nevertheless, Schweitzer was not naive about the necessity of sometimes taking lives, especially out of reverence for other lives. To maintain life, other life must be sacrificed as food. He was also willing to take an animal’s life to end its suffering.12 But this does not mean that Schweitzer defended some formula or rule to be
applied in cases of conflict to establish priorities. Such a hierarchy would undermine the foundation of the “reverence for life” ethic, by suggesting that some rule or criterion is more fundamental than reverence itself. It would also downplay the serious dilemma that we often face when we must take life. A principle or rule that unequivocally resolves conflict would suggest that any ethical conflict is only apparent and not real. Schweitzer did not envision reverence for life merely as some rule that we could apply to specific situations and, as it were, simply be read as the recommended decision. Reverence for life is more an attitude that determines who we
are than a rule for determining what we should do. It describes a character trait or a moral virtue rather than a rule of action. A morally good person stands in awe of the inherent worth of each life. But what does this say about those circumstances in which the good person must choose to kill? What about the doctor who kills a virus? The butcher who kills a pig? The farmer who cuts down a tree? Schweitzer denies that we can escape responsibility for these decisions. They must be made, but they should be made responsibly and consciously. Reverence for life is that character trait that sensitizes us to our responsibility for these decisions. It is an attitude that
makes us aware of the full implications of these decisions. It makes us reluctant to take a life randomly, callously, or without remorse. In doing this, it helps us live an authentic and moral life. It is an interesting exercise to consider how the creation of life forms in a laboratory might affect our attitude towards life. Natural life was created and evolved over eons, and any number of countless factors could have changed the course of history. Still, against all this, life does exist, life continues to evolve. In the face of such wonder, humans might take a more humble attitude towards their place in the universe. Yet, if these same humans can create life in a lab,
perhaps life itself is not so special, not so valuable. And perhaps humans are more unique, and should be more proud, than otherwise thought. Schweitzer’s ethical views are richly textured and firmly based in the experiences of many years in the African wilderness. Yet these views never attained 134 PART III THEORIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 9781285028330, Environmental Ethics, Fifth Edition, Desjardins – © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization. wide popularity among either the public or philosophers. Perhaps the tendency to see such a perspective as overly romantic or naive is too common and too great an obstacle. Schweitzer also never developed the type of scholarly defense of this position that professional philosophers demand. However, recent biocentric
theories may be more persuasive. 6.4 ETHICS AND CHARACTER Before moving to more recent biocentric views, it may be helpful to reflect for a moment on a philosophical issue that underlies this discussion. In the opening section of this chapter, we suggested that recent environmental philosophies represent a break with many traditional theories. Since that time, we have seen hints of what this might involve, and developing these hints at this point will prove useful. As we discussed in Chapter 2, many defenders of traditional ethical theories, such as utilitarianism, deontology, and natural law, treat the fundamental question of ethics as “What should I do?” The goal of ethics is to articulate and defend rules or principles that can guide our behavior. The philosopher’s job, then, is to justify those rules by demonstrating why all rational people should act in accordance with them. For most philosophers in these traditions, this task ultimately requires showing that obeying them is in a person’s rational self-interest.13 Given this approach to ethics, we can understand why many people would have difficulty accepting Schweitzer’s views on the reverence for life. If we do treat Schweitzer’s view as a rule for guiding our actions, reverence for life might well commit us to the type of counterintuitive positions we mentioned at the end of the previous section. But Schweitzer did not offer reverence for life as an ethical rule. Reverence for life would be a fundamental attitude that we would take toward the world. In this sense, Schweitzer’s ethics focused not on the question of what I should do but on what type of person I should be. His was not an ethics solely of rules as much as it was an ethics of character, seeking first to describe morally good people in terms of their character, dispositions, and values, rather than in terms of their actions. This shift represents a return to the tradition of virtue ethics described in Chapter 2. An ethics of virtue emphasizes moral character or virtues rather than rules or principles. Ethical systems such as utilitarianism, deontology, and natural law focus on human actions and seek to defend some rule or principle that we use
to judge whether those actions are right or wrong. Virtue-based ethics constructs
a philosophical account of the morally good person, describing and defending
certain character traits of that good person. Like Aristotle’s, most virtue-based
theories are teleological. Virtues are distinguished from vices (the opposite of virtues)
by their connection with attainment of some human telos, or fulfillment.
For Aristotle, the virtues were those character traits and dispositions that enable
people to live a meaningful and fulfilling human life.
Keep this distinction in mind as we examine more recent environmental
philosophies. Many of these emerging philosophies are not simply proposing
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alternatives to the rules or principles advanced by utilitarianism or deontology.
Instead, they require us to make a shift in our philosophical perspective—a shift
away from a concern with rules of behavior toward a concern with moral
character.
These shifts require not only a different view of the environment but, at
least as important, a different view of ourselves. Recall that Mark Sagoff tells us
that a satisfactory environmental ethics must address not only those values that
determine what we want but also those values that determine what we are.
Implicit in this distinction is the recognition that our identity as a person is constituted
in part by our values and attitudes. A person’s character—those dispositions,
relationships, attitudes, values, and beliefs that popularly might be called a
“personality”—is not some feature that remains independent of that person’s
identity. Character is not like a suit of clothes that the self steps into and out of
at will. Rather, the self is identical to a person’s most fundamental and enduring
dispositions, attitudes, values, and beliefs. Thus, when an environmental philosophy
requires that we change our fundamental attitude toward nature, it is requiring
quite literally that we change ourselves.
Note how this shift changes the nature of justification in ethics. If, as seems
true in many traditional ethical theories, justification of some rule requires that it
be tied to self-interest, we should not be surprised to find that this justification
often fails. Ethical controversies often involve a conflict between self-interest and
ethical values. Consider how we would “justify” the reverence for life. For a self
that does not already include a disposition to treat life with reverence, the only
avenue open for justification would involve showing how the disposition serves
some other interest of the self. Why should I, if I have not already embraced the
principle of treating life with reverence, do so now? The only way to answer this
question appears to be to show how it is in my self-interest to adopt this attitude.
But this means connecting the attitude to, in Sagoff’s terms, those values that
determine what we want instead of those that determine what we are. And this
is to say that reverence for life must be reducible to some instrumental value. We
should adopt the attitude of reverence because it, in some way, serves our purposes
or satisfies our wants. Of course, this is exactly what the “reverence for life” ethic
denies. Life has intrinsic value. It is much more than merely instrumentally valuable.
On the other hand, for the person already characterized by a reverence for
life, the question of justification is less relevant. If one of my fundamental attitudes
is a reverence for life, the question of why I should revere life ordinarily
would not arise.14 Thus, justification for an ethics that requires a fundamental
shift in moral attitude involves something other than an appeal to self-interest.
6.5 TAYLOR’S BIOCENTRIC ETHICS
Paul Taylor’s 1986 book Respect for Nature offered one of the most fully developed
and philosophically sophisticated contemporary defenses of a biocentric
ethics. Although Schweitzer tried to explain what reverence for life means and
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what practical implications follow from this attitude, he never provided an adequate
justification for adopting it. Part of the strength of Taylor’s view lies in his
careful exposition of why it is reasonable to adopt the attitude of respect for
nature. For this reason, we will concentrate on his view as our example of biocentric
ethics.
As a biocentric theorist, Taylor seeks a systematic and comprehensive
account of the moral relations that exist between humans and other living things.
Taylor sees this relationship as being based on the inherent worth of all life.
The central tenet of the theory of environmental ethics that I am defending
is that actions are right and character traits are morally good in virtue of their
expressing or embodying a certain ultimate moral attitude, which I call
respect for nature.15
Taylor’s explanation and defense of this theory proceed through a number of
steps. He first argues that it is meaningful to say that all living things have a
good of their own. All living things can be said to have a good of their own
because all living things are, in Taylor’s phrase, “teleological centers of life.”
Taylor believes that this “good” is a simple fact that follows from living beings
having a life. An entity’s having a good of itself is necessary, but not sufficient,
for us to conclude that humans have any responsibility to that entity.16 To say
that an entity has inherent worth is to go beyond the factual claim that it has a
good and to make the normative claim that this entity deserves moral consideration
and that moral agents have duties toward it. We move from the descriptive
claim that a being has a good of its own to the normative claim that it possesses
inherent worth when we come to understand and accept what Taylor calls “the
biocentric outlook on nature.” To accept this outlook and recognize the inherent
worth of all living things is to adopt respect for nature as our “ultimate moral
attitude.” In turn, adopting this attitude means that we will act in morally
responsible ways toward the natural environment.
To understand Taylor’s views, we first need to distinguish things that have a
good of their own from things that do not. Taylor cites a child as a being with a
good of its own and a pile of sand as something to which it makes no sense to
ascribe goodness. Parental decisions aim to promote the child’s good. The child
is benefited when that good is furthered and is harmed when that good is frustrated.
On the other hand, it is meaningless to talk of the sand’s own good, as
though the sand itself could be harmed or benefited in any way.
Taylor next relies on a traditional philosophical distinction between real and
apparent good or between what he calls objective and subjective value concepts. A
thing’s good is not always identical with what that being believes is its good.
What appears to me (subjectively) to be good for me may not really (objectively)
be good for me. This distinction allows Taylor to include in his biocentric ethics
any being that has an objective good of its own. Because he ignores the concept of
apparent or subjective goods, he need not include only those beings that possess
the beliefs, interests, or desires presupposed in any account of subjective good.
What entities have an objective good of their own? Taylor’s answer is to be
found in the concept of a teleological center of a life. To understand this, it is
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helpful to draw some parallels with Schweitzer’s “reverence for life” ethics and
the natural law tradition of Aristotle. It also is informative to contrast what
Taylor says with the concept of a subject-of-a-life as Regan uses it in animal
rights ethics.
Let us begin with an example from Taylor.
Concerning a butterfly, for example, we may hesitate to speak of its interests
or preferences, and we would probably deny outright that it values anything
in the sense of considering it good or desirable. But once we come to
understand its life cycle and know the environmental conditions it needs to
survive in a healthy state, we have no difficulty in speaking about what is
beneficial to it and what might be harmful to it… . Even when we consider
such simple animal organisms as one-celled protozoa, it makes perfectly
good sense to a biologically informed person to speak of what benefits or
harms them, what environmental changes are to their advantage or disadvantage,
and what physical circumstances are favorable or unfavorable to
them. The more knowledge we gain concerning these organisms, the better
are we able to make sound judgments about what is in their interest or
contrary to their interest.17
This is something that most of us, at least when we are not caught in the
grip of a philosophical theory, would accept. It makes perfect sense to talk
about the good of any living thing. This good is objective in the sense that it
does not depend on anyone’s beliefs or opinions. It is a claim that biological evidence
can support. It is something that we can come to know. When we know
an entity’s good, we know what would be in that entity’s interests, even if the
being itself, such as a plant, has no conscious interests of its own. Thus even the
weekend gardener can meaningfully talk about compost being good for tomatoes,
pruning being good for an apple tree, drought being bad for vegetables,
aphids being bad for beans, and ladybugs being bad for aphids.
All living things have a good, because living beings are teleological centers of
life. Remember from the discussion of natural law ethics in Chapter 2 that the
Greek word telos is translated as “purpose,” or “goal,” or “end.” Aristotle was led
by his biological observations to claim that all living things act toward some distinctive
goal, or telos. Like Aristotle, Taylor claims that each species has a distinctive
nature that determines the specific good for that species. Unlike Aristotle, he
believes this nature need not be identified with the organism’s essence or soul.
For Taylor, this nature is more like the ecological niche or function fulfilled by
that species.
As the aphid and ladybug examples suggest, however, the good of one species
may not be good for another species. Each species has its specific end, but all
living things do have ends. In general, that end is growth, development, sustenance,
and propagation. Life itself is directional in the sense that it tends toward
this end. Each living thing is the center of this purposive activity. Each living
thing is the teleological center of a life.
Schweitzer’s phrase in this context was “I am life which wills to live in
the midst of life which wills to live.” So long as we do not assume that all
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things that “will to live” must do so consciously, Schweitzer’s thinking is
similar to Taylor’s on this point. Each living thing has its own good because,
as a living thing, each life has direction, a goal, a telos. This is true whether
or not the being itself is consciously aware of that fact. The will to live is
manifested in the biological processes of growth, development, propagation,
and sustaining life.
This view can be contrasted with Tom Regan’s defense of animal rights. In
Chapter 5, Regan argued that all beings that are subjects-of-a-life have the
inherent value that qualifies them for moral standing. (Regan’s use of “inherent
value” functions for him as “inherent worth” does in this chapter.) To be a
subject-of-a-life involves a complex set of characteristics that go beyond merely
being alive and merely being conscious. In this way, Regan defends moral standing
only for “mentally normal mammals of a year or more.” Taylor’s concept of
a teleological center of a life is more inclusive than Regan’s subject-of-a-life.
According to Taylor:
To say it is a teleological center of a life is to say that its internal functioning
as well as its external activities are all goal-oriented, having the constant
tendency to maintain the organism’s existence through time and to enable it
successfully to perform those biological operations whereby it reproduces its
kind and continually adapts to changing environmental events and conditions.
It is the coherence and unity of these functions of an organism, all
directed toward the realization of its good, that make it one teleological
center of activity.18
Like Regan, and unlike Aristotle and Schweitzer perhaps, Taylor is especially
careful in moving from the descriptive claim that some being has a good of its
own to the normative claim that we have ethical duties toward that being.19
According to Taylor, it is a matter of biological fact that living things have a
good of their own. But it is not an ethical good in the sense that this fact alone
does not commit us to any particular ethical stance toward living things. Having
a good of its own does not by itself confer moral standing on a being.
Taylor’s perspective explains the normative claims that all living things have
moral standing and that we have duties toward them by reference to the concept
of inherent worth. As he uses this phrase, inherent worth commits us to making
two further normative judgments: Entities with inherent worth deserve moral
consideration, and all moral agents have duties to respect that entity’s own
good.20 What is the connection between a thing’s having a good of its own
and its possessing inherent worth?
Having a good of its own makes it possible for a living thing to be the object
of human duties. That is, we can have duties to promote or preserve a being’s
good, only if it does, in fact, have a good of its own to be promoted. Having a
good of its own is therefore necessary for a being to possess inherent worth. But
it is not sufficient. The normative claim that living things have an inherent worth
is to be explained and justified by reference to what Taylor calls the biocentric
outlook. The biocentric outlook is a system of beliefs that conceptualizes our
relationship to other living things. It is a system of beliefs that provides a
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fundamental view of the natural world and our relationship to it. Once we adopt
this worldview, we see that treating all living things as possessing inherent worth
is the only way of treating them that makes sense. Only this way of understanding
them is consistent with the biocentric outlook.
The biocentric outlook on nature revolves around four central beliefs. First,
humans are seen as members of earth’s community of life in the same sense and
on the same terms as all other living things. Second, all species, including humans,
are part of a system of interdependence. Third, all living things pursue their own
good in their own ways (the “teleological center of life” belief). Finally, humans
are understood as not inherently superior to other living things.21
Taylor goes on to explain that the biocentric outlook is a way of conceiving
of nature that all rational and factually informed people should adopt. It is an
outlook that is firmly based on reasonable scientific evidence. Rejecting this outlook
would require us to give up or significantly revise a good deal of what the
science of ecology has learned. Once a person adopts this view, she or he will see
that recognizing the inherent worth of all living things is the only perspective on
life that is consistent with this outlook.
To regard living things as possessing inherent worth is to adopt the attitude
of respect for nature. It is to adopt a fundamental attitude toward nature that
establishes certain basic motivations and dispositions. To adopt this attitude is to
be disposed toward promoting and protecting the good of other living things,
simply because it is their good. It is to accept the good of other beings as a reason
for one’s own action.
Taylor’s biocentric ethics addresses a number of philosophical issues that
were missing in Schweitzer’s “reverence for life” ethics. Taylor’s account of
how the biocentric outlook makes the attribution of inherent worth to all living
things reasonable offers a rational basis for this belief that is lacking in Schweitzer’s.
Likewise, his description of inherent worth and a good of one’s own adds much to
the philosophical debate. It remains for Taylor to turn to issues of normative ethics
and offer more practical advice.
6.6 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Taylor’s normative ethics focuses on two basic issues: the general rules or duties
that follow from the attitude of respect for nature, and priority rules for resolving
conflicts between the ethical claims of humans and those of other living things.
Let us briefly review these normative implications as an example of how more
recent ethical thinking might be applied to environmental practice.
Taylor develops four general duties that follow from the attitude of respect
for nature. They are the rules of nonmaleficence, noninterference, fidelity, and restitutive
justice.22 As the term suggests, the duty of nonmaleficence requires that we
do no harm to any organism. Taylor understands this as a negative duty. That is,
we have the duty to refrain from any act that would harm an organism with a
good of its own. We do not, however, have the positive duty to prevent any
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harms that we are not causing. Nor do we have the duty to reduce suffering or
aid the organism in attaining its own good. Finally, like all duties, this requirement
applies only to moral agents. For example, except for humans, predatory
animals cannot be required to refrain from harming their prey.
The rule of noninterference also establishes negative duties. By this rule, we
are required not to interfere with the freedom of individual organisms or, in
general, with ecosystems or biotic communities. Because humans can interfere
with individual organisms in a variety of ways, a variety of specific duties follow
from this general rule. We should neither actively prevent organisms from freely
pursuing their good nor act in such a way as to deny them the necessities
required to attain that goal. Thus we should not trap or enslave organisms or
do anything that would deny them health or nutrition.
The duty of noninterference requires that we “not try to manipulate, control,
modify, or ‘manage’ natural ecosystems or otherwise intervene in their normal
functioning.”23 Finally, because this is a negative duty, we have no positive
obligation to help such organisms fulfill their telos, except where our own actions
are the cause of the harm.
Taylor applies the rule of fidelity only to animals that live in the wild.
Respect for nature requires that we not deceive or betray wild animals. Most
hunting, fishing, and trapping—and much of the enjoyment and challenge of
these activities—involve the attempt to deceive and then betray wild animals.
As in any case of deception, the deceiver assumes a superiority over the
deceived. The deceived, whether an animal or another human, is taken to
have a lower worth than the deceiver. Although hunting, fishing, and trapping
also typically involve violating the duties of nonmaleficence and noninterference,
breaking the rule of fidelity is yet another way of showing disrespect for
nature.
The fourth rule, the duty of restitutive justice, requires that humans who
harm other living organisms make restitution to those organisms. Justice demands
that when a moral subject has been harmed, the agent responsible for that harm
make reparations for the harm. In general, the first three duties establish the basic
moral relationship between humans and other living organisms. When any of
these rules is violated, the rule of restitutive justice requires that the moral balance
between the two be restored. Thus, if we destroy an animal’s habitat, justice
demands that we restore it. If we capture or trap an animal or a plant, justice
demands that we return it to its natural environment.
Finally, Taylor argues for a priority relation for these four rules. He believes
that the duty of nonmaleficence is our “most fundamental duty to nature.” He
also believes that with careful attention, we can minimize conflicts involving the
other three. However, when conflicts cannot be avoided and when significant
good can result without permanent harm, restitutive justice outweighs fidelity,
which outweighs noninterference.
Perhaps the greatest challenge to any biocentric ethics arises when human
interests conflict with the interests of nonhumans. In many ways, this is the primary
test of any environmental philosophy, and it is typically the major motivation
behind any attempt to develop an environmental philosophy. What is to be
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done when important human interests come into conflict with the welfare of
nonhuman organisms?
We need to recognize that in order to remain consistent with the fundamental
principle of biocentric ethics, any resolution of such conflicts must not
privilege human interests. That is, we cannot accept as a solution any decision
that grants an in-principle advantage to humans. Any solution to conflict must
respect the inherent moral worth of nonhumans.
We thus recognize that many moral conflicts and dilemmas would not arise
within an anthropocentric framework. It is only after we acknowledge the inherent
worth of other living things that a wide variety of conflicts can arise. Taylor
mentions several as examples: filling in a wetland to build a marina, bulldozing a
meadow of wildflowers to build a shopping mall, plowing a prairie to plant
wheat or corn, and strip-mining a mountainside.
These activities raise moral problems only when we acknowledge that they
create significant harm to other living organisms. But how do we resolve these
conflicts without automatically favoring humans?
Following a long tradition in liberal political philosophy, Taylor argues for
several formal or procedural rules to provide fair and impartial resolution of
these conflicts. These rules are (1) self-defense, (2) proportionality, (3) minimum
wrong, (4) distributive justice, and (5) restitutive justice. Self-defense
would justify favoring human interests when the conflicting interests of nonhuman
organisms threaten or endanger human health or life. Thus we would be
justified in killing an attacking grizzly bear or exterminating an infectious
organism or insect. As in the case of human self-defense, this principle holds
only as a last resort.
The other four principles come into play when no serious harm to humans
is threatened. They all rely on a distinction between basic interests and nonbasic
interests. The principles of proportionality and minimum wrong govern those
cases in which the basic interests of nonhumans conflict with the nonbasic interests
of humans. In this case, if the nonbasic human interest is incompatible with
the basic interests of nonhumans, the principle of proportionality prohibits us
from satisfying the (nonbasic) human interests at the expense of the (basic) nonhuman
interests. Thus, for example, human interest in killing reptiles to make
fashionable shoes and handbags is prohibited, via the principle of proportionality,
by the respect for nature.
When nonbasic human interests can be made compatible with the basic
interests of nonhumans, even though they threaten or endanger the nonhumans,
the principle of minimum wrong sets the conditions for satisfying human interests.
Thus the respect for nature might allow damming a river for a hydroelectric
power plant even, when this will adversely affect other living things.
The principle of distributive justice sets the conditions for resolving conflicts
between the basic interests of humans and nonhumans. In general, fairness
demands that burdens be shared equally and that the distribution of benefits
and burdens be accomplished impartially. Finally, restitutive justice demands
that restitution be made whenever a resolution of conflict fails to meet the conditions
established by the principles of minimum wrong or distributive justice.
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6.7 CHALLENGES AND DEVELOPMENTS
Even Taylor’s careful defense of biocentric ethics faces serious challenges. First,
there are several practical challenges to his conclusions. For example, the emphasis
on noninterference as a major normative principle suggests a view of humans
and nature that is questionable at best. To say that we ought not to “interfere
with” nature implies that humans are somehow outside of or distinct from
nature: Humans are separate from nature, so we should leave natural processes
alone. Thus the claim is that environmental change—or even environmental
destruction—is allowable (good?), if it results from natural processes. Change or
destruction is wrong, if it results from human interference. But surely humans are
as much a part of natural processes as any other organism. Accordingly, the fact
that change is brought about by humans should not in itself have any ethical
implications.
Other challenges center on Taylor’s emphasis on individual organisms.
Inherent worth resides only in individual organisms. We have no direct duty to
ecosystems, nonliving objects, or species, for example. Thus, although Taylor’s
biocentrism is nonanthropocentric, it remains individualistic. Several problems
follow from this.
First, Taylor’s ethics tends to assume an adversarial relationship between individuals.
By focusing on individuals, each pursuing its own telos, Taylor assumes
that conflict and competition are the natural state of life. The challenge for biocentric
ethics, in this model, is to find a procedure for resolving these conflicts
impartially. We will see other philosophers suggest that a more holistic philosophy
would emphasize cooperation and mutual dependencies rather than conflict.
Further, the focus on individuals seems to place Taylor in a serious dilemma.
Consider one example. I am planning to dig up a small section of my front yard
and replace the lawn with a concrete and brick patio. In the process, I will be
destroying countless living things, from the individual blades of grass to millions
of microbiotic organisms. Does this action raise a serious moral conflict?
As we have seen, Taylor cannot simply grant the human interest priority
without abandoning his biocentric egalitarianism. Thus he would rely on the
distinction between basic and nonbasic interests and the principles of proportionality,
minimum wrong, and restitutive justice to resolve this conflict. Ultimately,
I will either be allowed to build the patio, or I will not.
If I am not allowed to build the patio, Taylor’s ethics may require too much
of us. This is more than simply saying that it is counterintuitive. (Taylor argues
that we have no reason to reject a conclusion solely because it is
counterintuitive.) Rather, Taylor’s standard would require a level of attention
and care far beyond the abilities of most people. (Should I refrain from walking
across my lawn, lest I create a path and thereby destroy countless blades of grass?
Do I really need to provide an ethical justification for eating vegetables?) It is
difficult to see how we could ever be justified in doing much of anything if we
treated all nonhuman life-forms as deserving moral consideration.
On the other hand, if I am allowed to build the patio, Taylor must show
exactly why such a nonbasic interest as this can override the basic interests of
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the grass and microorganisms. Clearly, we could never allow the mass killing of
humans for the sake of a patio, so in order to maintain the nonanthropocentrism,
we need strong justification for why patio construction is allowed in the case of
plants. Taylor seems to suggest that, finally, the principle of restitutive justice
comes into play. I can build the patio so long as I “restore the balance of justice
between us and them.” Because I unfortunately cannot restore the balance with
those organisms that I have destroyed, this option seems to imply that my duty is
to the organism’s species. Perhaps I ought to replant some grass elsewhere in my
yard. But this, of course, requires us to abandon the individualism on which
Taylor’s ethics rests.
A more general challenge returns to the discussion of teleology and biological
designs and purposes introduced in Chapter 2. Taylor’s view relies on inferring,
from certain biological facts, the conclusion that teleological centers of a life
have a good of their own. The biological sciences do commonly refer to an
object’s purpose, goals, or function, and in this sense, they also seem to adopt a
teleological framework. But does all goal-directed activity imply that the goal
must be understood as a “good.” Such an inference was made in the Aristotelian
and natural law traditions, but it is not obviously valid.
Consider the clear example of a human action that aims for some goal. Why
do we assume that this goal is a good thing? One explanation is that we assume
that any intentional act by conscious and rational agents is undertaken, because
that agent believes that the goal is, in some sense, good. Almost by definition, a
rational person wouldn’t choose to do something, unless he or she believed that
it was the good thing to do. Aristotle himself argued that all acts aim for some
good. But if the subject is nonconscious and nonintentional, can we still conclude
that its goal is a good?
In contrast, consider the following examples from Chapter 2: “The purpose
of the kidney is to remove waste from the blood,” “The goal of brightly colored
plumage on male birds is to attract females,” “The function of a predator species
is to control the population of a prey species,” and “Wetlands function as flood
control and water-filtration systems.” Assuming that kidneys, bright plumage,
species, and wetlands do not consciously and intentionally choose the goals
they serve, it is less clear that attaining the goals does accomplish even a perceived
good. Only if some other value component is elsewhere assumed (for
example, that blood free from waste is good, that attracting females birds is
good, that controlling the population of a prey species is good, or that floods
are bad), can one conclude that attaining the goal is good. The question is
whether Taylor slips in such a value assumption with the concept of a biocentric
outlook and the attitude of respect for nature.
We can take a broader perspective on these challenges to Taylor by considering
the case of synthetic biology that was introduced in this chapter’s discussion
topic. For all practical purposes, scientists have created life, self-replicating, biological
organisms, in a laboratory. The existence of such artificial, synthetic life
raises questions for each of the four principles that Taylor identifies as comprising
the biocentric outlook and entailing an ethical respect for nature. First, Taylor
claims that this biocentric outlook assumes that humans are mere members, on
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equal terms, of the biotic community. But, this claim loses some credibility, if
humans are also creators of other members of the biotic community. Second,
Taylor claims that all life forms, having evolved together, are part of a single
system of interdependence. Yet, this is not true for synthetic life, which has
played no role in an interdependent system. Third, Taylor asserts that all living
beings have a good of their own and are “teleological centers of life.” Given that
humans have designed and created artificial life, a more plausible claim would be
that the good of synthetic life forms is confirmed, when they serve the purposes
for which humans have designed them. Finally, Taylor suggests that the biocentric
outlook asserts that human beings are not inherently superior to other life
forms. However, as creators of some life forms, one could argue that humans
are, at least for those organisms, inherently superior.
So, major challenge to any biocentric theory remains. Are we justified in
attributing a good to all living beings? Clearly, some things (Taylor’s example
was a pile of sand) have no good of their own. Clearly, other things do. Autonomous
human beings, who form and pursue their own purposes and goals, surely
have independent goods of their own. But do all living things have an independent
good? What distinguishes life from random change, such that interference
with one is a harm and with the other is not? It seems that unless we retrieve an
Aristotelian teleological biology in which living beings naturally move to fulfill
some natural end or adopt a “divine plan” version of natural law in which natural
functions are God’s design, it is not obvious that life left alone is good. Nor is
it obvious that artificial life has a good of its own. Some life (those beings with
their own purposes, for example) qualify, but others may not. The challenge
remains for biocentrists to explain and defend the sense that all living things
have a good intrinsic to their own life.
6.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The biocentric approach pushes the bounds of moral standing about as far as
they might ever go. All living beings, simply by virtue of being alive, have
moral standing. Biocentrists are surely right to focus attention on the value of
all living things. But the question is whether the value of life is moral value in
the sense of full moral standing or is a different, perhaps still anthropocentric
value. Reflecting on Schweitzer’s reverence for life calls to mind the spiritual,
symbolic, and aesthetic values discussed by Mark Sagoff. Perhaps not every
object with noninstrumental, intrinsic value should be included in the category
of moral standing.
Biocentrists also face the challenge arising from a more ecological point of
view. It is not at all clear that species or ecosystems can be incorporated into
the biocentric theory, because neither is alive in any straightforward sense.
According to many environmentalists, such ecological wholes should be the
primary focus of environmental ethics. We turn to these concerns in the following
chapters.
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NOTES
1. See, for example, E. O. Wilson,
“Threats to Biodiversity,” Scientific American 261 (September 1989): 108– 16; E. O. Wilson, “The Current State of Biological Diversity,” in Biodiversity, eds. E. O. Wilson and Frances
Peters (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1988); and John C.
Ryan, “Conserving Biological Diversity,” in State of the World 1992,
ed. Lester Brown (New York:
Worldwatch Institute, 1992), pp. 9–26.
For estimates of extinction rates
besides Wilson’s, see Dick Bryany,
Daniel Neilsen, and Laura Tangley,
The Last Frontier Forests (Washington,
D.C.: World Resources Institute,
1997), and United Nations Environmental
Program, Global Biodiversity
Assessment (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1995). The statement
on recovery rates is taken from
the work of James Kirchner, University
of California-Berkeley press
release, March 3, 2000, “New Study
Suggests Humans Will Not Live Long
Enough to See Earth Recover from
Mass Extinction.”
2. E. O. Wilson, “The Little Things That
Run the World,” address given at the
opening of the invertebrate exhibit,
National Zoological Park, Washington,
D.C., May 7, 1987. Reprinted in
The Environmental Ethics and Policy
Book, eds. Donald VanDeVeer and
Christine Pierce (Belmont, Calif.:
Wadsworth, 1994), p. 84.
3. http://www.jcvi.org/cms/fileadmin/
site/research/projects/first-selfreplicating-
bact-cell/press-releasefinal.
pdf.
4. All definitions were taken from
Synthetic Biology project website,
http://www.synbioproject.org/
topics/synbio101/definition/ accessed
June 13, 2011. A helpful ethical analysis
of synthetic biology is “The Ethics of
Synthetic Biology and Emerging
Technologies,” Presidential Commission
for the Study of Bioethical Issues,
Washington, D.C., December 2010.
Available at www.bioethics.gov.
5. See Christopher Stone, Earth and
Other Ethics: The Case for Moral
Pluralism (New York: Harper & Row,
1987). Moral pluralism is discussed in
Chapter 12.
6. Perhaps the best philosophical
account of the values that support a
comprehensive environmental ethics
can be found in the writings of
Holmes Rolston. See especially
Environmental Ethics (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1988).
7. The philosophical debate over the
meaning and legitimacy of instrumental,
intrinsic, and inherent value continues.
The understanding of instrumental
value is relatively trouble-free. In what
follows, I adopt Susan Armstrong and
Richard Botzler’s suggestion that an
“emerging consensus” is settling on the
meaning of intrinsic and inherent value.
In this view, intrinsic value is independent
of the presence of a valuer. An
object has intrinsic value when it has
value both in and for itself. Inherent
value, on the other hand, requires the
presence of a valuer who confers the
value on the object. Thus, although it
may be valued for its own sake (its value
does not come from its usefulness), it
does not have value in itself (if there
were no one around to value it, itwould
be without value). For example,
children have intrinsic value (they are
valued in and for themselves), whereas a
family heirloom has inherent value (it is
valued for itself and not for its economic
worth) but would be valueless, if there
were no family around to value it. If we
accept this distinction as meaningful,
the major question becomes whether
natural objects and nonhuman living
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beings have intrinsic value or inherent
value. For the emerging consensus
claim, see Susan Armstrong and Richard
Botzler, Environmental Ethics: Divergence
and Convergence (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1993), p. 53. For a defense of
intrinsic value, see Holmes Rolston,
Environmental Ethics (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1988). For a
defense of inherent value, identified as
intrinsic value in a “truncated sense,” see
J. Baird Callicott, “The Intrinsic Value
of Nonhuman Species,” in The Preservation
of Species, ed. Bryan Norton
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1986), Ch. 6.
8. The most comprehensive statement
of Schweitzer’s ethical views is found
in his Civilization and Ethics (London:
A. & C. Black, 1946). His autobiographical
Out of My Life and Thought,
trans. A. B. Lemke (New York: Holt,
1990), is also quite helpful. James
Brabazon’s biography, Albert Schweitzer:
A Biography (New York: Putnam,
1975) is a good secondary source.
9. Schweitzer, Out of My Life and
Thought, p. 130.
10. Ibid., 130.
11. Ibid., 131.
12. Brabazon, Albert Schweitzer: A Biography,
p. 257, reports that Schweitzer
was willing to kill his pelican when he
recognized that its injuries were
untreatable. The other anecdotes
reported in this paragraph are also
from Brabazon.
13. See Kenneth Goodpaster, “From
Egoism to Environmentalism,” in
Ethics and Problems of the Twenty-First
Century, eds. Kenneth Goodpaster
and Kenneth Sayre (Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1979), pp. 21–35.
14. Of course, people do have moments in
which their fundamental attitudes are
questioned. Such moments of existential
crisis, however, tend to reinforce
rather than counter the view that
no further justification can be given.
15. Paul Taylor, Respect for Nature
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1986), p. 80.
16. Here Taylor uses the phrase inherent
worth in roughly the same sense in
which I have been using intrinsic value.
An object with inherent worth possesses
a value that is independent of
any (other) valuer. It is to be valued
both in and for its own sake.
17. Taylor, Respect for Nature, pp. 66–67.
18. Ibid., 121–22.
19. For Tom Regan’s views on this
“naturalistic fallacy,” see The Case for
Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1983), pp. 247–48.
20. Taylor, Respect for Nature, p. 75.
21. Taylor, Respect for Nature, especially
Ch. 3, fully develops the biocentric
outlook.
22. Chapter 4 of Taylor, Respect for
Nature, fully presents these duties.
23. Ibid., 175.
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1. We use the word value both as a
noun and as a verb. Certain
objects are said to possess value,
and humans value numerous
objects. If no humans were
around to do the valuing, would
anything of value remain?
2. Compose a list of things that you
value. Distinguish those things
that you value instrumentally
from those things valued for
their own sake. How many different
types of value can you
think of?
CHAPTER 6 BIOCENTRIC ETHICS AND THE INHERENT VALUE OF LIFE 147
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3. Like Aristotle, Taylor suggests that
each species has a distinctive
nature that can best be identified
in terms of a characteristic activity.
How else might you distinguish
between species?
4. Taylor relies on a distinction
between basic and nonbasic
interests to mediate conflicting
interests. Do you find this
distinction helpful? What are
some basic human interests?
What are some nonbasic human
interests? Do basic interests always
override nonbasic interests?
5. In Taylor’s account, does it make
sense to attribute interests or goods
to a wilderness area, to a river, or to
other ecosystems? Can such things
be teleological centers of life?
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